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CEO narcissism in M&A decision-making and its impact on firm performance 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a large sample of about 1,900 M&A deals from 1993 to 2005, and data on more 
than 3,100 CEOs, I explore merger and acquisition activities from a psychological 
perspective, and provide another explanation for M&A motives and associated firm 
stock performance. Specifically, I empirically test if highly narcissistic CEOs are more 
likely to conduct mergers or acquisitions than lowly narcissistic CEOs. I also examine 
the impact of high level of CEO narcissism on the market reaction to firm M&A 
announcements, and also long run post-M&A stock returns. In addition, I empirically 
investigate the impact of the parallel CEO narcissistic tendency of target firm on 
acquiring firm M&A performance. Three proxies for CEO narcissism are used in this 
study: Holder67, a CEO option exercise-based measur, CEO media portrayal, and a 
third new measure based on the formal content analysis of actual CEO speech.  
 
I find empirical evidence that CEOs with high level of narcissism are more likely to 
conduct mergers and acquisitions than other CEOs. My results also suggest that a high 
level of acquiring firm CEO narcissism has a significantly negative impact on acquiring 
firm short run M&A performance. Post-acquisition, I find that deals conducted by highly 
narcissistic CEOs significantly underperform those by lowly narcissistic CEOs. 
Moreover, my results show that a high level of target firm CEO narcissism similarly 
negatively affects acquiring firm short run M&A performance.  
 
In an additional analysis, I find that the positive link between CEO narcissism and the 
likelihood of a CEO conducting an M&A deal is stronger and the impact of CEO 
narcissism on firm M&A performance is more negative n large firms than that in 
smaller firms. My results also show that the negative impact of CEO narcissism on firm 
short run M&A performance is strongest when both acquiring firm and target firm CEO 
narcissism coexist concurrently. However, I find that the level of CEO narcissism is 
negatively associated with the quality of corporate governance, and the positive link 
between CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO conducting an M&A deal is 
weaker in firms with good corporate governance than t t in firms with poorer corporate 
governance, which may suggest that effective corporate governance mechanisms might 
play positive roles in curbing CEO narcissistic tend cies and in helping to ameliorate, 
to some extent, the adverse impact of high level of CEO narcissism on firm M&A 
decision making.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
This chapter introduces the thesis together with the background and motivation for 
the research. The chapter consists of seven sections. Section 1.1 introduces the 
background to this research. Section 1.2 presents the research gaps and raises my 
research questions. On the basis of the research questions, Section 1.3 clarifies the 
aims of this research. Section 1.4 outlines the resarch approach. An overview of the 
key findings is provided in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 states the research contributions 
and outlines the suggestions for future research. Finally, Section 1.7 introduces the 
basic structure of the thesis.   
 
1.1 Background of this study  
 
The strategic management and psychology literature views managers as being prone 
to a high degree of narcissism in their personalities, and this narcissistic tendency is 
particularly widespread among CEOs. One reason is that such personality traits of 
high narcissism (HN) managers, such as high levels of outward self-confidence, 
enthusiasm, and a strong drive to attain prestige, help such individuals to rise to 
powerful positions within an organization (Lubit, 2002). As a result, HN managers 
are more likely to become CEOs than low narcissism (LN) managers. The literature 
suggests that a narcissistic personality can play an important role in CEO 
decision-making, and consequently have a significant impact on firm performance. 
As HN CEOs have very inflated self-views (Campbell, Goodie, and Foster, 2004), 
they tend to be overconfident in their abilities to achieve positive results. Their 
excessive optimism and self-confidence, together with their intense need for attention 
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and applause, another important trait of a narcissist c personality, can thus lead CEOs 
to engage in dramatic and attention-attracting behaviours, such as mergers and 
acquisitions (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). The aim of this study is to explore 
empirically the role and impact of such a CEO narcissistic tendency in M&A activity.  
 
M&A activity is one of the best studied phenomena i finance, and there is an 
extensive research literature exploring both the acquiring firm long run 
post-acquisition performance and short run announcement period performance. The 
majority of studies report negative abnormal returns over the longer-term post-M&A 
time horizon, which suggests that M&A deals at the aggregate level underperform in 
the long run. However, although the research results about M&A short run 
(announcement) performance are more mixed, nonetheless, many studies that find 
positive announcement returns also suggest that those f r the acquiring firms are 
very small and almost all of the gains go to the target firms (Asquith, 1983; Bradley, 
Desai, and Kim, 1983).  
 
So, if there is no gain for acquiring firm shareholders, why do we observe so many 
mergers and acquisitions occurring in the market place? What are the real drivers of 
these deals? What are the factors that lead to the generally negative long run 
post-acquisition performance? Various interpretations are offered in the literature 
from the traditional finance perspective, which assume that managers always make 
rational M&A decisions; however this may not always be the case in reality. In this 
study, I explore the potential role that CEO narcissistic tendencies, as characterized 
by an inflated sense of self-importance, overestimation of self-ability and 
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achievement, and excessive seeking of admiration (Lubit, 2002), may play in helping 
to explain such paradoxical M&A behaviour.   
 
As early as 1986, Richard Roll proposed a “hubris hypothesis” for takeovers. He 
argues that the hubris of the individual decision makers in the bidding firms may 
result in overbidding. Since then, more and more academics have begun to study the 
apparent M&A “anomaly” from a behavioural perspective, arguing, for example, that 
managers may be prone to such cognitive biases as overconfidence in their 
acquisition decisions. Based on a sample of 330 takeovers, Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) report evidence that hubris drives many takeover decisions. Fanto 
(2001) also provides evidence of the presence of behavioural biases (or 
psychological factors) during the decision-making process of mega-mergers, in his 
psychologically-oriented study. In particular, he reports the existence of 
over-optimism bias in the Banc One/FC deal (1998), Daimler/Chrysler deal (1998), 
NationsBank/BA (1998), Norwest/Wells Fargo (1998), Travelers/Citicorp (1998), 
MCI/Sprint deal (1999), Qwest/US West deal (1999), AOL/TW (2000), Chase/J.P. 
Morgan (2000), Chevron/Texaco (2000), and Firstar/U.S. Bancorp (2000). 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) conduct an empirical study to explore whether CEO 
overconfidence is related to the likelihood of conducting an M&A deal, and the 
associated market reaction to the announcement even, usi g a sample of 477 large 
Forbes firms from 1980 to 1994. Their results suggest that CEO overconfidence can 
be one of the drivers of the merger decision and it has a negative impact on firm 
short run stock price performance around the announcement date of the deal, 
consistent with Roll (1986).  
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However, the psychology and management literature (e.g. Kets de Vries, 1990) 
argues that a narcissistic personality stirs hubris or overconfidence and it is the more 
ingrained trait (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). Therefore, in this study, I treat 
hubris or overconfidence as a trait of narcissism and thus work with the term 
“narcissism”, staying away from the label “hubris” or “overconfidence”. Further 
justification of my use of the term “narcissism” and more discussion about the 
associated conceptual issues are presented in section 2.3.3.2.  
 
1.2 Research gaps and research questions 
 
Based on a comprehensive review of the extant literature, I identify five research 
gaps.  
 
First, very limited attempts have been made to study empirically the role and impact 
of a CEO narcissistic personality in the context of M&A deals based on a large recent 
sample of firms across the full size spectrum.  
 
Second, prior studies mainly focus on the effects of CEO overconfidence on firm 
short run M&A performance, and very few researchers have looked at the impact of 
such overconfidence on firm long run post-acquisition performance.  
 
Third, previous studies only consider the CEO overconfidence in acquiring firms, 
failing to take any parallel bias among target firm CEOs into account when 
examining the impact of CEO overconfidence on firm performance. 
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Fourth, extant work is constrained to use imperfect and indirect proxies for CEO 
overconfidence. Some of these proxies may suffer from the “non-deal-specific” 
problem, which therefore calls for the development of a “deal-specific measure.   
 
Finally, the terms “hubris” and “overconfidence”, widely used in the finance area, are 
very loose concepts and their definitions are inconsistent in the extant literature. 
Some academics (Kwan and colleagues, 2004) claim that many inconsistent findings 
and arguments about “hubris” or “overconfidence” may result from the obscure 
definitions of these concepts, as most previous related studies tend to use these 
different definitions interchangeably. The problems associated with the use of such 
loose and ill-defined terms call for a more fundamental and coherent concept – 
narcissism. 
 
To fill these research gaps, I conduct an empirical study to explore the link between 
the level of CEO narcissism and the likelihood of the CEO conducting an M&A deal, 
and to examine the impact of such a narcissistic tendency (of both acquiring firm 
CEOs and target firm CEOs) on acquiring firm short run M&A announcement 
performance and long run post-acquisition performance, using a large recent sample 
of 2,129 firms across the full size spectrum from 1993 to 2005.  
 
Specifically, the following four main research questions are raised in this study: (1) 
Are highly narcissistic CEOs more likely to conduct M&A deals than lowly 
narcissistic CEOs? (2) What is the impact of the degre  of acquiring firm CEO 
narcissism on the market reaction to the M&A announcement? (3) What is the impact 
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of the extent of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm long run 
post-acquisition performance? (4) What is the impact of the level of target firm CEO 
narcissism on acquiring firm M&A performance?  
 
Besides the four main research questions, in order to further investigate the impact of 
CEO narcissism on M&A activities in firms of differnt sizes, the relationship 
between the quality of corporate governance and CEO narcissism, and the impact of 
concurrent coexistence of acquiring firm CEO narcissism and target firm CEO 
narcissism, I also raise three additional questions as follows: (1) Does CEO 
narcissism in large firms have the same (or same degree of) impact on M&A 
decision-making and firm performance as that in small firms? (2) Can good 
corporate governance help to ameliorate the potential adverse consequences (if any) 
of CEO narcissism on shareholder wealth in the context of M&A? (3) What is the 
impact of CEO narcissism on firm M&A performance when such narcissistic 
tendency exists in both the acquiring firm and the target firm concurrently?      
 
In addition, I introduce into my study the psychology-based concept “narcissism” 
which has already been widely applied in the manageri l literature. I also attempt to 
measure this personality construct more directly by content analyzing the CEO’s 
actual narratives about the particular M&A deal. 
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1.3 Research aims 
 
Based on my research questions, I further refine my research aims as follows:  
 
(1) To empirically test the link between CEO narcissism and the probability of a 
CEO conducting M&A deals and provide new evidence based on a large sample of 
firms and CEOs.  
 
(2) To investigate if the market reacts to the M&A deals conducted by highly 
narcissistic CEOs and those by lowly narcissistic CEOs differently. If it does, what is 
the relationship between the market reaction and the level of CEO narcissism? 
Positive or negative? 
 
(3) To explore empirically the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on acquiring 
firm performance over the two-year post-acquisition time window, controlling for 
other factors.  
 
(4) To test if CEO narcissistic tendency in target firm has any effects on acquiring 
firm short run and long run M&A performance by including the proxy variable of 
target firm CEO narcissism in my regression models.     
 
(5) To explore the role of corporate governance in helping ameliorate the potential 
negative impact (if any) of CEO narcissism in M&A activities. 
 
(6) To examine if CEO narcissism in large firms have the same (or same degree of) 
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impact on M&A decision-making and firm performance as that in small firms. 
 
(7) To construct a new content analysis-based measur  of CEO narcissism.  
 
1.4 Research approach 
 
The research method I use has three parts: (1) regression models to test the 
hypotheses I establish, (2) an event study approach, nd (3) the development of 
appropriate metrics to measure CEO narcissism.  
 
To address the questions and fill the research gaps,  et of hypotheses are 
established based on the extant literature in this area which are then tested through 
regression analyses. Two types of regression model are employed in this study – the 
logistic regression model and OLS multivariate regression model. The logistic 
regression is conducted to explore the role of CEO narcissism in the firm’s M&A 
decision-making, with the binary dependent variable equal to 1 if the firm announces 
at least one deal (successful bid and completed deal) in  specific firm year, and 0 
otherwise, and with the main independent dummy variable HN equal to 1 for a highly 
narcissistic CEO, and 0 otherwise, together with a group of control variables. The 
OLS multivariate regression models are employed to examine the potential impact of 
CEO narcissism on firm short run M&A performance and long run post-acquisition 
performance. The dependent variable in these regressions is either announcement 
period CAR (cumulative abnormal return) or post-acquisition BHAR (buy-and-hold 
abnormal return), which are derived using an event study approach.    
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To test the established hypotheses, I first need to address two methodological issues: 
how to calculate CAR and BHAR and how to construct the variable HN (the measure 
of CEO narcissistic tendency).  
 
In this research, the event study approach is employed to evaluate firm M&A 
announcement period, and long run post-acquisition performance. In the short run 
event study, I calculate the CARs of the acquiring f rms over the announcement time 
window based on the market model. For the purpose of robustness check, I use both 
the CRSP equally weighted and value weighted index as the market indices, and 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) and Scholes-Williams betas as the methods of 
parameter estimation of the market model. In the long run event study, I calculate the 
BHARs for the acquiring firms over a relatively long post-acquisition period, using 
the benchmark portfolio method, as introduced in section 4.3.3.  
 
Another important methodological issue in this study is the measure of CEO 
narcissism. Three alternative measures of CEO narcissism are employed, two 
non-M&A deal-specific measures of CEO narcissism already used in the literature, 
the Holder67 proxy (a CEO unexercised in-the-money option-based measure), and 
CEO portrayal in the financial press (CEO media portrayal keyword count), together 
with a new measure based on formal content analysis of actual CEO comments about 
the particular acquisition bid. The rationale of these measures and the way to 
construct them are detailed in section 4.2.  
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1.5 Main results  
 
A series of analyses are conducted to address my research questions. The key results 
are summarised in this section.  
 
In my first logistic regression analysis, aiming to investigate the link between the 
level of CEO narcissism and the likelihood of conducting an M&A deal, my results 
demonstrate that high narcissism CEOs are almost 40% more likely to conduct 
mergers and acquisitions than low narcissism CEOs, which is consistent with 
Malmendier and Tate’s (2008) finding and provides new supporting evidence for 
Roll (1986), Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2003), and Aktas et al (2005). This strong 
relationship between CEO narcissism and acquisitiveness behaviour might be 
interpreted in four ways. First of all, high narcissism CEOs might be more likely to 
conduct an M&A deal if they (often) mistakenly believe they can perform better than 
target firm CEOs due to their narcissistic personality inter alia characterised as 
excessive confidence in their own abilities. Second, such CEO narcissistic tendency 
may lead to an increase in the bid premium that the CEO is prepared to pay leading 
to an increase in the probability of winning the auction. Third, my results are also 
consistent with the proposition in the strategic management literature that high 
narcissism CEOs may be using M&A activity as a way of gaining attention and 
admiration. And finally, my findings may reflect such key characteristics of the 
narcissistic personality as “glory-building”, “excitement-seeking”, etc (Chatterjee 
and Hambrick, 2007; Lubit 2002). 
 
Besides the degree of CEO narcissism, I also find that some other factors have a 
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significant impact on firm acquisitiveness. First of all, my results suggest that the 
CEOs of larger firms are more likely to conduct M&A deals than the CEOs of small 
firms. This size effect can be explained in two ways. First, large firms usually have 
fewer financial constraints compared to small firms when making M&A decisions. 
Second, the CEOs of larger firms might have a greate  propensity to exhibit a high 
degree of narcissism because of their associated greater power, authority, reputation 
or public profile. In addition, I find that the firms with higher cash flows are more 
likely to conduct M&A deals, which is consistent with the traditional free cash flow 
hypothesis that firms with rich cash flow tend to invest more. Moreover, my results 
suggest that firms with a high Tobin’s Q are more lik ly to conduct M&A deals than 
those with a low Tobin’s Q, which can be explained by the Q theory of mergers 
(Servaes, 1991) that M&A activity can be a response to profitable reallocation 
opportunities.   
 
In my second regression analysis, I examine the impact of acquiring firm CEO 
narcissism on firm M&A announcement performance (short run performance). My 
results show a significant negative association betwe n the level of CEO narcissism 
and firm M&A announcement cumulative abnormal returns. I also calculate the 
average CAR for the deals conducted by high narcissism CEOs and by low 
narcissism CEOs respectively, and the results show t at the average (-1,+1) three-day 
CAR for the deals conducted by high narcissism CEOs is 61 basis points below that 
for the deals by low narcissism CEOs. These findings suggest a significant negative 
impact of CEO narcissism on acquiring firm short run (announcement) performance, 
consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2008). In this regression analysis, I also find 
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that the cumulative abnormal return over the announcement period for cash payment 
deals is higher than that for non-cash payment deals; the short run performance of 
small acquirers is better than that of large acquirers; and the market reaction to the 
deals conducted by firms with good corporate governance is better than that to the 
deals conducted by firms with poor corporate governance. The possible 
interpretations of these findings are detailed in Chapter 6.  
 
My third regression analysis aims to examine the eff cts of CEO narcissism on firm 
long run post-acquisition performance. I find a significantly negative relationship 
between acquiring firm CEO narcissism and a firm’s 2 year post-acquisition 
buy-and-hold abnormal return, and the results show that the M&A deals conducted 
by high narcissism CEOs significantly underperform those conducted by low 
narcissism CEOs in the (1, 24) month event window by between -1.7% and -2.4%. In 
the long run analysis, these findings support the propositions (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, 2007) that a CEO’s narcissistic tendency can destroy shareholder value in 
the long run. Besides CEO narcissism, I also find that CEO vested option holding is 
positively associated with firm long run post-acquisition performance; cash payment 
deals perform better in the long run; and an effectiv  corporate governance 
mechanism has a significant positive impact on firm long run post-acquisition 
performance. The explanations for these results are also presented in Chapter 6.  
 
My fourth and fifth regression analysis aim to explore the impact of target firm CEO 
narcissism on acquiring firm M&A announcement (short run) performance and its 
long run post-M&A performance. My results demonstrate  negative relationship 
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between the level of target firm CEO narcissism and acquiring firm M&A 
announcement period CAR across all my three models (ba ed on three alternative 
measures for CEO narcissism). These results thus sugge t that a high level of CEO 
narcissistic tendency in the target firm has a negative effect on the market reaction to 
the announcement of the M&A deal, which provides supporting evidence for the 
speculative proposition raised in the unpublished working paper of Malmendier and 
Tate (2003). This negative impact might be interpreted in terms of an “overpayment” 
argument that high narcissism target firm CEOs may believe that they can manage 
the firm at least as well as the bidding firms’ CEOs (or are more “entitled” to do this) 
and therefore require a higher bid premium, which may lead bidders to pay more 
than the optimal premium to win the deal. It seems that the market may be 
identifying such an overpayment and discount the value of the acquiring firm’s share 
accordingly. On the other hand, in the long run analysis, I do not find any significant 
impact of target firm CEO narcissistic tendency on the acquiring firm’s 2-year 
post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal return. However, it is possible that the 
impact of target firm CEO narcissism may be swamped by many other factors in the 
long run.       
 
Based on my main analyses, I also conduct a series of additional analyses to further 
explore the impact of CEO narcissism on M&A activities in firms of different sizes, 
the role and impact of corporate governance in curbing CEO narcissism and 
ameliorating associated adverse effects in M&A, andthe impact of the concurrent 
coexistence of acquiring firm CEO narcissism and target firm CEO narcissism on 
firm M&A performance. . 
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My first additional analysis is to address the question “Does CEO narcissism in large 
firms have the same (or same degree of) impact on M&A decision-making and firm 
performance as that in small firms?”. My results show that the positive link between 
CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO conducting a deal is stronger in large 
firms than that in small firms. I also find that CEO narcissism has more negative 
impact on firm short run and long run M&A performance in large firms than in small 
firms. It appears that the problems associated withthe high level of CEO narcissism 
in M&A activities are severer in large firms than i smaller firms. Higher CEO 
compensation and more public attention might be two possible explanations for these 
findings. CEOs of large firms usually have higher compensation and attract more 
public attention, compared with those of small firms. A CEO’s inflated self-image 
may be further reinforced by such high level of compensation and public attention, 
which may result in a higher degree of CEO narcissism and consequently cause a 
more negative impact on firm M&A decision-making and performance.  
 
My second additional analysis is to address the question “Can good corporate 
governance help to ameliorate the potential adverse consequences (if any) of CEO 
narcissism on shareholder wealth in the context of M&A?”. I report evidence that the 
level of CEO narcissism is negatively associated with the quality of corporate 
governance (measured as corporate governance index). In other words, a high level 
of CEO narcissism is associated with poor corporate governance, and a low level of 
CEO narcissism is associated with strong corporate gov rnance. Furthermore, in my 
logistic regression analysis, I find that the positive link between the level of CEO 
narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO conducting M&A deals is stronger in firms 
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with poor corporate governance than in firms with good corporate governance.  
 
These findings may suggest that effective corporate governance may help to curb 
CEO narcissism somewhat and mitigate its adverse impact in M&A decision-making 
to some extent. Strong corporate governance mechanisms may play important roles 
in dealing with the problems associated with high leve  of CEO narcissism in such 
ways as identifying highly narcissistic individuals t early stage and preventing them 
from rising to the position of CEO in the first place, removing value-destroying high 
narcissism CEOs before they do more harm, curbing the absolute power of high 
narcissism CEOs, and effectively monitoring the decision-making process    . 
   
My final additional analysis is to address the question “What is the impact of CEO 
narcissism on firm M&A performance when such narcissistic tendency exists in both 
the acquiring firm and the target firm concurrently?”. I report the most negative 
impact of CEO narcissism on firm short run M&A (annou cement) performance 
when acquiring firm and target firm CEO narcissism coexist concurrently. This result 
might be interpreted as the exacerbated overpayment problem resulting from the 
coexistence of acquiring firm and target firm CEO narcissism. As high narcissism 
target firm CEOs are likely to overvalue their firm or to be overconfident about their 
own ability to create value (believe they can create at least as much value as bidding 
firm’s management team), they may require a higher t an optimal bid premium. On 
the other hand, high narcissism CEOs of bidding firms are more likely to accept such 
a higher than optimal premium as they are overconfide t about their ability to extract 
value from the deal or they have a deep feeling of entitlement to win the bid. 
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Therefore the existence of high level of CEO narcissism on both sides may result in a 
more serious overpayment problem. It appears that the market is able to identify this 
severer overpayment problem and discount it in share price more heavily.  
 
1.6 Contributions and future research 
 
This study contributes to the literature along 6 dimensions. First of all, my results 
provide original empirical evidence about the role f CEO narcissism in M&A 
decision-making and extend our understanding of the eff cts of managerial 
narcissism on firm performance and shareholder value. Compared with Malmendier 
and Tate (2008), the more comprehensive sample structure in this study allows me to 
investigate my research questions more completely and draw much stronger 
conclusions from my analysis. Second, to the best of my knowledge, this study is the 
first to empirically examine the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on M&A 
performance. Third, this study also empirically examines the impact of CEO 
narcissism on firm long run post-acquisition performance; most previous studies only 
focus on the short run (announcement period) effects of such narcissistic tendencies. 
Fourth, I develop a novel measure of CEO narcissism based on the formal content 
analysis of CEO speeches and discourses about the specific M&A deal, which may 
help to overcome some drawbacks associated with the previous Holder67 and CEO 
media portrayal proxies used to measure “overconfide ce”. Fifth, my study 
highlights the potential role of effective corporate governance mechanisms in 
addressing the problems associated with high level of CEO narcissism. Finally, 
drawing on the strategic management and psychology literature, I explicitly 
introduce into my study the psychology-based construct of “narcissism”, which has 
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both motivational and cognitive dimensions (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) to help 
explain the motivation and performance of M&A deals. This is a richer and more 
coherent construct which goes beyond “overconfidence” or “hubris”.  
 
However, I also admit the limitations of this study, which in turn suggest several 
opportunities for future research. First, underlying theory relating to CEO narcissism 
can be further developed and more refined ways of measuring this construct should 
be delineated. Related to this, a more comprehensiv et of keywords that can 
capture different aspects of CEO narcissism needs to be developed and used to 
construct my media portrayal measure in any future study. Second, the potential role 
of specific corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. board structure, compensation 
package, ownership structure, etc.) in reducing the problems arising from CEO 
narcissism needs to be further explored. Third, my current study could be extended to 
investigate the role and impact of CEO narcissism in other corporate finance areas 
such as IPOs, capital structure decisions and dividend policy, etc, not only in M&A 
deals. Finally, using other methodologies, such as surveys and personality 
questionnaires may provide rich sources for us to construct more direct and robust 
measures of CEO narcissism and generate other interesting results.  
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. In Chapter 1, starting by introducing the 
background and motivation for this study, I present my research questions and aims. 
The chapter then describes the research methods and data and briefly discusses the 
main findings and conclusions. The contributions, limitations, and future research are 
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also outlined in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the extant relevant literature from which the research gaps are 
identified and the testable hypotheses developed. The following streams of literature 
are reviewed: research about M&A performance (short run and long run); research 
on M&A motivations; the literature about the concept, role, and impact of the 
narcissistic personality, and papers about the closely-related constructs of managerial 
overconfidence and hubris. Based on this comprehensive literature review, I identify 
the research gaps and raise my research questions.  
 
To address the research questions, in Chapter 3, I develop five main hypotheses 
based on the finance, strategic management and psychology literature. Hypothesis 1 
addresses the relationship between acquiring firm CEO narcissism and M&A 
decision-making. Hypothesis 2 and 3 relate to the pot ntial impact of acquiring firm 
CEO narcissism on firm M&A short run (market reaction) and long run 
post-acquisition performance. Hypothesis 4 and 5 focus on the potential impact of 
target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm M&A performance.  
 
To empirically test my established hypotheses, I need to address the following three 
methodological issues: (1) How to measure CEO narcissism?; (2) How to calculate 
firm short run M&A (announcement) and long run post-acquisition performance?; 
and (3) How to examine the link between CEO narcissism and M&A 
decision-making and performance. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I first introduce my three 
measures of CEO narcissism – Holder67, the CEO option exercise based measure, 
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media portrayal, and content analysis of CEO speech. Then I present the event study 
methods used to evaluate the firm M&A announcement p riod performance and long 
run post-acquisition performance. Finally, I introduce my regression models 
(including the definitions of the variables) employed to test the developed 
hypotheses.  
 
To empirically test the established hypotheses, the following six groups of data are 
required: (1) CEO data; (2) firm data (firm characteristics and performance data); (3) 
M&A data; (4) CEO media portrayal data; (5) CEO speeches about M&A deals; and 
(6) other supplementary data. Chapter 5 details the data sources, sampling process, 
data selection criteria, and data descriptions for these datasets.  
 
Chapter 6 provides and discusses the main results of this study. Starting by 
investigating firm M&A performance (short run and long run), I then conduct a 
series of regression analyses to examine the role and impact of CEO narcissism on 
M&A activity. The results are presented in two parts. First, I show and discuss the 
results of my event studies on acquiring firm short run and long run M&A 
performance. In the short run study, I report and aalyse acquiring firm M&A 
announcement period abnormal return (AR) and cumulative bnormal return (CAR) 
based on two models (the market model and the Scholes-Williams Model) and two 
market indices (CRSP equally weighted index and value weighted index) 
respectively. In the long run study, I report and discuss acquiring firm buy-and-hold 
abnormal return based on the benchmark portfolio approach over relatively long 
post-acquisition time horizons. I also compare my CAR and BHAR results of 
 20 
acquirers with previous studies. Second, I present and discuss the results of my 
regression analyses in testing the hypotheses that aim to address my research 
questions. More specifically, the results of five sts of regressions are reported: 
logistic regressions to explore the relationship betwe n the level of CEO narcissism 
and the likelihood of a CEO conducting M&A deals, regressions to examine the 
impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on firm M&A short run (announcement) 
performance (market reaction), regressions to test the impact of acquiring firm CEO 
narcissism on firm long run post-acquisition performance, regressions to explore the 
impact of the target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm M&A short run 
(announcement) performance, and regressions to examine the impact of the target 
firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm long run post-acquisition performance.  
 
In addition to the main analyses in Chapter 6, in Chapter 7, I also address my 
additional research questions relating to the impact of CEO narcissism on M&A 
activities in firms of different sizes, the role and impact of corporate governance in 
curbing CEO narcissism and ameliorating associated dverse effects, and the impact 
of the concurrent coexistence of acquiring firm CEO narcissism and target firm CEO 
narcissism. I first develop a set of additional hypotheses relating to my additional 
research questions. Then I introduce the regression m dels used to test these 
hypotheses. Finally, the results of my additional analyses are presented and 
discussed.   
 
Chapter 8 summarises the empirical results of this study, discusses the main findings 
and draws conclusions relating to my research questions. It also presents the main 
contributions and implications of this study. In addition, the limitations of my current 
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work are also discussed and suggestions for future st dy are provided.   
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I review previous work related to my current research. As the aim of 
this work is to explore the role of CEO narcissism in M&A decision-making and its 
impact on firm M&A short run and long run performance, this study relates to two 
strands of literature: (1) M&A literature (M&A performance and drivers of M&A 
activities); and (2) the literature relating to CEO narcissism. For the first strand of 
literature, I review studies on M&A long run performance, short run performance, 
and drivers of M&A activities respectively. For the s cond strand of literature, I first 
review research relating to the narcissistic personality in the psychology and strategic 
management literature; and then I review the studies on closely related constructs in 
the extant finance literature.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify research gaps nd raise my research questions 
through a comprehensive review of the relevant studies in the finance, psychology 
and management literature. This review is important for the establishment of my 
testable hypotheses, the identification of control variables, and the discussion of my 
findings in later sections.     
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explores the M&A literature. M&A 
long run performance, short run performance, and motivations are reviewed and 
discussed respectively in sub-sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3.  Section 2.3 examines 
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the concept and role of CEO narcissism in managerial behaviour. It consists of three 
sub-sections. Sub-section 2.3.1 reviews the concept of narcissism in the personality 
and psychology literature. 2.3.2 discusses previous st dies on CEO narcissism in the 
strategic management literature. Sub-section 2.3.3 reviews two closely-related 
constructs – hubris and overconfidence – in the extant finance literature. In the 
second part of sub-section 2.3.3, I also discuss the labelling issues associated with 
these constructs and justify my introduction of theCEO narcissism concept in this 
study. Section 2.4 summarizes this chapter, identifi s the research gaps and raises my 
research questions.   
 
2.2 Literature review about M&A performance and drivers of M&A 
activities 
 
M&A is one of the most significant and important phenomena in corporate finance. 
Merger and acquisition activities also have a great impact on corporate short run and 
long run performance. The majority of extant studies have explored the drivers and 
performance of M&A deals. In the following sub-sections, the studies of long run 
post-acquisition performance, short run M&A (announcement) performance, and 
motivations for M&As are reviewed respectively.  
   
2.2.1 Review of long run post-acquisition performance  
 
The majority of studies on M&A performance report negative abnormal returns over 
the long post-M&A time horizon (e.g. Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Conn, Cosh, Guest, 
and  Hughes, 2003; Asquith, 1983; Loderer and Martin, 1992; Malatesta, 1983; 
Kennefy and Limmack, 1996; Gregory, 1997; Agrawal, J ffe, and Mandelker, 1992; 
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Kohers and Kohers, 2001; Louis, 2002; Varaiya and Ferris, 1987; Ferris and Park, 
2001; Rosen, 2003; Langetieg, 1978), suggesting that M&A deals, on average, may 
destroy firm value in the long run. 
 
Although Malatesta (1983) and Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) posit that it is 
possible that the observed long run abnormal returns might just be statistical artefacts 
or results of inappropriate benchmarks being used, many studies report negative long 
run post-M&A abnormal returns consistently when employing a range of different 
benchmarks and calculation techniques. For example, Gr gory (1997) conducts a 
comprehensive study on the long run post-acquisition returns of acquiring firms in 
the UK. His data set consists of all successful UK deals (bidder value is more than 
£10 million) between 1984 and 1992. Six different models (CAPM, DM1, SS2, a 
multiple-index model, a value-weighted multiple-index model, and the Fama French 
three-factor model) are used to calculate abnormal eturns. He reports significantly 
negative two-year CAARs3 ranging from -0.1182 to -0.18 across all six models. 
Gregory (1997) together with a lot of other studies ( .g. Kennedy and Limmack, 
1996; Ferris and Park, 2001; Rosen, 2003 etc) sugget that the observed negative 
post-acquisition abnormal returns are not just statistical artefacts, but reflect real 
post-M&A underperformance.  
 
Post-M&A underperformance leads to two questions. First, if M&A deals do not 
create value (or even destroy firm value), why have so many M&A deals been 
conducted? Second, how to explain such long run M&A underperformance? In this 
                                                   
1 Dimson and Marsh risk and size adjustment model. 
2 Simple size control-portfolio-model. 
3 Cumulative average abnormal returns. 
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study, I propose that that CEO narcissism can be at l as  a possible driver4, among 
others, of M&A deals and an alternative explanation f r long run post-M&A 
underperformance. The relevant literature about CEO narcissism is reviewed in 
Section 2.3 and associated hypotheses are established in Chapter 3.   
 
2.2.2 Review of short run M&A performance 
 
In the literature of short run M&A performance, although more of the previous 
studies report significant positive cumulative abnormal returns around the deal 
announcement5 than those that report negative returns6, the empirical results are 
rather mixed and less clear than those relating to long run performance.  
 
In addition to the research on the sign (positive or negative) of short run M&A 
abnormal returns, some studies focus on the effect of some deal characteristics (e.g. 
business relatedness and payment method) on firm short run M&A performance. For 
example, Sicherman and Pettway (1987) examine the impact of the relatedness of 
activities between acquiring firm and target firm on acquiring firm short run 
(announcement) abnormal returns, utilizing a sample of 147 US mergers and 
acquisitions taking place between 1983 and 1985. Their results show that 
announcement period cumulative abnormal returns in the case of mergers or 
                                                   
4 Other drivers of M&A activities are reviewed in Section 2.2.3. 
5 E.g. Kummer and Hoffmeister, 1978; Jarrell and Bradley, 1980; Malatesta, 1983; Sicherman and 
Pettway, 1987; Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1982, 1988; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1989; Jarrell and 
Poulsen, 1989; Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail, 1998; Kohers and Kohers, 2000, 2001; Leeth and 
Borg, 2000; Floreani and Rigamonti, 2001; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Rosen, 2003; 
Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain, 2003; Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah, 2005; Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005; Bradley, 1980. 
6 E.g. Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1987; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Servaes, 1991; Healy, 
Palepu, and Ruback, 1992; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Berkovitch and 
Narayanan, 1997; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Walker, 2000; Houston, James, and Ryngaert, 2001; 
Delong , 2001, 2003; Kuipers, Miller, and Patel, 2003; Moeller, 2005.  
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acquisitions of related businesses are significantly higher than those in the case of 
unrelated businesses.  
 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1997) report consistent results in their study of the 50 
largest US industrial takeovers over the period 1979-1984. They find that the short 
run performance of a merger of acquisition is better when the acquirer and the target 
have highly overlapping businesses than in the case of a deal involving the 
acquisition of unrelated businesses. Fan and Goyal (2006) also show that vertical 
mergers generate significantly larger positive wealth effects than diversifying 
mergers in their study of a larger sample of 2,162 completed mergers over a longer 
period of time (1962-1996). 
 
In addition, previous studies suggest that another deal characteristic, method of 
payment, may also have an impact on short run M&A performance. For example, 
Travlos (1987) examines the impact of method of payment on firm announcement 
period abnormal returns using a sample of 167 M&A deals for the period 1972 
through 1981. A significant difference in acquiring firm abnormal returns between 
stock offers and cash offers is reported. Stock returns of stock-financing bidding 
firms are significantly negative during the event anouncement period, whereas 
shareholders of cash-financing bidding firms earn a “normal” return on the 
announcement of a takeover. Travlos claims that his results are consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis, which proposes that the use of stock as the payment method 
conveys the negative signal that the bidding firm’s stock is overvalued, and therefore 
the market reacts negatively.  
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Besides deal characteristics, previous studies suggest that some firm characteristics 
(e.g. Tobin’s Q, corporate governance, ownership structure, etc) may also have an 
impact on M&A performance. For example, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) (LSW) 
use a sample of 211 successful tender offers over the period 1968-1980 to examine 
the relationship between Tobin’s Q and takeover gains. They find that the stock 
returns for high Q bidders are significantly higher than the stock returns for low Q 
bidders. They claim that, as Tobin’s Q is a measure of managerial performance, their 
results are consistent with the view that takeovers of targets with poor management 
teams by well-managed acquirers have higher gains. However, the sample used by 
LSW consists only of tender offers, and some important variables such as deal 
attitude (hostile versus friendly), payment method, and relative size of target and 
bidder are not controlled for. Therefore, building upon LSW (1989), Servaes (1991) 
re-examines the relation between M&A gains and Tobin’s Q using a sample of 704 
mergers and tender offers over the period 1972-1987. Consistent with LSW (1989), 
he finds that announcement period returns for a bidder are larger when the bidder has 
a high Tobin’s Q and the target has a low one. However, Servaes shows that LSW’s 
results hold not only for tender offers, but also for mergers. Furthermore, the relation 
between M&A gain and Q ratio is even stronger when additional takeover 
characteristics are taken into account.  
 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) explore the impact of another characteristic of firm, 
corporate governance, on firm M&A short run performance. Specifically, they test 
the relation between one important aspect of corporate governance, outside directors, 
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and bidding firm announcement period abnormal return, tilizing a sample of 128 
tender offer bids made between 1980 and 1987. They report a negative 
announcement return for bidding firms over the 2 day event (announcement of tender 
offer) window (-1, 0). However, bidding firms with at least fifty percent of board 
seats held by independent outside directors have significantly higher (less-negative) 
announcement period abnormal returns than bidding firms with less then fifty percent 
of the board seats held by independent outside directors. This evidence confirms the 
traditional view that independent outside directors can efficiently monitor the M&A 
decision-making process on behalf of shareholders’ interests.  
 
Besides the characteristics of acquiring firm (e.g. Tobin’s Q and corporate 
governance of acquiring firm), pervious studies suggest that some characteristics of 
target firm (e.g. high-tech status, growth stage of target firm, etc) may also have a 
significant impact on firm M&A short run performance. For example, Kohers and 
Kohers (2000) report that announcement cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers 
of high-tech targets are significantly positive. In addition, they suggest that growth 
stage of target and relative size of target may also influence bidder announcement 
returns.  
 
In summary, through reviewing the literature on short run M&A performance, I 
identify deal or firm characteristics that may have impact on firm short run 
announcement returns, such as business relatedness, payment method, Tobin’s Q, 
corporate governance, ownership structure, high-tec status, growth stage of target 
firm, and relative size of target. Therefore, in this study, I control for these factors in 
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my regression models when testing the impact of CEO narcissism on firm M&A 
performance. 
 
2.2.3 Review of the literature on the drivers of (motivations for) mergers and 
acquisitions 
 
Previous studies in both finance and strategic management show that that mergers 
and acquisitions may be driven by a complex variety of motives. Some main 
explanations given in the literature for M&A activies are efficiency (synergies), 
managerial competition (the market for corporate control), Q-theory, and the agency 
problem.   
 
In the strategic management literature, efficiency theory as an explanation of mergers 
and acquisitions is well established. According to this theory, purpose of mergers and 
acquisitions is to achieve synergies. Academics in the strategic management area 
often divide synergies into three categories: financi l synergies, operational synergies, 
and managerial synergies. Financial synergies refer to the synergies resulting from 
the lower costs of capital after mergers or acquisitions, which can be achieved in two 
ways. One way is to reduce the systematic risk of a company (or a company's 
investment portfolio) through the acquisition of unrelated businesses. The other way 
is to increase firm size though mergers or acquisitions, with the larger firm generally 
believed to have greater ability to gain access to cheaper capital. Operational 
synergies resulting from the combining of the operations of different business units 
and/or from knowledge transfers (Porter, 1985) may reduce the production costs of 
the business units within the corporation. Operational synergies may also improve 
the company’s ability to provide unique products and services. The third type of 
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synergy, managerial synergy, usually results from the bidder’s managers’ superior 
management skills. However, there is very limited empirical evidence supporting this 
efficiency theory. Synergy effects in M&A activities are not detected in many studies 
(e.g. Rumelt, 1986; Montgomery and Singh, 1984).   
 
A derivative of efficiency theory, the management competition model, is proposed by 
Jensen (1986). This model views takeover as a market for corporate control.  
Managers who perform poorly are threatened by outside competing management 
teams, which provide an external incentive on the incumbent managers to improve 
performance. Jensen (1984, 1986) provides supportive evidence for his management 
competition model.  
 
Related to management competition model, Q-theory of investment is used by 
academics in the economics and finance area to explain both motivation for the 
M&A and post-M&A performance. (Q is the ratio of firm market value to its 
replacement cost of capital). Servaes (1991) proposes that mergers are a channel 
through which capital flows to better projects and better management.  
 
However, some studies cast doubt on these management competition-based models. 
For example, Porter (1987) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) find that acquiring 
firm performance (operating performance) is actually below-average prior to a 
merger or acquisition, and target firm performance (operating performance) prior to a 
merger or acquisition is above-average, which is not consistent with the management 
competition model argument.   
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Unlike efficiency theory, management competition model, and Q-theory of 
investment, the agency theoretic explanation for M&A activities (i.e. the agency 
problem) takes a different perspective. According to this theory, managers tend to 
maximize their own utility, instead of shareholder value, in conducting mergers or 
acquisitions (Rhoades, 1983; Black, 1989), and consequently this agency problem 
may destroy firm value in the long run.  
 
All of the theories or models reviewed above, except the agency problem, have their 
limitations in explaining the well-documented long run post-acquisition 
underperformance in the literature. According to efficiency theory, management 
competition model, and Q-theory of investment, M&A activities should enhance firm 
value through achieving synergies or removing ineffective management teams. 
However, most empirical evidence on M&A long run performance reported in the 
literature is contradictory to the predictions of these models. Although the agency 
problem may help to explain the motivation for M&A and long run post-M&A 
underperformance to some extent, it has its limitation in explaining that many CEOs 
conduct value-destroying M&A deals with no private b nefits gained. Therefore, to 
better understand the causes and consequences of M&A activities, we need to further 
explore other explanations. In this study, I propose that CEO narcissism could be a 
possible driver, among others, of M&A activities and may provide an alternative 
explanation for M&A performance. . 
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2.3 CEO narcissism  
 
While the concept of narcissism has been well reseach d in both the psychology and 
management literature, it has received surprisingly little attention in the area of 
finance research. In this section, I first provide an overview of the concept of 
narcissism in the personality and social psychology literature, then review the 
research employing this concept in the management lit rature and the related studies 
in the corporate finance area.  
 
2.3.1 The concept of narcissism in the personality and psychology literature 
 
The term “narcissism” comes from a figure in Greek mythology, whose name was 
Narcissus. He believed that he was much better than others and distained the people 
who loved him. Eventually, he fell in love with his own reflection in a lake and 
finally died of frustration. This concept was first introduced to the psychology 
literature by Ellis (1898) and then further developed by Freud (1914). Freud referred 
to narcissism as “a state of being the centre of a l ving world in which the individual 
could act spontaneously and purely out of desire”. Freud (1957, 14: 7-66) further 
identified a set of different manifestations of narcissism, such “as self-admiration, 
self-aggrandizement, and a tendency to see others as an extension of one’s self”. 
Most studies of this concept in the area of psychology have their roots in Freud’s 
work on this topic. 
 
Researchers in clinical psychology originally used the term narcissism as a label for a 
mental disorder. They diagnosed individuals who think they are special and unique, 
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who overestimate their ability, and exaggerate their achievements as suffering from 
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) (DSM IV - Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In the aspect of 
interpersonal relations, individuals suffering from NPD tend to be arrogant and lack 
empathy for others.  
 
Though narcissism was initially treated as a clinical syndrome, in later research, 
psychologists re-conceptualize it as a personality dimension (Raskin and Hall, 1979; 
Raskin and Terry, 1988; Emmons, 1987). The development of the Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory (NPI), a psychometric scale for narcissism, by Raskin and Hall 
(1979), represents a crucial step in establishing a formal measure of such a 
personality dimension. Raskin and Hall constructed a list of 220 items that are 
believed to be a reflection of the narcissism tendency, using the DSM-III behavioural 
criteria for the narcissistic personality as a conceptual template. Then, they use this 
measure to explore individual differences in narcissism in non-clinical populations. 
In a series of later follow-up studies, they continued culling the NPI items using an 
internal consistency approach, and finally produced a 54-item measure of narcissism 
with high internal consistency. Other research by psychologists related to the 
construct validity of the NPI has also helped to enrich the understanding of the 
concept of narcissism and its measurement. For example, Emmons (1984) conducts 
research on the NPI using a principal-components analysis. He finds four NPI 
components and labels them Exploitativeness/Entitlement (I insist upon getting the 
respect that is due to me); Leadership/Authority (I like to be the centre of attention); 
Superiority/Arrogance (I am better than others); and Self-Absorption / 
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Self-Admiration (I am preoccupied with how extraordinary and special I am). In his 
follow-up work (Emmons, 1987), he identified the same four NPI components as he 
had found in Emmons (1984), using factor analysis.    
 
In a similar way, Brunell, Gentry, Campbell, Hoffman, Kuhnert, and DeMarree (2008)  
conceptualize narcissism as a personality that contains three basic characteristics:  
(1) “positive and inflated views of the self”, (2) “a pervasive pattern of self- 
regulation that maintains positive self-views—often at the expense of others”, and (3) 
“interpersonal relationships that lack warmth and itimacy”. They further explain the 
first characteristic, “positive and inflated views of the self”, as possessing three 
sub-features: self-centred (Emmons, 1987), self-focused (Emmons, 1987; Raskin & 
Shaw, 1988), and self-serving (Rhodewalt and Morf, 1998). “Narcissists believe that 
they are more intelligent and attractive than others”, and “they are overconfident 
individuals who exaggerate their beliefs about their abilities and achievements and 
inflate their own performance in achievement domains”. The second and the third 
characteristics refer to the relationship of narcissist  with others. Previous studies 
(John and Robins, 1994; Farwell and Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998; Campbell, Reeder, 
Sedikides, and Elliot, 2000) show that narcissists of en have an inflated perception 
about their own positive input while feeling reluctan  to acknowledge others’ input. 
The authors further point out that narcissists usually have some interpersonal 
strategies for maintaining their self-esteem.  
 
Other studies also explore the social relationship of narcissists with other people. 
Bushman and Baumeister (2002) find that narcissists often oppose people who give 
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negative feedback to them. Narcissists usually liketo draw attention away from 
others (Buss and Chiodo, 1991), have a strong need for admiration from others (Morf 
and Rhodewalt, 2001; Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006), and often derogate others in 
order to maintain their self-esteem (Morf and Rhodewalt, 1993; John and Robins, 
1994). Narcissists are not interested in building itimacy with others through social 
relationships, but use social relationships as the tool for maintaining their inflated 
self-views.  
 
2.3.2 Narcissism in the managerial literature 
 
Brown (1997) employs the theory of narcissism in the analysis of organizational 
behaviour. He points out that "narcissism is an important label that permits us to 
group cognitions and behaviours, which have, as their common factor, a role to play 
in the regulation of self-esteem”. Based on the previous literature, he summarises the 
characteristics of the narcissistic personality into six broad tendencies: (1) denial (“a 
primitive and desperate unconscious method of coping with otherwise intolerable 
conflict, anxiety, and emotional distress or pain which can lead to increased 
confidence and feelings of invulnerability”, (2) rationalization (“an individual's 
attempt to justify or find reasons for unacceptable ehaviour or feelings and thus 
present them in a form consciously tolerable and acceptable”), (3) 
self-aggrandizement (“a general tendency of an indiv dual to overestimate his or her 
abilities and accomplishments”), (4) attributional egotism (“the tendency of an 
individual to offer explanations for events that are ‘self-serving’ or ‘hedonic’ and 
that typically involve the attribution of favourable outcomes to causes internal to the 
self and unfavourable outcomes to external causes”), (5) sense of entitlement (“a 
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strong belief in his/her right to exploit others and an inability to empathize with the 
feelings of others” accompanied by “an insatiable eagerness to obtain their 
admiration and approval”), and (6) anxiety (“narcissists ‘cannot live without an 
admiring audience. His apparent freedom from family ties and institutional 
constraints does not free him to stand alone or to glory in his individuality. On the 
contrary it contributes to his insecurity’”). Individuals who have a narcissistic 
personality are prone to these tendencies unselfconsci usly “in response to a deeply 
felt need to preserve self- esteem”. The first five tendencies are ego-defence 
mechanisms and the sixth tendency, “anxiety”, is actually “not an ego-defense 
mechanism but what the ego-defense mechanisms are designed to ameliorate”. The 
main contribution of Brown’s work is that it demonstrates that the theory of 
narcissism is very useful for the research on cognitions or behaviours, not only at the 
individual level, but also at the group or organization levels.  
 
A series of later studies show that narcissism is a widespread tendency in leadership 
roles, such as those of CEOs and other top executiv managers (Deluga, 1997; 
Maccoby, 2000; Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006) and that these narcissistic 
personalities of leaders are often associated with risky decision-making (Chatterjee 
and Hambrick, 2007), counterproductive behaviour (Penney and Spector, 2002; 
Judge, LePine, and Rich, 2006), and poor performance (Blair, Hoffman, and Helland, 
2006; Judge, LePine, and Rich, 2006). Lubit (2002) extensively discusses such 
negative impact of destructive narcissism of managers on organizations. He 
explicitly distinguishes healthy narcissism and destructive narcissism, and compares 
them from several different aspects. “Healthy narcissism is based on relatively secure 
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self-esteem that can survive daily frustrations and stress”, while destructive 
narcissism is often “a reaction to fragile self-este m”. Another key difference is that 
an individual with destructive narcissism is obsessed with power, admiration, etc, 
while an individual with healthy narcissism may enjoy them without obsession. He 
defines destructive narcissism from three aspects: (1) grandiosity (“inflated sense of 
self-importance, arrogance, preoccupation with power and wealth, excessive seeking 
of admiration”), (2) a sense of entitlement (“a sense that they are entitled to have 
whatever they want, including a willingness to exploit others to get it”), and (3) 
interpersonal relations (“the lack of concern for and devaluation of others”). He 
points out that the destructive narcissism of CEOs can have a negative impact on 
organizations. On the one hand, CEOs with destructive narcissistic tendencies tend to 
make disastrous business decisions because “their personal agendas take precedence 
over the company’s best interests”. Their glory-seeking and need for excitement 
often make them engage in such behaviours as empire-building and “rapid change of 
course”, which impede the “prudent” growth of a company. On the other hand, the 
traits of destructively narcissistic CEOs limit their ability to work with other people 
in the organization effectively.  
 
If the narcissistic personality is associated with ineffective leadership, why do 
individuals with a narcissistic tendency rise to positi ns of leadership? What are the 
origins of such destructive narcissism? Lubit (2002) and Brunell, Gentry, Campbell, 
Hoffman, Kuhnert, and DeMarree (2008) raise these qu stions. Brunell, Gentry, 
Campbell, Hoffman, Kuhnert, and DeMarree (2008) conduct three studies directly to 
investigate the link between narcissistic personality and leader emergence, using 
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traditional research methods (questionnaire and group discussion) in the areas of 
personality and psychology. Their results show that n rcissism predicts emergent 
leadership and that highly narcissistic individuals re more likely to emerge as 
leaders during “leaderless group discussions”. They conclude that “narcissists have 
skills and qualities that are beneficial for becoming leaders”. Consistent with Brunell, 
Gentry, Campbell, Hoffman, Kuhnert, and DeMarree (2008), Lubit (2002) also 
claims that such destructive narcissism personality traits as high levels of expressed 
self-confidence and extremely strong driving ambitions may actually help mangers to 
rise to top positions within organizations. In addition, he discusses two possible 
origins of destructive narcissism, based on two streams of theories. According to 
psychodynamic theories, destructive narcissism is a defence mechanism of “fragile 
self-esteem”. According to social learning theory, narcissistic behaviour is learnt by 
observing others, and influenced by outside reinforcement (e.g. reward or 
punishment for behaviour). He also proposes the potential roles that corporate 
governance mechanisms (e.g. performance measurement, th  reward system, and the 
hiring process) can play in dealing with the destructive narcissism of managers.  
  
Different from above studies, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) conduct a large 
sample empirical test on the narcissistic tendency of CEOs and its impacts on firm 
strategy and general performance. They conceptualize narcissism as a personality 
dimension where individuals can be assigned low, medium or high scores along a 
continuum, based on Emmons (1987). A set of hypotheses are developed on the basis 
of relevant managerial and psychological literature. First, they consider the impact of 
CEO narcissism on a firm’s strategy and hypothesise that “the greater the narcissistic 
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tendencies, the greater the dynamism of the company's strategy”. Second, they 
establish a link between CEO narcissistic tendencies and a specific strategic decision 
of firms – acquisition – and hypothesise that “the gr ater the narcissistic tendencies 
of a CEO, the greater the number and size of acquisition  made by the company”. 
Their third and fourth tests are about the relation between CEO narcissism and firm 
performance. They hypothesise that “the greater the narcissistic tendencies of a CEO, 
the more extreme the company's performance” and “the greater the narcissistic 
tendencies of a CEO, the greater the fluctuation in the company's performance”. To 
test these hypotheses about CEO narcissism, they construct a 5-item narcissism index 
using five unobtrusive, publicly-available indicators: (1) “the prominence of the 
CEO's photograph in the company's annual report”; (2) “the CEO's prominence in 
the company's press releases” (3) “the CEO's use of first-person singular pronouns in 
interviews”; (4) relative cash pay (“the CEO's cash compensation divided by that of 
the second-highest-paid executive in the firm); and(5) relative non-cash pay (“the 
CEO's non-cash compensation divided by that of the second-highest paid executive 
in the firm”). Then, based on their measure of narcissism, they empirically test their 
four hypotheses, using a sample of CEOs in the computer software and hardware 
industries between 1992 and 2004. They conclude that CEO narcissism is positively 
related to strategic dynamism and grandiosity, and that it affects the number and size 
of the acquisitions undertaken by the firm. Their rsults suggest that the narcissistic 
tendency makes a CEO favour bold, attention-attracting actions, and consequently 
results in extreme and fluctuating firm performance.  
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2.3.3 Closely related constructs  
  
2.3.3.1 Review the closely related constructs – hubris and overconfidence  
 
Two closely-related constructs to managerial narcissism used in the extant finance 
literature are hubris and overconfidence, drawing on the behavioural finance 
cognitive psychologically based literature.  
  
As early as 1986, Richard Roll proposes a “hubris hypothesis” of takeovers, which 
provides another possible explanation of M&A activities. He argues that the hubris 
of the individual decision makers in the bidding firms may result in overbidding, and 
firms may suffer from this hubris in takeover activities. Since then, the term 
managerial “hubris” has become widely used in finance studies.7  
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Hayward and Hambrick (1997) are two 
studies that empirically investigate Roll’s “hubris hypothesis”.  
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) investigate into the drivers of takeovers, using a 
sample of 330 tender offers made during 1963-1988. They develop a test based on 
the correlation among target, acquirer, and total gains to distinguish synergy motive, 
agency motive and hubris motive. Their results show strong evidence that many 
takeover decisions are driven by hubris, although the agency problem seems to be the 
major reason for the value-destroying takeovers.   
                                                   
7 Bollaert and Petit (2009), however, point out that ubris is essentially a literary concept, not a 
psychological one, originating in Greek mythology.  It refers to “excessive beliefs and behaviours 
linked to defiance or contempt for every day laws, destiny and the gods”, with consequences that are 
almost invariably fatal.  As such, the concept is elusive without a precise definition, making it 
difficult to measure for research purposes. 
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Hayward and Hambrick (1997) use a sample of 106 large cquisitions conducted in 
1989 and 1992 to investigate the link between the CEO’s hubris and the size of the 
premiums paid for acquisitions. They use four indicators as proxies for CEO hubris: 
(1) the acquiring company's recent performance, (2) recent media praise for the CEO, 
(3) the CEO's self-importance (CEO relative compensation), and (4) a composite 
factor of these three indicators. They find that these indicators have a strong 
association with the size of the premiums paid for acquisitions. First, they find that 
firms with better recent performance tend to pay higher premiums for acquisitions. 
The authors suggest that this is because the recent success makes the CEO more 
confident in his or her own ability to create greater value through the acquisition and 
therefore would like to pay a higher price for it. Second, their results suggest that the 
recent media praise “conveys to the CEO an external validation of his or her 
capabilities”, which further confirms and strengthens his or her inflated view about 
his or her personal ability. The belief in their superior ability makes them feel that 
they can generate great benefits that will recoup the extremely large acquisition 
premium. Third, they find a positive association between the size of the acquisition 
premium and the CEO’s self-importance, which is measured by the CEO’s pay 
relative to the pay of the second-highest-paid executive. Finally, they report a strong 
association between the comprehensive hubris factor nd the acquisition premiums. 
Their results also demonstrate a negative relation between the CEO hubris factor and 
the firm performance. In addition, they find that the firms that pay larger premiums 
suffer greater losses during the one-year period after cquisition. 
 
On the basis of Roll (1986), some academics have extended the research on hubris by 
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studying, theoretically or empirically, overconfidence bias in managers’ 
decision-making and its effects on firm performance.  
 
Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2003), Heaton (2002) and Paredes (2005) are three 
theoretic studies in this area.  
 
Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2003) conduct theoretical work to explore the role of 
managerial overconfidence and optimism in corporate investment policy and 
corporate incentive mechanisms. Their study suggests that overconfident and 
optimistic CEOs are more likely to undertake risky projects than rational CEOs. 
However, they argue that a moderate level of overconfidence and optimism may 
benefit the shareholders and create value for firms through reducing the 
underinvestment problem. In addition, they propose that managerial overconfidence 
and optimism could reduce the need for the stock option compensation that is 
designed to reduce underinvestment problems. The authors suggest that 
overconfidence and optimism can actually play a positive role in the corporate 
investment decision making and provide an alternative solution to the 
underinvestment problem. 
 
Heaton (2002) theoretically explores the relationship between managerial optimism 
and free cash flow in a firm based on a simple “three date-two period corporate 
finance model”. This study presents two features of overoptimistic managers: first, 
overoptimistic managers believe that the market undervalues their firms’ stocks and 
therefore they may decline positive NPV projects if they have to finance that project 
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externally; second, optimistic managers often overvalue the projects they like, and 
therefore they may choose negative NPV projects unconsciously. He suggests that 
the managerial irrationality may result in the behavioural cost that is different from 
the cost due to asymmetric information and the traditional rational agency problem. 
 
Paredes (2005) further investigates the relationship between behavioural bias 
(especially overconfidence) and corporate governance. He proposes that CEO 
overconfidence might be actually a product of corporate governance. High CEO pay 
may give CEO positive feedback and make the CEO believe that he performs well 
and has a very high capability. The positive feedback makes a CEO feel that he is 
better than many others, and facilitates the formation of overconfidence. Based on 
pure theoretical analysis, Paredes suggests that it is possible that there is a link 
between CEO compensation and CEO overconfidence. He further points out that a 
CEO is more likely to become overconfident if he has a very strong and concentrated 
power within the firm. This might particularly be the case in the US, because the 
“CEO-centric model” dominates in US firms.  
 
Besides theoretical studies, several empirical studies on the role of psychological 
factors in corporate decision-making, particularly in M&A decision-making, have 
also been conducted.  
 
Fanto (2001) provides evidence of the presence of behavioural biases (or 
psychological factors) during the decision-making process of mega-mergers, based 
on a psychologically-oriented empirical study. He finds a set of behavioural biases in 
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the mega-mergers between 1998 and 2000 through analyzing the documents that 
reflect the decision-making process. For example, he reports strong “ Over-optimism 
bias” in the Banc One/FC deal (1998), Daimler/Chrysler deal (1998), 
NationsBank/BA (1998), Norwest/Wells Fargo (1998), Travelers/Citicorp (1998), 
MCI/Sprint deal (1999), Qwest/US West deal (1999), AOL/TW (2000), Chase/J.P. 
Morgan (2000), Chevron/Texaco (2000), and Firstar/U.S. Bancorp (2000). His 
research suggests that, to gain a better understanding of M&A activities, it is 
necessary to study the role and impact of behavioural biases in M&A 
decision-making. 
 
Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate are two of the pioneers in empirically 
examining the overconfidence bias involved in M&A activities and other corporate 
decisions. Malmendier and Tate (2008) suggest that overconfidence can be one of the 
drivers of the merger decision. They argue that most traditional explanations for 
M&A activities and firm performance around and after M&As are based on the 
assumption that managers can always make decisions rationally, but that might not 
always be the case in reality and top managers may be prone to overconfidence bias. 
They conduct an empirical investigation of the role f CEO overconfidence in M&A 
decision-making, using a sample of 477 large, publicly-traded US firms that are 
listed in the Forbes 500 over the period 1980-1994. In this study, they invent three 
proxies for CEO overconfidence: Holder67, Longholder, and press portrayal.8 The 
first two are based on the managers’ option exercising behaviour: according to the 
Holder67 measure, CEOs are classified as “overconfide t” CEOs if they fail to 
                                                   
8 Section 4.2.1 introduces these measures in detail.   
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exercise their vested options that are highly in the money (67% in the money) in the 
fifth year prior to expiration. According to the Longholder measure, CEOs are 
identified as “overconfident” CEOs if they hold an option until expiration, even 
though the option is at least 40% in-the-money entering its final year. The third 
measure for CEO overconfidence is based on the outsiders’ perception of a CEO. 
Malmendier and Tate set the overconfidence indicator s equal to 1 when the number 
of “confident” and “optimistic” mentions for a CEO exceeds the number of “not 
confident”, “not optimistic”, and “reliable, cautious, practical, conservative, steady, 
frugal” mentions in LexisNexis and The Wall Street Journal searches. Their results 
show a strong relationship between overconfidence and the probability of 
undertaking mergers. The relationship is the strongest in diversifying mergers and 
M&A deals with internal financing. They also find that the market reacts more 
negatively to the announcement of a merger decided by overconfident CEOs. Using a 
three-day window, they calculate the CAR around the bids and find that, on average, 
the CARs for “overconfident” bids are roughly 78 basis points lower than those for 
“rational” bids. 
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) have also conducted other research, aiming to explore 
managerial overconfidence in explaining the distortion of corporate investment 
decisions. Unlike Malmendier and Tate (2008), who focus on the overconfidence 
bias in M&A decision making, this research explores the role and impact of 
managers’ overconfidence in a much broader context – general corporate investment 
decisions. The same sample of 477 large, publicly-traded firms in the Forbes 500 as 
that in Malmendier and Tate (2008) is used in this study. Three proxies for CEO 
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overconfidence are used in this research – Holder67, Longholder, and “Habitually 
buyer of stock”. The first two measures are the same s those used in Malmendier 
and Tate (2008). The third different measure is based on CEO’s stock purchase 
activities. In brief, CEOs are classified as “overconfident” CEOs if they are “habitual 
purchaser (or net buyer) of the firm’s stock”. This measure is reviewed in detail in 
section 4.2.1. This study concludes that overconfide t CEOs “overinvest when they 
have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external 
financing”. Results of this study also suggest that a CEO’s personal characteristics 
(e.g. financial education, financial employment, status in the company, military 
service, membership in the 1920-1929 birth cohort and technical background) may  
have an impact on corporate investment decision-making.  
 
Not only the role and impact but also the source of managerial overconfidence 
interests researchers. Billett and Qian (2008) explore the source of managerial 
overconfidence in the context of M&A through studying the history of deals made by 
individual CEOs, using a sample of 4,051 mergers and acquisitions during the period 
1980-2002. They use managerial “Net Purchase” of shares9 as their proxy for 
“overconfidence”. They find that the higher the “deal order”10, the greater the CEO’s 
net purchase of shares preceding the deals. Their results also show that higher-order 
deals suffer more negative announcement returns than lower-order deals. Although 
the likelihood of a CEO conducting a deal increases with the positive performance of 
previous acquisitions, past positive performance dos not mitigate the negative 
wealth effects in subsequent acquisitions. They explain their results as evidence that 
                                                   
9 The “Net Purchases” measure is reviewed in section 4.2.1.  
10 Billetta and Qian define the “deal order” within each firm based on the number of deals conducted 
in the preceding five years. (The “Deal order” is defined based on a five-year rolling window.) 
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self-attribution results in CEO overconfidence, which leads to poor M&A deals. In 
addition, their results suggest that the market anticipates future deals according to a 
firm’s M&A activities in the past and that these exp ctations are reflected in the 
firm’s stock price. 
 
Besides studies about the role and the source of CEO overconfidence in M&A 
decision-making, Aktas, De Bodt and Roll (2005) go one step further to ask “Can 
CEOs learn from past experience?” Their theoretical study suggests that, if the 
corporate governance system allows overconfident or overoptimistic CEOs to 
survive for long enough, CEOs could correct their overconfidence or overoptimism 
gradually through a learning process, and, therefore, the CEOs could reduce value 
destruction from deal to deal. However, such an analytic l approach is very different 
to a perspective that views personality characteristics as relatively fixed.   
 
2.3.3.2 Hubris, overconfidence and narcissism  
 
In this sub-section, I discuss the distinction between narcissism and the traditional 
constructs (overconfidence and hubris) and justify my use of narcissism as the label 
in this study.  
 
Distinction between narcissism and the traditional constructs  
 
Although hubris, overconfidence and narcissism are closely related constructs and 
are often used interchangeably in management research, they are different in several 
aspects. First of all, they follow two different psychological traditions (or 
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approaches). Narcissism belongs to personality psychology and overconfidence (or 
hubris) belongs to cognitive psychology. (Bollaert and Petit, 2009). In other words, 
narcissism is a personality construct while overconfide ce is often treated as a 
cognitive bias. Second, many psychology and management studies propose that 
narcissism is a more fundamental property than such cognitive bias as 
overconfidence (Emmons, 1984; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). Hubris or 
overconfidence is only an offshoot of narcissism (Ketsde Vries, 1990). Finally and 
importantly, overconfidence is only one cognitive trait of the narcissistic personality, 
while narcissism is a much richer concept consisting of both cognitive 
(overestimation of his/her abilities) and motivational (intense needs for affirmation) 
elements (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) 
    
Justifications of my use of narcissism as the label in this study 
 
While the terms “hubris” and “overconfidence” are widely used in the field of 
finance, they are inexact concepts and often have different meanings across studies. 
For example, Moore and Healy (2008) report that over 60% of empirical papers on 
overconfidence use the definition that “overconfidenc  is the overestimation of one’s 
actual ability, performance, level of control, or chance of success”, roughly 5% 
employ the definition that “people believe themselves to be better than others, such 
as when a majority of people rate themselves better than the median”, and the 
remaining 30% or so use the definition that “overconfidence is excessive certainty 
regarding the accuracy of one’s beliefs”. Moore and Healy further point out that 
researchers routinely assume, explicitly or implicitly, that the overconfidence 
constructs they work with, although based on different definitions, are, nonetheless, 
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the same and can be used interchangeably. Consequently, as Kwan et al (2004) 
explain, many of the inconsistent findings and arguments about the underlying 
overconfidence phenomenon that researchers are seeking to measure result from the 
lack of a clear definition.  
 
Both hubris and overconfidence lack a theoretical grounding. Hubris is more of a 
literary term, rather than a theoretically sound concept. Studies on overconfidence in 
M&As rely heavily on Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis and lack a solid psychological 
foundation. Bollaert and Petit (2009) point out theproblem in this subject area that 
“the link between a particular characteristic and observed effect is not clearly 
established with reference to psychology theory”.  
 
The problems associated with loose or inconsistent definitions of hubris and 
overconfidence thus motivate me to introduce a more fundamental and coherent 
concept into this research – narcissism – drawing o the psychological and 
management literature.  
 
Narcissism is a coherent and measurable psychological construct that is widely used 
in the management literature to explain managerial behaviour. It contains “both a 
cognitive frame and a motivational mechanism - consisting simultaneously of a 
belief in one’s superior abilities and an intense, continuous need for affirmation” 
(Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) and makes a deeper understanding of managerial 
behaviour possible. Narcissism, as a dispositional trait, is a more fundamental 
property than cognitive bias (Emmons, 1984). A narcissistic personality stirs up 
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hubris or overconfidence, and “we can look at hubris as a predicable offshoot of 
unbridled narcissism” (Kets de Vries, 1990). Therefo , narcissism should be treated 
as the more ingrained trait (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). Thus, I work with the 
personality attribute of “narcissism” as an important determinant of managerial 
behaviour in line with the psychological and strategic management literature.11 In 
my study, I treat hubris or overconfidence as traits of narcissism and therefore use the 
term “narcissism”, staying away from the label “hubris” or “overconfidence”.  
 
2.4 Summary  
 
To explore the role and impact of CEO narcissism on a firm’s M&A activities 
(performance and drivers), I first review the studies of long run and short run M&A 
performance and the drivers of M&A deals. Then, I explore the concept of narcissism 
in the personality, psychology, and strategic management literature. Finally, I review 
the role of CEO narcissism (and its closely related constructs) in M&A 
decision-making and its impact on firm M&A performance. 
 
Based on the literature review, I identify the following research gaps: first, the 
empirical studies on the role of CEO narcissism personality on M&A 
decision-making are very limited in the finance litrature. Second, previous studies in 
this area only focus on M&A short run performance, and there are very few studies 
examining the impact of CEO narcissism on firm long run post-M&A performance. 
                                                   
11  According to the American Psychiatric Association (2000), narcissistic personalities are 
characterized by a grossly inflated sense of their own importance, and overestimate their achievements 
and personal capacities. They feel an excessive need for admiration, consider themselves to be special 
and unique, expecting this to be recognized by their colleagues, and display an overweening sense of 
entitlement, assuming that they will be rewarded accordingly. In addition, such individuals believe 
that they are envied by everyone and develop fantasies regarding their personal power. 
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Third, to my knowledge, the role of target firm CEO narcissism has never been 
empirically examined in the extant literature. Fourth, the measures of the related 
constructs used in the finance literature to date are indirect measures and have some 
drawbacks. Finally, the key studies in this area by Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2005b, 
2008) only focus on a sample of 477 large Forbes firms from 1980 to 1994. 
Therefore, a study based on a larger sample and covering a longer period is needed.        
 
To fill these research gaps, I posit my four main research questions as follows: 
 
(1) Are highly narcissistic CEOs more likely to conduct M&A deals than lowly  
   narcissistic CEOs?  
 
(2) What is the impact of the degree of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on the market 
reaction to the M&A announcement?  
 
(3) What is the impact of the extent of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on acquiring   
   firm long run post-acquisition performance?  
 
(4) What is the impact of the level of target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring  
   firm M&A performance?  
 
These questions are designed to explore the role of CEO narcissism in M&A from 
two dimensions: cause (its impact on the M&A decision) and consequence (its 
impact on the M&A performance). The framework is shown in Figure 2-1. A set of 
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control variables is also derived from the relevant literature.    
 
Besides these four main research questions, I also r i e three additional questions to 
further investigate the impact of CEO narcissism on M&A activities in firms of 
different sizes, the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and 
CEO narcissism, and the impact of concurrent coexist nce of acquiring firm CEO 
narcissism and target firm CEO narcissism. Specifically, my three additional research 
questions are as follows: 
 
(1) Does CEO narcissism in large firms have the same (or same degree of) impact  
   on M&A decision-making and firm performance as that in small firms?  
 
(2) Can good corporate governance help to ameliorate the potential adverse    
   consequences (if any) of CEO narcissism on sharehold r wealth in the context of  
   M&A?   
 
(3) What is the impact of CEO narcissism on firm M&A performance when such  
   narcissistic tendency exists in both the acquiring f rm and the target firm  
   concurrently?      
 
To address these research questions, I test a set of hyp theses using a large, recent 
sample of firms across the full size spectrum from 1993 to 2005. In addition, I 
develop a new measure of CEO narcissism based on the content analysis of CEO 
speech. The testable hypotheses relating to my main and additional research 
questions are developed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7 respectively.
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Figure 2-1 The framework for testing the impact of CEO narcissism on M&A decision-making and firm M&A performance 
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Chapter 3 Hypotheses development 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, I review the literature about M&A performance (both short run 
and long run) and the motives for M&A deals. Then, the concept of narcissism in 
both the psychology and strategic management literature is fully discussed. On the 
basis of the extant literature, I identify the research gaps and raise my research 
questions. 
 
To fill the research gaps and to answer the research questions, I develop my five 
main testable hypotheses in this chapter. The first hypothesis aims to test the link 
between CEO narcissistic personality and M&A decision-making. The second and 
the third hypotheses aim to examine the impact of CEO narcissism on acquiring firm 
short run (announcement) M&A performance and long run post-acquisition 
performance. My fourth and fifth hypotheses relate to the target firm CEO narcissism. 
In particular, I explore if a parallel narcissistic endency in the target firm has any 
impact on the acquiring firm announcement period abnormal return and long run 
post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal return. The empirical models employed to 
test these hypotheses are introduced in chapter 4 and the results are presented and 
discussed in chapter 6.   
 
In addition to the five main hypotheses developed in th s chapter, a set of additional 
hypotheses (nine hypotheses) relating to the effect of firm size, the role of corporate 
governance, and the impact of concurrent coexistence of acquiring firm CEO 
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narcissism and target firm CEO narcissism are also developed and tested in Chapter 
7.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops the testable 
hypotheses based upon the discussion of the relevant literature and arguments. 
Section 3.3 concludes with a summary of these hypotheses.   
 
3.2 Hypotheses development  
 
Starting with a discussion about the concept and the main traits of CEO narcissistic 
personality, I develop the following three categories of hypotheses about the role of 
CEO narcissistic tendency in M&A activities: (1) CEO narcissism and M&A 
decision-making (hypothesis 1); (2) Acquiring firm CEO narcissism and firm M&A 
performance (hypothesis 2 and 3); and (3) the role of the target firm CEO narcissism 
(hypothesis 4 and 5).  
 
3.2.1 CEO Narcissism and M&A decision-making 
 
The extant literature provides a rich source of studies on how managers make 
decisions. Richard Roll (1986) proposed a “hubris hypothesis” for takeovers, which 
provides another possible explanation for M&A activities complementary to such 
conventional arguments as synergy, market expansion, industry shock, etc. He argues 
that the hubris of the individual decision makers in the bidding firms may result in 
overbidding. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) point out that a sense of self-importance, 
a central trait of a narcissistic personality, is actu lly “a precursor of hubris”.  
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The central idea of narcissism is that “individuals have a need to maintain a positive 
sense of self, and they engage in ego-defensive behaviour in order to preserve 
self-esteem” (Brown, 1997). Lubit (2002) summarises the four defining 
characteristics of the “destructive narcissist” as “grandiosity (inflated sense of 
self-importance, arrogance and excessive seeking of admiration), a sense of 
entitlement, lack of concern for, and devaluation of others, and a lack of enduring 
attachment to a set of values and an inner emptiness that leads them to seek 
excitement despite high risks”. Campbell, Goodie, and Foster (2004) define highly 
narcissistic CEOs as those who have very inflated slf-views and who are 
preoccupied with having these self-views continuously reinforced. In my study, I 
treat CEO narcissism as a personality dimension which consists of both cognitive 
and motivational elements. “On the cognitive side, narcissism entails a belief in one’s 
superior qualities”, and “on the motivational side, narcissism carries an intense need 
to have one’s superiority reaffirmed.” (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) 
 
As shown in the literature review in Chapter 2 Section 2.3, a narcissistic tendency is 
widespread in leadership roles, such as CEOs and other top executive managers 
(Deluga, 1997; Maccoby, 2000; Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006). Several studies show 
that the narcissistic tendency of leaders often has a negative impact on firms or 
organizations (Penney and Spector, 2002; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Blair, 
Hoffman, and Helland, 2006; Judge, LePine, and Rich, 2006; Lubit, 2002). If 
narcissistic leaders have such a negative impact on firm performance, why then do 
we observe so many narcissistic leaders (CEOs) surviving and rising in an 
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organization (firm)? In the more specific context of M&A activities, why do we 
observe so many narcissistic CEOs surviving even after many value destructive deals?  
Brunell, Gentry, Campbell, Hoffman, Kuhnert, and DeMarree (2008) raise this 
question, and they give one possible explanation that “narcissists have skills and 
qualities that are beneficial for becoming leaders”. Lubit (2002) also proposes that 
narcissistic CEOs are often very good at company politics.   
 
Another possible explanation is that it is difficult for investors to arbitrage away the 
consequences of managerial narcissism via takeovers r other corporate governance 
mechanisms due to the extremely high transaction costs involved in such activities 
(Heaton, 2002). Furthermore, the traditional corporate governance mechanisms, 
paradoxically, are not only limited in addressing managerial narcissism directly, but 
can even increase such narcissistic tendencies. For example, the way many firm 
compensation systems are constructed, leading to high CEO rewards, may result in 
providing reinforcing positive feedback to the CEO, making him/her believe that 
they are performing well, have superior abilities, and are better than other CEOs, 
enhancing their level of narcissism and belief in their own self-worth and entitlement  
(Paredes, 2005).  
 
Another reason for the persistence of the adverse impact of high levels of managerial 
narcissism in M&A decision-making is that feedback about deal success/failure is 
slow, impeding the managers’ ability to learn approriately from the results of past 
decisions. As a result, narcissistic managers may mke more value-destroying deals 
before their propensity to destructive narcissism i recognized. In addition, even after 
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several years, managers with a high level of narcissist c tendency may still be unable 
to acknowledge the consequences of their decisions due to the feedback they receive 
being very noisy. Too many other factors can be viewed as leading to poor 
post-acquisition performance, and highly narcissistic managers are likely to attribute 
such adverse outcomes to outside factors rather than their own decisions, leaving 
their self-image untouched. Such opportunities for self-attribution can, thus, further 
exacerbate the problem of high levels of CEO narcissism (Billett and Qian, 2008; 
Brown, 1997).  
 
Empirical studies on the impact of managerial narcissism in M&A deals are limited.  
Rovenpor (1993) conducts a psychology study to examine the relationship between 
CEO personality characteristics and firm M&A activities, using as a sample the 
CEOs of the top 350 firms in the Forbes 500 list of 1988. He finds that a high level 
of CEO self-confidence is associated with a high level of M&A activity. Fanto 
(2001), in his psychologically-oriented empirical study of recent mega-mergers, 
reports strong managerial over-optimism in such deals.  He proposes that the 
manager may overestimate the value of a potential merger because he/she believes 
that his/her leadership or management skills are “better than average”. Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) provide empirical evidence that a strong relationship exists between 
level of CEO overconfidence and the probability of undertaking mergers. Importantly, 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) formally establish a connection between CEO 
narcissism and their strategic decisions and performance outcomes. They point out 
that narcissistic managers will favour acquisitions both because they are highly 
confident in their ability to perform better than the target firm managers, and, also, 
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because they view M&A activity as a perfect stage on which to act out a drama to 
attract attention and to feed their need for admiration. My first hypothesis is thus 
derived as follows: 
 
H1:  High narcissism CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers and acquisitions 
than low narcissism CEOs. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I first divide my sample of CEOs into two groups: high 
narcissism (HN) CEOs and low narcissism (LN) CEOs using two measures: 
Holder67 and media portrayal. The comparative acquisitiveness behaviour of the two 
groups of CEOs is next examined. I then explore the relation between CEO 
narcissism and CEO acquisitiveness behaviour. I do not seek to conduct a similar 
analysis using my narrative content analysis-based m asure of CEO narcissism in 
this case, as I cannot measure this for non-bid situations, as there is no relevant CEO 
comment. The detailed methodology issues associated with hypothesis testing is 
discussed in section 4. 
 
3.2.2 Acquiring firm CEO narcissism and firm performance in M&A   
 
According to traditional finance theory, the rationale for undertaking mergers or 
acquisitions is to increase (maximize) shareholder w alth through the synergies 
created by such deals. However, the extensive extant li erature demonstrates that 
mergers and acquisitions only benefit the shareholders of the target firms with, at 
best, on average, no significant gains for the shareholders of the acquiring firms. In 
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fact, many studies even suggest that M&A deals destroy firm value in the long run.12 
But, if such mergers and acquisitions cannot enhance shareholder wealth, why then 
do we observe so many value destroying deals? Why do so many firms underperform 
in the long run after making acquisitions?  
 
Several explanations are provided in the management and finance literature, such as 
efficiency (synergies) (Kitching, 1967; Chatterjee, 1986), management competition 
(Jensen, 1986), managerial timing of market overvaluations (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003), Q-theory (Jovanovic and Roussear, 2002), and the agency problem (Rhoades, 
1983; Black, 1989).  
.  
Such potential explanations for value-destroying M&A activities, however, are 
partial or only valid in some cases; they are far from complete. Richard Roll (1986) 
proposes that value-destroying takeovers may result from “hubris”. On this basis, Lys 
and Vincent (1995) conduct a case study on AT&T’s acquisition of NCR, and suggest 
that the massive value-destruction in that deal mayh ve resulted from managerial 
hubris.  
 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to 
undertake diversifying mergers, which are unlikely to create value on average. Their 
results also suggest that the market prefers the bids of less overconfident managers: 
cumulative abnormal returns around the bid announcement date are roughly 75 basis 
                                                   
12 E.g., Dodd and Ruback (1977), Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2003), Asquith (1983), Loderer 
and Martin (1992), Malatesta (1983), Kennefy, Limmack, Gregory (1997), Agrawal, Jaffe, and 
Mandelker (1992), Kohers and Kohers (2000), Louis (2002), Varaiya and Ferris (1987), Ferris and 
Park (2001), Rosen (2003), Langetieg (1978).                                                                                                                                              
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points lower on average in the case of overconfident managers. Doukas and 
Petmezas (2007) also provide evidence consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2008), 
using a sample of UK M&A deals. Aktas, De Bodt, and Roll (2005) further point out 
that managerial hubris may lead to an increase in bid premium to raise the likelihood 
of doing the deal (winning the auction). Since this premium is partly a distorted 
perception of reality, the market reaction will be n gative (if the capital markets are 
efficient).  Such overbidding is an important channel by which high levels of CEO 
narcissism can lead to value destruction. These findings in the finance studies are 
actually highly consistent with the results of relevant studies in the managerial 
literature, which show that the leaders with narcissistic personalities are often 
involved in counterproductive behaviour (Penney andSpector, 2002; Judge, LePine, 
and Rich, 2006) and risky decision-making behaviour (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 
2007), consequently leading to poor performance (Blair, Hoffman, and Helland, 2006; 
Judge et al., 2006). Lubit (2002) also proposes that t e destructive narcissism of 
CEOs can have negative impacts on organizations in two ways. First, a narcissistic 
tendency often drives highly narcissistic CEOs to make disastrous business decisions 
because “their personal agendas take precedence over the company’s best interests”. 
Second, highly narcissistic CEOs often engage in such activities as empire-building 
and “rapid change of course”, in order to feed their n ed for excitement and glory. 
These activities can disturb a firm’s normal operation and impede the “prudent” 
growth of a company, and consequently destroy firm value.         
 
Thus, in general, previous work predicts that mergers conducted by HN CEOs will 
perform worse on average than mergers conducted by LN CEOs, and will lead to the 
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destruction of the firm value. I thus develop my second and third hypotheses: 
  
H2:  The impact of CEO narcissism on firm M&A announcement performance is 
negative.  
 
H3: The impact of CEO narcissism on firm long run post-acquisition performance is 
negative. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I first conduct event studies to measure the respective 
announcement period M&A deal cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), and long run 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). I then examine the relation between level 
of CEO narcissism and firm performance (CARs or BHARs) using a multiple 
regression model approach which includes a comprehensiv  set of control variables.  
 
3.2.3 The impact of target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm performance  
 
Previous research only focuses on the potential impact of implicit acquiring firm 
CEO narcissism.  There is no similar formal empirical study of target firm CEO 
narcissism, although Malmendier and Tate (2003) briefly mentioned this point. In 
this study, I argue that the CEO narcissistic tendency, as a personality characteristic, 
may also exist in target firms. In other words, target firm CEOs can equally be prone 
to high levels of narcissism, and an associated sense of inflated self-worth and 
confidence in their ability to create value.  As a result, they may overestimate the 
value of their firm to a bidder, pushing the bid premium up. On this basis, it is 
reasonable to expect that acquirers might have to pay more for targets with HN CEOs, 
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and the resulting overpayment above an optimal bid premium will have a negative 
impact on acquiring firm performance. This leads to my fourth and fifth hypotheses:  
 
H4: Target firm CEO narcissism has a negative impact on firm M&A announcement 
performance.  
 
H5: Target firm CEO narcissism has a negative impact on firm long run 
post-acquisition performance.  
 
It is worth stressing here that this study has no intention of asking and addressing the 
question of who (the acquiring firm CEOs vs the target firm CEOs) are more likely 
to be HN CEOs. My argument here is that the role of target firm CEO narcissism 
should be appropriately considered and examined in the study of M&A activities. 
Actually, it would be unsurprising to find a large number of HN CEOs in the target 
firms, as HN CEOs are usually associated with ineffective leadership and poor 
performance, and the firms that have poor management and performance are more 
likely to become targets of acquisitions according to the management competition 
model of M&A drives (Jensen, 1986).   
 
3.3 Summary 
 
To address my research questions, I develop a set of t stable hypotheses based on the 
literature reviewed in the previous chapter. The test of my first hypothesis (H1) aims 
to examine the link between CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a firm conducting 
an M&A deal. The second hypothesis (H2) is designed to explore the market reaction 
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to the deals announced by highly narcissistic CEOs. The third hypothesis (H3) tests 
the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on firm long run post-acquisition 
performance. Finally, my fourth and fifth (H4 and H5) hypotheses are aimed at 
examining the role of target firm CEO narcissism in explaining firm short run M&A 
(announcement period) performance and long run post-acquisition abnormal returns.   
 
The methodological issues associated with hypothesis testing are introduced and 
discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research methodology used in this study. To test the 
hypotheses developed in chapter 3, three methodologica  issues need to be addressed: 
(1) How can CEO narcissism be measured? (2) How can a firm’s abnormal return 
during and after M&A deals be calculated? (3) How can the impact of CEO 
narcissism on M&A decision-making and firm performance be tested?  
 
Therefore, in this chapter, I start with one of themost important aspects of my study, 
the construction of my measures of CEO narcissism. Specifically, I detail the 
methods and steps for constructing my three CEO narcissism measures: Holder67, 
media portrayal, and content analysis on CEO speech. At the beginning of the 
measures construction section, I also briefly review the measures used to date in both 
the finance and managerial literature. Following this discussion of my measures of 
CEO narcissism I describe the event study methods employed in this study to 
calculate firm short run (announcement period) M&A abnormal returns and long run 
post-M&A abnormal returns. Finally, I introduce my three regression models and the 
variables used to test my hypotheses. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the 
construction of my CEO narcissism measures. There are two sub-sections. 
Sub-section 4.2.1 reviews nine measures used in previous studies in both the finance 
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and strategic management areas: Holder67, Longholder, Net Purchase Ratio (NPR), 
Net buyer, Media portrayal, Prominence of the CEO’s photograph, CEO prominence 
in company press releases, CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns, and Relative 
pay. Sub-section 4.2.2 introduces the three measures s d in this study. The 
procedures used to construct these measures are detaile  in this sub-section 
respectively. Section 4.3 describes the event study methods employed in this research. 
Both short run and long run event studies are discussed in sub-sections 4.3.1 and 
4.3.2. Section 4.4 introduces the three regression m dels used in this study: a logistic 
regression model and two OLS regression models. For each model, the dependent 
variable, independent variable, and control variables are defined and discussed. 
Finally, Section 4.5 summarises the methodology employed.    
         
4.2 CEO narcissism measures 
 
4.2.1 Review of the measures of CEO narcissism (and the related construct) 
 
In the finance and management literature, academics have developed some direct or 
indirect measures of CEO narcissism. It worth repeating here that, as overconfidence 
is a key trait of a narcissistic personality, the CEO overconfidence measures 
reviewed in the following sub-section are directly or indirectly proxying for the more 
fundamental construct with better construct validity, CEO narcissism, although the 
“overconfidence” label is still used here in order to be consistent with the literature.  
 
4.2.1.1 Holder67 (“Holding options too long”) 
 
Malmendier and Tate’s (2005, 2008) studies of the effect of CEO overconfidence on 
 67 
a firm’s investment (including M&A) decision-making develop a measure of 
overconfidence, Holder67, to identify CEO overconfidence based upon the timing of 
option exercise. Based on a benchmark for the extent of options of “in the money” at 
which a rational CEO should exercise their options, Malmendier and Tate construct 
their Holder67 variable by examining each CEO’s actu l option-exercising behaviour. 
The rationale for this measure is that economically rational and under-diversified 
CEOs should exercise at least some portion of theirvested options if the amount of 
in-the-money of their options is beyond a benchmark level. However, overconfident 
CEOs will tend to overestimate the future returns from their investment projects. 
Therefore, they believe that their firm’s stock prices will continue to rise under their 
leadership more than they should expect objectively. As a result, their overconfidence 
will induce them to postpone their option exercise in order to benefit personally from 
their expected future gains. 
 
In Malmendier and Tate (2005), according to Holder 67, a CEO is identified as  
“overconfident” if he/she failed to exercise their highly in-the-money options at least 
twice since year 5 (including year 5).13 As only CEOs who exhibit such late 
exercising behaviour at least twice are classified as “overconfident”, this measure 
can capture “a ‘permanent’ rather than ‘transitory’ verconfidence effect”.  
 
In Malmendier and Tate (2008), the definition of Holder67 is slightly different from 
Malmendier and Tate (2005), though based upon the same rationale. They classify a 
CEO as an “overconfident” CEO if he/she does not exercise their options that are 
                                                   
13 Malmendier and Tate (2005) consider the option exercising decision since year 5, as most options 
in their sample “have a ten-year duration and are fully vested only after year four”.   
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highly in-the-money (at least 67% in-the-money) in the fifth year prior to expiration. 
67% in-the-money is used as the threshold corresponding to a risk aversion of three 
in a constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) utility specification.14    
 
However, this measure may suffer from some disadvantages. One drawback is that it 
primarily captures CEO overconfidence about overall firm performance rather than 
overconfidence about the potential merger project. In addition, there are some 
potential alternative explanations for holding optins that are highly in the money. 
For example, a CEO might hold a highly in-the-money option not because he or she 
is overconfident, but because he or she has inside information that stock prices will 
rise and will therefore tend to hold the option longer in order to reap larger profits. 
Another potential alternative explanation is signalli g. CEOs may wish to send 
positive signals to the market through holding their highly in-the-money options. 
Though admitting there are these potential alternative explanations associated with 
Holder67, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) alleviate such concerns in their 
discussion.    
 
4.2.1.2 Longholder (“Holding option forever”)  
 
Longholder is another measure of CEO overconfidence used in Malmendier and Tate 
(2008). A CEO is classified as an “overconfident” CEO if he or she holds an 
in-the-money option until expiration.15 Unlike Holder67 (Malmendir and Tate, 2008), 
                                                   
14 According to Hall and Murphy (2002), CEOs should exercise the vested option if it is 67% in the 
money. This threshold corresponds to a risk aversion of 3. (The level of risk version is based upon a 
CRRA utility specification.) 
15 Malmendier and Tate (2008) identify CEOs as “overconfident” CEOs if they “hold an option until 
the year of expiration, even though the option is at le st 40% in-the-money entering its final year”.  
 69 
that only captures the CEO’s behaviour in option exercise in the fifth year prior to 
expiration, Longholder can capture the behaviour beyond the fifth year prior to 
expiration. However, as the Longholder measure is also based on the timing of 
option exercise to identify overconfidence, which is the same idea as with Holder67, 
this measure suffers from similar disadvantages.  
 
4.2.1.3 Net Purchase Ratio (NPR) 
 
Billett and Qian (2008) construct a measure of overconfidence, Net Purchase Ratio 
(NPR), in their study of the source of managerial hubris in mergers and acquisitions.   
The rationale of this measure is that, if managers b lieve that mergers or acquisitions 
will create value, they would want to increase their olding of firm stock before deal 
announcements. If managers are overconfident, we would expect to observe them 
exhibiting abnormal purchase behaviour (with purchasing level exceeding the normal 
level), but, if the drivers of M&A deals are agency problem issues or market 
overvaluation of acquiring firm, managers should want to decrease their stake in the 
firm before deal announcements as they know the truth and do not believe that the 
deals will create value for the firm. Based on this principle, Matthew and Yiming 
(2005) measure overconfidence through the investigation of the trading activities of 
the acquiring firm’s CEO before the M&A deals. They develop NPR to quantify 
insider trading activities, and then use abnormal NPR, or abnormal insider trading 
activity (using normal insider trading activity as the benchmark) to identify CEO 
overconfidence. The construction of the measure consists of four steps.  
 
First, they calculate the CEO’s “Net purchase” using the following formula:   
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Net Purchase = number of shares bought from the open market or other source 
            + share purchase by exercising options 
            - number of shares sold 
Then, they calculate the NPR using the following formula: 
            
nTransactioInsidertheofVolumeTotal
PurchaseNet
NPR =  
Next, they construct the normal insider trading benchmark in the following two 
ways:  
(1) A cross-sectional control: the benchmark is the mean NPR for a size-matched 
   portfolio of firms during the 180 days before an acquisition announcement.  
(2) A time-series control, the benchmark is the acquiring firm’s NPR measured from  
  days (-360, -180) before the announcement of the firm’s first deal in the preceding  
  five years. 
Finally, they calculate abnormal NPR by comparing the firm’s NPR with benchmark 
NPR.  
   
The major advantage of this measure is that it can capture a CEO’s overconfidence 
about a specific merger and acquisition deals he/she engages in rather than about the 
companies’ general performance. In addition, it takes both the stock purchase and the 
option exercise into account. However, NPR does not consider the real market 
misvaluation. That is, the CEO may be the “net purchaser” only because he or she 
intends to take advantage of the market misvaluation, rather than because he or she is 
overconfident.   
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4.2.1.4 Net buyer (“Habitual buyer of stock”)  
 
Considering that CEOs can not only choose to hold or exercise their options but also 
choose to buy or sell their shares, Malmendier and Tate (2005) construct an 
alternative indicator, “Net buyer” (“Habitual buyer of stock”), to measure 
overconfidence. This proxy uses the habitual acquisition of the company stock to 
identify CEO overconfidence. Specifically, Malmendier and Tate classify CEOs who 
are net buyer of stocks during their first five sample years as “overconfident”. They 
define “a net buyer” as “someone who bought stock on net at least one more year 
than he sold stock on net during his first five sample years”.16 Though this measure 
has the same rationale as the NPR measure, it is slghtly different. NPR measures a 
CEO’s trading behaviour over a specific time window before the specific M&A deal 
he/she engages in and therefore it can help to capture the CEO’s overconfidence 
about the deal. In contrast, Net buyer measures a CEO’s trading behaviour over a 
time period that is not necessarily before the deal, in an attempt to capture CEO 
habitual overconfidence.  
 
In sum, the strength of this proxy is that it can capture the “permanent or habitual” 
rather than “transitory” overconfidence effect, as the measure is based on the 
examination of CEO habitual stock purchase behaviour. However, like other 
measures, Net buyer also has some disadvantages. First, it can only capture CEO 
overconfidence about overall firm performance rather t an the specific M&A deal. 
Second, this proxy might be affected by restrictions  CEO stock purchase. Finally, 
there are some other alternative explanations for CEO stock purchase behaviour.  
                                                   
16  Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate (2005), CEO overconfidence and corporate investment,     
   Journal of Finance, Vol.60 Issue 6, pp. 2661-2700. 
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4.2.1.5 Media portrayal 
 
Media portrayal is the measure of overconfidence developed by Malmendier and 
Tate (2003, 2005b). Unlike the measures reviewed so far (Holder 67, Longholder, 
NPR and Net buyer), which are based on the CEO’s option exercise or stock 
purchase activities, Media portrayal relies on outsiders’ views to identify CEO 
overconfidence. A systematic search for articles refer ing to the CEO in the 
mainstream press is conducted. The number of articles referring to the CEO as 
“confident”, the number of articles referring to him as “optimistic”, and the number 
of articles referring to him as “reliable”, “conservative”, “cautious”, “steady”, 
“practical”, or “frugal” are recorded. Then Malmendier and Tate construct an 
indicator variable which takes the value 1 whenever th  number of “confident” and 
“optimistic” articles on the CEO (removing any “not confident” or “not optimistic” 
articles) exceeds the number of “reliable”, “conservative”, “cautious”, “steady”, 
“practical”, and “frugal” articles.  
 
The main advantage of this measure is that it can capture outsiders’ (or the market’s) 
perceptions about CEO overconfidence. The disadvantage is that the words that the 
media use may be very subjective. In addition, there is much less abundant exposure 
(media) information about small and medium-sized companies than about big ones. 
This may result in the restriction of the sample to the large companies that are more 
likely to attract media attention.  
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So far, measures for a key trait of CEO narcissism – CEO overconfidence – have 
been reviewed. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) develop four direct but unobtrusive 
measures of CEO narcissism: the prominence of the CEO’s photograph, the CEO’s 
prominence in press releases, the CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns, and 
the CEO’s relative pay. In the following sections, these measures are reviewed 
respectively.  
    
4.2.1.6 Prominence of the CEO’s photograph 
 
Chaterjee and Hambrick (2007) point out that the firm’s annual report provides a 
stage on which a CEO can “showcase himself or herself a  the firm’s leader”. 
Through discussions with communications specialists, they further provide evidence 
that CEOs usually pay a lot of attention to and have control over their image in the 
annual report. Therefore, they measure the prominence of the CEO’s photograph, 
based on an expectation that “the highly narcissistic CEO will seek a great deal of 
visibility in the annual report, both as an exercise of vanity and as a strong 
declaration that he or she is more important than all others in the firm”. They rate the 
proxy according to the size of the CEO’s photograph in the firm’s annual report and 
whether the photograph is of the CEO alone. Then thy use this proxy to indicate the 
CEO’s narcissistic tendency.  
 
4.2.1.7 CEO prominence in company press releases  
 
CEO prominence in company press releases is another measure of CEO narcissism 
developed by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) and based on the content analysis of 
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companies’ press releases on a wide range of corporate issues. Again, based on their 
discussions with communications specialists, they point out that CEOs have full 
control over companies’ press releases and, therefor , narcissistic CEOs may use 
these messages as a tool to remind outsiders how important they are. They expect 
that the “highly narcissistic CEO will insist on being mentioned as often as possible, 
both as an exercise of vanity and out of a desire to showcase his or her authority”. 
Based on this rationale, they construct the measure, CEO prominence in company 
press releases, by calculating the CEO prominence using the following formula: 
   
CEO prominence
releasespressscompanytheallinwordsofnumbertotalThe
releasespressscompanytheinmentionedwasnamesCEOthetimesofNumber
'
''=  
 
4.2.1.8 CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns  
 
As the use of such first-person singular pronouns as “I”, “me”, “mine”, “my”, 
“myself” in speech can reflect self-absorption, a key characteristic of narcissism, 
(Raskin and Shaw, 1988), Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) construct a measure of 
CEO narcissism based on a count of first-person singular pronouns in transcripts of 
interviews with CEOs. They count the number of first-person singular pronouns (I, 
me, mine, my, myself) the CEO uses and the number of first-person plural pronouns 
(we, us, our, ours, ourselves), respectively. Then, they calculated the percentage of 
first-person singular pronouns by using the following formula: 
   
.).( pluandsinbothpronounspersonfirstallofnumberThe
pronounssin.personfirstofnumberThe
sin.personfirstofPercentage =  
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4.2.1.9 Relative pay 
 
Drawing on the literature (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) 
that shows CEOs have a great impact on decisions regarding their own compensation 
package, Chatterjee and Hambric (2007) propose that CEO narcissism can be 
reflected in the CEO’s pay relative to other executive officers in the firm, as 
narcissistic CEOs view themselves as more valuable nd more important than others 
in the firm and consequently tend to pay themselves more. Based on Hayward and 
Hambrick’s (1997) measure of self-importance, they d velop two measures of CEO 
narcissism: CEO relative cash pay17 and CEO relative non-cash pay.18 These two 
measures are calculated as follows:  
 
paycashsexecutivepaidhighestSecond
paycashsCEO
paycashlative
'___
'
Re =  
paycashnonsexecutivepaidhighestSecond
paycashnonsCEO
paycashnonlative
_'___
_'
_Re =  
 
In sum, these unobtrusive measures of narcissism developed in Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2007) have both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, these 
measures are not prone to the problems of reactivity or social desirability bias, that 
are often associated with some research methods (e.g. surveys) in social studies, as 
they are based on “non-participant observation, documentary sources, and the written 
and spoken words” to identify the narcissistic personality. On the other hand, they 
can be very noisy. For example, in the case of the relative pay measure, other factors, 
such as CEO tenure and past performance, may have an impact on CEO 
compensation.  
                                                   
17 Cash pay includes salary and bonus.  
18 Non-cash pay includes deferred income, stock grants, d stock options.  
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At the end of this section, I summarise the key features of the reviewed measures in 
Table 4-1.  
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Table 4-1 Summary of CEO narcissism (or related constructs) measures and their advantages/disadvantages 
 
Label (term) Measure Method of measuring Advantages Disadvantages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Holder67  
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005): a CEO is 
classified as an “overconfident” CEO if 
he/she failed to exercise highly 
in-the-money option at least twice since 
the fifth year after the grant of the 
options. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008): a CEO is 
identified as an “overconfident” CEO if 
he/she doesn’t exercise their options that 
are highly in-the-money (at least 67% 
in-the-money) during the fifth year prior 
to expiration.  
 
 
It can capture the “habitual” rather 
than “transitory” overconfidence 
effect.   
 
 
 
 
1. It primarily captures 
overconfidence about the firm’s 
performance rather than 
overconfidence about potential 
M&A projects. 
2. It may suffer from alternative 
explanations, such as insider 
information, signalling, stock 
price bubbles, and stock price 
volatility. 
 
             
 
 
Longholder  
 
CEOs who during their tenure hold an 
in-the-money (at least 40% in-the-money 
entering the final year) option until 
expiration are considered 
“overconfident”.  
 
 
Longholder considers the CEO’s 
option exercising behaviour beyond 
the fifth year prior to expiration. 
 
It has the same disadvantages as 
Holder67, as it is also based on 
the timing of the option 
exercises.  
 
 
Overconfidence 
 
Net buyer 
(Habitual 
Buyer of 
Stock)  
 
 
 
A CEO is considered “overconfident” if 
he/she was a net buyer of stock for more 
years than he/she was a net seller during 
their first five sample years. 
 
 
It can capture the habitual” rather 
than “transitory” overconfidence 
effect.   
 
 
 
 
 
1. It can only capture the CEO’s  
overconfidence about overall 
firm performance rather than 
the M&A deal. 
2. Restrictions on the CEO’s 
share purchase may have 
significant effects on this proxy. 
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Net Purchase 
Ratio              
(Insider 
trading 
activity) 
 
It uses abnormal insider trading activity 
to identify “overconfidence”.  
 
Net Purchase =  
 the number of shares bought from the   
 open market or other private source 
+share purchase by exercising options 
- the number of shares sold 
 
NPR: standardizing the “Net Purchase” 
by using the total volume of the insider 
transactions. 
 
 
1. It can capture the CEO’s 
overconfidence about specific 
merger and acquisition deals rather 
than about the firm’s general 
performance.  
2. It takes both the stock purchase 
and the option exercising into 
account.  
 
NPR does not consider the 
potential market misvaluation. 
The “net purchaser” might not 
be overconfident about his/her 
own abilities, but simply intend 
to take advantage of market 
misvaluation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Media 
Portrayal 
 
A systematic key word search for media 
portrayals of a CEO is conducted. A 
CEO is considered “overconfident” if the 
number of articles describing the CEO as 
“confident” and “optimistic” exceeds the 
number of those describing him/her as 
“reliable,” “conservative,” “cautious,” 
“steady,” “practical,” and “frugal”. 
 
 
It can capture the outsiders’ (or 
market’s) perception about the 
CEO’s overconfidence.  
 
 
The words that the media use 
may be very subjective. 
Narcissism 
 
Prominence 
of photograph 
 
 
It uses the prominence of the CEO’s 
photograph in the annual report as an 
indicator of CEO narcissism. The 
indicator is rated in different points 
based on the size of the CEO’s photo 
and whether the photo was of the CEO 
alone.  
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Prominence 
in company 
press releases 
 
 
It uses the number of times the CEO’s 
name was mentioned relative to the total 
number of words in the firm’s press 
releases as an i dicator of narcissism.                  
 
 
Use of 
first-person 
singular 
pronouns 
 
 
It uses the number of first-person 
singular pronouns relative to the number 
of first-person plural pronouns as an 
indicator of narcissism.  
 
Relative pay 
 
 
It views the cash pay and non-cash pay 
of a CEO relative to the second highest 
paid executive as a reflection of his/her 
narcissism tendency (inflated sense of 
self-importance).    
 
 
These unobtrusive measures are 
based on “non-participant 
observation, documentary sources, 
and the written and spoken words” 
to identify a narcissistic personality, 
alleviating the problems of 
reactivity or social desirability bias 
often associated with some research 
methods (e.g. survey) in social 
studies.  
 
 
These measures might be 
affected by many other factors. 
Therefore, they can be very 
noisy.  
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4.2.2 Three measures for CEO narcissism in this study 
 
In this study, I use three proxy variables to measure CEO narcissism: Holder67, 
media portrayal, and content analysis of CEO speech. The first two measures are 
based on CEO option exercise behaviour and media comments on CEOs respectively. 
The third proxy content analysis measure which is original to the literature is based 
on the analysis of CEOs’ speeches about M&A deals. In this sub-section, I introduce 
the construction of these three measures of CEO narcissism and discuss the potential 
issues related to these proxies. 
 
4.2.2.1 Holder67  
 
Holder67 is used as one proxy for CEO narcissism in this study. As reviewed in the 
last sub-section, this measure is developed by Malmendier and Tate (2003, 2005, and 
2008) and based on CEO option exercise timing behaviour. It is used as a measure of 
the CEO’s belief in his/her ability to generate superior returns, and the associated 
self-value, which are key aspects of a narcissistic personality. We would expect a 
high narcissism CEO’s elevated self-image to lead to his/her expectation that the 
firm’s stock price will continue to rise under his/her leadership more than is 
objectively justified. Therefore, as a result, highly narcissistic CEOs will tend to 
postpone their option exercise to benefit personally from the future gains they see 
themselves as generating, even if the amount in-the-money is beyond a rational 
benchmark.  
 
However, there is some debate about whether this measur  is necessarily a clean 
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measure, since CEOs may hold their deep in-the-money ptions for other reasons. 
One possible reason is insider information. If CEOs have, or believe they have, some 
positive inside information which makes them believe that their firm’s stock price 
will rise in the future, to profit from this they would choose to hold their option 
longer even if deep in-the-money. However, Malmendir and Tate (2008) argue that, 
if insider information drives a CEO late option exercise, the return for holding the 
options should be positive. However, their evidence shows that CEOs do not profit 
from a delay in the option exercise, which helps to rule out this explanation. Another 
issue relating to the use of Holder67 is that the CEO option exercise behaviour could 
also relate to the firm’s prior performance. Good recent past performance may lead 
CEOs to expect that their firm will continue to perform well in the future, leading to 
the non-exercise of deep in-the-money options in order to benefit from the expected 
further increase in share price. To control for this explanation, I include a 1-year 
lagged return in my cross-sectional regression analyses.  
 
In addition, some academics argue that CEOs may fail to exercise their in-the-money 
options not for psychological reasons, but because they want to increase their 
ownership stake in the firm. However, I believe that this explanation is unlikely, as 
the previous literature (e.g., Ofek and Yermack, 2000; Bartov and Mohanram, 2004) 
documents evidence that executives tend to sell nearly all of their shares acquired 
through option exercise, rather than retain them.  
 
Malmendier and Tate (2003, 2005, 2008) use the Halland Liebman (1998) and 
Yermack (1995) data set, from which they extract the data required for the 
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construction of Holder67. The virtue of that data set is that it provides detailed 
information on the stock ownership and set of option packages — including exercise 
price, remaining duration, and number of underlying shares — for the CEO of each 
company year by year, which makes the construction of Holder67 possible. However, 
this data set only includes 477 large firms19 for the period 1980-1994, leading to 
potential problems in generalizing their results to maller size firms and, importantly, 
to recent periods, including the technology bubble period. To deal with these issues, I 
construct my Holder67 measure based on Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database, 
which covers the compensation data of top managers in S&P 500, S&P 400 Midcap 
and S&P Smallcap 600 companies. The status of each individual option package and 
the option exercise activity of each sample CEO are examined. The percentage of 
in-the-money of the option package for each CEO is also calculated. Then, the option 
exercise behaviour of each sample CEO is used to classify CEOs into two categories: 
highly narcissistic (HN) CEOs and lowly narcissistic (LN) CEOs. Based on Hall and 
Murphy (2002), and following Malmendier and Tate (2005; 2008) I use 67% 
in-the-money as the threshold. The option that is 67% (or higher) in the money is 
considered as a highly in-the-money option.  
 
The construction of my Holder67 measure requires three steps. First, the information 
of each CEO’s option package is extracted from the Ex cuComp database. Second, 
the percentage of in-the-money of each CEO’s option p rtfolio in a particular firm 
year is calculated. Finally, a CEO is classified as an “HN” CEO if he or she failed to 
exercise his or her vested options which are at least 67% in-the-money at least twice 
                                                   
19  Firms were on the lists of the largest US companies compiled by Forbes Magazine in the period 
1984-1994.   
 83 
during the sample period.20 Otherwise, a CEO is classified as an “LN” CEO. To be 
classified as an “HN” CEOs, the CEO is required to exhibit the failure of option 
(highly in-the-money option) exercise at least twice, as I attempt to capture the 
CEO’s habitual rather than transitory narcissistic tendency.    
 
4.2.2.2 Media Portrayal  
 
I use third party media portrayal as another proxy for the level of CEO narcissism. 
This variable classifies CEOs as HN or LN based upon h w the media portray each 
individual CEO, or, in other words, how they are perceived. The main strength of this 
proxy is that it can capture the outsiders’ (or market’s) perception about CEO 
narcissism.    
   
To construct this measure, I conduct a systematic search for articles and news about 
each of my sample CEOs in a range of 37 media sources via Factiva databases.21 
The same set of keywords used by Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Brown and 
Sarma (2007) is also employed in my study. These keywords reflect the outsiders’ 
views about a central aspect of a narcissistic personality – the overestimation of 
his/her achievements and their personal capacities. Considering the potential 
endogeneity problem that CEOs may change their tenor to send positive signals 
during M&A bids, or the media may be more likely to perceive acquiring CEOs as 
confident, I restrict the article coverage to those published in the period before the 
bid was announced. If a CEO conducted more than one M&A deal during his/her 
                                                   
20 For robustness checks, I also 50% in-the-money and 80% in-the-money as thresholds to construct 
the option exercise behaviour-based measures of CEO narcissism. My results remain unchanged. (The 
regression results are presented in Appendix 3.)  
21 The media sources are introduced in detail in Section 5.2. 
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tenure, I restrict the sample to articles up to his/her first merger or acquisition. I 
record the number of articles that describe the CEO as: (1) “optimistic” (including 
“optimism”) and “confident” (including “confidence”); (2) “reliable”, “cautious”, 
“conservative”, “steady”, “practical”, “frugal”, “disciplined”, “conscientious”, “not 
confident”, and “not optimistic”. I use N (1) and N (2) to represent the number of 
articles that describe the CEO as these two categories f words respectively. If N (1) 
> N (2), the CEO is classified as an HN CEO; otherwise, an LN CEO. I exclude the 
observations whenever N (1) = N (2), as, in that case, it is impossible to classify a 
CEO as HN or LN according to this measure.      
 
4.2.2.3 Content analysis of CEO speech 
 
As mentioned in the review of CEO narcissism measures, the major disadvantage of 
Holder67 and Media portrayal is that they are not “M&A deal-specific” measures. In 
other words, such proxies can only capture any CEO narcissistic tendency in relation 
to the CEOs’ beliefs about their firm performance and their roles generally, rather 
than in terms of their beliefs in the specific M&A context. To address this problem, I 
construct a new direct measure of CEO narcissism based on the content analysis of 
CEO speech regarding a specific M&A deal. This measure can capture the CEO’s 
beliefs about his/her ability to extract value from the particular M&A deal.    
 
Webb et al. (1966) point out the importance of the us  of the written and spoken 
words of people as a way to “learn about their preferences, perceptions, and 
personalities”. In the area of psychology, researchers have constructed some 
unobtrusive measures based on the word usage to detect individual differences in 
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personalities (Pennebaker, Mehl, and Niederhoffer, 2003). In the area of strategic 
management, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) highlight that “speech is a form of 
expressive behaviour, reflecting the most dominant and consistent personality traits 
of an individual”. However, this method has received little attention in finance 
studies.  
 
In this study, I develop my third CEO narcissism measure based on content analysis 
of CEO speeches about M&A deals. The analysis of CEO speeches (narratives) is 
conducted through the content analysis software, Diction 5.0.  
 
Diction 5.0 is a Windows-based program that examines the verbal tone of a text, 
based on a 10,000-word corpus. It uses a series of dictionaries to search the content 
for five semantic features – Activity, Optimism, Certainty, Realism and Commonality 
(with thirty five sub-features). It has a theoretical basis in applied linguistics and 
focuses on the linguistic structure in narratives. It has been widely used in 
psychology studies (e.g. Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl, 2004), politics studies (e.g. 
Forsythe, 2004; Blighn and Hess, 2007), and management studies (e.g. Finkelstein, 
1997; Emrich, Brower, Feldman, and Garland, 2001; Bligh and Hess, 2007; 
Alexander, Ober, and Zhao, and Davis, 1999).   
 
This software is appealing for use in this study for three reasons. First, the semantic 
features it searches for fit well the purpose of my study. Second, the focus of the 
Diction analysis fits very well with the nature of the texts, CEO speeches, to be 
analyzed in this study. More specifically, Diction 5.0 focuses on rhetorical narralogy 
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(Hart, 1985) and the speeches of CEOs are notorious for their great rhetoric. Finally, 
the software can generate objective scores of the verbal tone of a text, free from the 
researchers’ subjective judgements.     
 
In this study, the Diction variable OPTIMISM22(optimistic tone) is used to construct 
my content analysis of CEO speech measure of CEO narcissism. The score on 
variable OPTIMISM obtained in the content analysis of a CEO’s speech about a 
specific M&A deal he/she engages in reflects the CEO’s belief in his/her ability to 
extract value from the particular deal. The abnormally high score on variable 
OPTIMISM may reflect the CEO’s distorted belief in his/her superior 
(better-than-average) quality and ability to generate returns in M&A. This 
“overconfidence” or “overestimation” of his/her ability is a core characteristic of a 
narcissistic personality. Therefore, I use the abnormally high OPTIMISM score to 
detect high level of CEO narcissism in this study. In addition, as the CEO narrative 
passages we are interested in here are business-related texts (CEO speeches), to give 
us greater specificity, I employ Diction’s built-in “Business: Corporate Public 
Relations” as the normative profile. The Corporate Public Relations normative 
profile is developed from a broad range of collection of “official mission statements, 
public pronouncements, and CEO speeches in behalf of maj r American corporations 
from 1960s through the mid-1990s”.23   
 
There are four steps in the construction of my Content analysis of CEO speech 
measure of CEO narcissism. First, I extract CEO speech s (discourses) or statements 
                                                   
22 See Appendix 1 for the formulae and word lists used to construct variable OPTIMISM in Diction 
5.0. In addition, an example of the output of Diction 5.0 is presented in Appendix 2.  
23 DICTION 5.0 THE TEXT-ANALYSIS PROGRAM User’s Manual.  
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about the deal from 8-K SEC-filed documents, other relevant documents (e.g. proxy 
statements), and the same wide-range of financial media sources used in deriving my 
media portrayal measure.24 Second, I transform the file format into the format 
required by Diction. Third, I conduct content analysis on those CEO narrative 
passages and obtain the Diction score for variable OPTIMISM. Finally, I obtain the 
value of the binary variable HN (measure of CEO narcissistic tendency) by 
comparing the OPTIMISM score with the Diction defind normal score range (the 
range of normal level of narcissism). HN = 1 (the CEO is classified as highly 
narcissistic CEO) if the OPTIMISM score is greater han the upper limit of the 
normal OPTIMISM score range, otherwise 0.  
 
I remove the observations if the CEO’s OPTIMISM score is equal to the upper limit 
of the normal OPTIMISM score range, as, in that case, it is impossible to decide 
whether a CEO should be classified as highly narcissist c or not, according to this 
measure. In addition, if a CEO has more than one narrative passage about a deal, I 
obtain the OPTIMISM score for each narrative separately and then use the average 
score of these narratives as the CEO’s OPTIMISM score. However, if a CEO has 
conducted more than one deal and has more than one narrative passage about 
different deals, I obtain the OPTIMISM score for each deal separately and classify a 
CEO as HN (HN=1) and LN (HN=0) CEO based on the CEO OPTIMISM score for 
each deal. This means that it is possible for a CEO to have two different OPTIMISM 
scores if he/she has conducted more than one deal.    
                                                   
24 The data collection procedure is introduced in detail in section 5.5.   
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4.3 Method used to evaluate M&A short run and long run 
performance 
 
As the main aim of this study is to explore the relationship between CEO narcissism 
and firm M&A performance, I first need to evaluate firm performance in the context 
of M&A. Therefore in this section, the methods used to measure firm short run and 
long run performance are discussed.  
 
4.3.1 Event study methodology 
 
In this study, an event study method is employed to evaluate firm M&A 
announcement and long run post-acquisition performance.  
 
An event study is a method for examining the impact of an event (e.g. the 
announcement of an M&A deal) on firm (stock) performance, and it has been widely 
used in finance and economics studies. The basic asumption of this method is that 
the capital market is efficient and the impact of an event will be reflected in the 
repricing of an asset consequent on the announcement of the event. The central idea 
of this method is to detect the abnormal return dueto an event. To achieve this, 
researchers need to conduct a series of calculations. A typical event study often 
consists of three steps. First, the normal (or benchmark) return needs to be calculated. 
Second, the abnormal return is calculated by comparing the firm’s actual (or realised) 
return with the normal (or benchmark) return. Finally, the abnormal returns need to 
be aggregated over time or (and) across securities (firms). However, this is only the 
general procedure. There are many different models that can be used to conduct the 
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calculations in each step. Which specific method should be used depends on the type 
of study, the purpose of the study, and the characte istics of the data.  
According to the length of the event window, event studies are often divided into two 
categories: short run event studies and long run event studies. Short run event study 
examines stock performance during a short time window around the event, while a 
long run event study measures the firm (stock) performance over a relatively long 
period of time after the event. As this study examines the impact of CEO narcissism 
on both short run firm M&A performance and long run post-acquisition performance, 
both short run and long run event study methods are employed. These two types of 
event study methods are very different in terms of how they measure normal return, 
the method for calculating abnormal return and the procedure for aggregating 
abnormal returns. Therefore, in the following sub-sections, I introduce my short run 
event study method and long run event study method respectively.  
 
4.3.2 Short run event study 
 
The short run event study method is employed to evaluate firm stock performance 
around the announcement of a merger or acquisition. The event is a merger or 
acquisition; t=0 is the deal announcement date; and daily stock data is used in the 
calculations. The abnormal return is defined as follows: 
 
)|( tititit XRERAR −=  
     Where itR  is the return of stock i at time t; and  
           tX  is the conditioning information for the normal return model.  
 90 
 
To calculate the abnormal return, I first need to derive the normal return that would 
be expected if the event did not occur. The market model is used to estimate the 
normal or benchmark return:   
 
    itMtiiit rr εβα ++=      ( ,0)( =itE ε  
2)var(
iit εσε =  ) 
 
       Where itr  is the return at time t on the stock (firm) i; and   
             Mtr  is the return at time t on the market portfolio; and  
             ii βα ,  the parameters of the market model; and 
             itε  the disturbance term. 
 
Model parameters are estimated from the data over an stimation period. In this short 
run event study, the minimum estimation period is (-145, -46) days and the maximum 
estimation period is (-345, -46) days.25 Both the CRSP equally weighted and the 
value weighted indices are used as the market index. Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and Scholes-Williams betas are used in the parameter es imation of the market model. 
Then I derive the abnormal return that is the error of the prediction obtained from the 
market model:    
 
Mtiiitit rrAR βα ˆˆ −−=  
 
Where itAR  is the abnormal return at time t on stock (firm) i; and   
       iα̂  is the OLS estimator of the parameter iiα in market model; and 
       iβ̂  is the OLS estimator of the parameter iβ in market model.  
                                                   
25 My choice of minimum and maximum estimation period is based on Peterson (1989), which shows 
that the general estimation periods for short run (daily) event study range from 100 to 300 days.  
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Finally, the abnormal returns are aggregated for a defined announcement event 
window ( 21,ττ ). In this study, for short run stock performance, the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for the 3-day event window (-1, +1) are calculated:26  
it
t
i ARCAR ∑
=
=
2
1
),( 21
τ
τ
ττ  
Where ),( 21 ττiCAR  is the cumulative abnormal return on stock (firm) i over the 
event window ( 21,ττ ), in this case (-1, +1).  
 
4.3.3 Long run event study 
 
A long run event study method is also employed to evaluate acquiring firm long run 
post-M&A performance. For each acquiring firm, I compute the 
buy-and-hold-abnormal return (BHAR) by comparing the buy-and-hold return on the 
acquiring firm over a post-M&A window with the buy-and-hold return on a 
benchmark portfolio. The time horizon is (+1, +24)27 months, commencing one 
month following the event date t=0. The BHARs are derived as follows:  
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      Where itr  is the return at time t on stock (firm) I; and  
          ),( 21 ττ  is the post-M&A window, in this case (+1, +24); and  
     ptR  is the return at time t on benchmark portfolio.    
                                                   
26 For robustness checks, the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window (in days) (-2, +2), 
(-3, +3), (-5, +5) and (-10, +10) are also used in the short run performance regression analysis. My 
results remain unchanged.  
27 For robustness checks, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the post-acquisition period (in 
month) (+1, +12) and (+1, +18) are also used in the long run performance regression analysis. My 
results remain unchanged. 
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The return on the benchmark portfolio is used as an estimate of the unobservable 
“status quo” return that an acquiring firm would have had if the merger or acquisition 
had not happened. I construct my benchmark portfolios based on the industry, firm 
size and book-to-market ratio (BE/ME).28 
 
I extract the information about all non-financial and non-utility stocks29 listed on 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Then I classify all stocks into 10 industry groups, 
following the industry classification process used by Fama and French.30 Following 
that, I first divide the firms in each industry group into 3 portfolios based on their 
size, and then further break down each portfolio int 3 sub-portfolios based on their 
book-to-market ratio (BE/ME). Through this process, I obtain 90 (10×3×3) 
benchmark portfolios.  
 
4.4 Regression models and variables 
 
This section introduces the models31 used to test the hypotheses developed in 
chapter 2. Two types of regression model are used in this study: the logistic and 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. I introduce these two types of 
regression model in the following sub-sections respectively.  
 
                                                   
28 For robustness checks, I also include a momentum factor in the construction of benchmark 
portfolios. My results remain unchanged.   
29 I include all stocks for which the relevant data are vailable.  
30http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.frech/data_library.html#HistBenchmarks. I  
exclude financial and utility industries from Fama-French’s 12 industry portfolios, leaving 10 industry 
groups in my study.  
31 For robustness checks, I add the variable High_tecdummy (a dummy variable that indicates the 
high-tech status of a firm) in the models introduced in this chapter to test if my results are driven by 
high-tech firms. My results remain unchanged. (The regression results are presented in Appendix 4.) 
In addition, my regression models used in Chapter 7 also include the variable High_tech_dummy.      
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4.4.1 Logistic regression 
 
To explore the role of CEO narcissism in M&A decision-making, more specifically, 
to examine the relation between the likelihood of a CEO conducting deals and the 
CEO narcissism tendency, I test my first hypothesis H1.   
 
H1:  High narcissism CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers and acquisitions 
than low narcissism CEOs. 
 
The following logistic regression model is used to test this hypothesis:   
 
Y=
876543210 ββββββββα ++++++++ QCFVOSOSizeCGHN ε+−1yearreturn  (1) 
 
As my dependent variable Y is a binary variable, the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
model is unsuitable here. Therefore, in this case, I chose the logistic regression 
technique that is often used when the dependent variable is a binary. As the 
assumptions of logistic regression model and OLS model are very different, the 
estimator significance test and goodness of fit tests for these two types of model are 
also different. In this logistic regression analysis, the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic is 
used to test the goodness of model fit, and the z-statistic is used to test the 
significance of the regression variables. In the rest of this section, I introduce the 
variables in this model.  
 
The dependent variable Y is a binary variable, which equals 1 if the firm announced 
at least one deal (successful bid and completed deal) in  specific firm year. I derive 
 94 
the value of Y based on the historical data of firm M&A activities.  
 
The main independent variable is HN, a binary variable equals to 1 for high 
narcissism CEOs, and equals to 0 otherwise. Two proxies for CEO narcissism – 
Holder67 and Media portrayal, are used in this model. The value of HN is derived 
from these two narcissism measures respectively. The Content analysis of CEO 
speech measure is not used in this model, as the construction of this measure requires 
the CEO to have conducted at least one M&A deal during the sample period (in other 
words, the content analysis measure can only be constructed for CEOs who have 
ever conducted deals), while in this regression model the observations include both 
CEOs who have ever conducted deals and those who have not.    
 
To control for other factors that might impact on the M&A decision, a set of control 
variables is also included in the model. Specifically, variable Size controls for firm 
size, since there is some evidence (e.g., Moeller and Stulz, 2004) that the CEOs of 
larger firms are more likely to suffer from hubris. In my study, Size is the natural 
logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets at the endof the last fiscal year (before the 
deal announcement year), as used by Malmendier and Tate (2008).  
 
Variables SO (stock ownership) and VO (CEO holding of vested options) are 
included to control for the impact of the CEO compensation package on their M&A 
decision making. SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end 
of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement y ar. VO is the CEO’s holdings 
of exercisable options, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Variable CF is 
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used to control for the firm’s internal level of resources. CF is the normalized ratio of 
firm cash flow. Variable Q (Tobin’s Q) is used to control for growth opportunities, 
and is defined as the market value/book value of the assets.  
 
Variable CG (G-index) is used to control for corporate governance quality. Most 
previous studies only use a single corporate governance variable, such as the number 
of board members (Malmendier and Tate, 2008) or CEO tenure (Sudarsanam and 
Huang, 2006), which lead to weak proxies for the ovrall corporate governance 
regime. Therefore, I use a more comprehensive and sophisticated proxy for the 
quality of corporate governance, the G-index, in ths study. The G-index is a number 
based on 24 different governance provisions in several governance areas and 
provides a comprehensive measurement of the quality of the firm’s governance 
mechanism (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003).32 It is worth mentioning here that 
the G-index is constructed in such a way that, the higher the G-index, the poorer the 
corporate governance quality.   
 
Finally, I also include a lagged return variable 1−yearr turn  in my regression to 
control for the impact of prior returns on firm acquisitiveness behaviour.  
In this study, the Pearson residual is used to test for outliers.33   
 
 
 
                                                   
32The G index is firstly constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, and then issued by IRRC 
(Investor Responsibility Research Center. The index I used here is downloaded from 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~metrick/data.htm.  
33 The Pearson residual is the raw residual divided by the square root of the variance function. An 
observation is identified as an outlier if its Pearson residual is not in the normal range (-2.0, +2.0). 
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4.4.2 Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models 
 
To examine empirically the impact of CEO (both acquiring firm CEO and target firm 
CEO) narcissism on firm performance in the context M&A, I need to test the 
hypotheses developed in chapter 2 as follows:   
 
H2: The impact of CEO narcissism on firm M&A announcement performance is 
negative.  
 
H3: The impact of CEO narcissism on firm long run post-acquisition performance is 
negative. 
 
H4: Target firm CEO narcissism has a negative impact on firm M&A announcement 
performance.  
 
H5: Target firm CEO narcissism has a negative impact on firm long run 
post-acquisition performance.  
 
Conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression m dels are used in testing 
these hypotheses. The t-stat is used to test the significance of each predictor variable, 
and the adjusted R2 and F-test are used to test the model fit.  
 
4.4.2.1 The regression model used in examining the impact of acquiring firm 
CEO narcissism on the announcement return of the acquiring firm 
 
The following regression model is used to examine the impact of acquiring firm CEO 
narcissism on acquiring firm M&A announcement performance (or the market 
reaction) to the deal announcement. (Test for the hypot esis H2.)  
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6543210  (2) 
 
Variables SO, VO, CG, and Size follow the same definitions as in equation (1). 
 
The dependent variable in this regression is the 3-day event window (-1, 1) 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the event day t=0 (5-day, 7-day, 11-day, 
21-day and 41-day CARs are also calculated for robustness check purposes.). The 
method for calculating CARs has been introduced in section 4.3.2. 
 
HN is the main independent variable of interest, which is equal to 1 for high 
narcissism CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. Its value is d rived from three measures 
for CEO narcissism – Holder67, Media portrayal, and Content analysis of CEO 
speech respectively.  
 
To control for the impact of other factors on firm performance, I use a group of 
control variables. These controls are extracted from the literature which suggests that 
these factors may have an influence on firm performance in M&A.  
 
Variable RSize represents the relative size of the target firm and is calculated as the 
ratio of the acquirer’s size/target size. The literature (Kohers and Kohers, 2000) 
shows that relative size of target to bidder has a significant impact on the bidder’s 
announcement returns.   
 
Variable Attitude is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is 
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classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies it to be “friendly” or “neutral”.34 Some 
previous studies show that the performance of the acquiring firms that conduct 
“hostile” takeovers is significantly better than tha  of those conduct “friendly” deals. 
However, some academic argue that this difference might actually be a reflection of 
the difference in the types of deals – non-tender offers or tender offers. In the 
literature, there is evidence that tender offers tend to perform better than non-tender 
offers, while most “hostile” deals are tender offers.       
 
Variable relatedness is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the first two digits of 
the SIC code of the acquirer and those of the target ar  the same, 0 otherwise. I 
include this variable in the set of controls, as previous studies suggest that the M&A 
performance is associated with the relatedness of the acquiring firm’s business and 
the target firm’s business. For example, Sicherman and Pettway (1987) report that 
the CAR for the mergers or acquisitions of related business are significantly higher 
than those of mergers or acquisitions of unrelated business, which suggests that the 
acquisition of related business units enhances the acquiring firm’s value while the 
acquisition of unrelated business may have a negative impact on the acquiring firm’s 
shareholder value. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) also find that the 
announcement period return of the takeover is higher when the acquiring firm’s 
business and the target firm’s business are highly overlapping compared with the 
return of the acquisition of unrelated business. Fan and Goyal (2006) also show 
evidence that vertical mergers perform better than diversifying mergers.  
  
                                                   
34 I follow the TOB deal attitude definition: “Friendly” indicates the target firm’s board recommends 
the offer; “Hostile”, that the target firm’s board officially rejects the offer but the acquirer persist  with 
the takeover; and “Neutral”, that the target firm’s board has nothing to do with the transaction. 
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Variable Growth is the target’s market/book (M/B) ratio, which is u ed to proxy for 
growth options. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) report that acquiring firm M&A 
short run (announcement) performance is better if the acquisitions involve the 
purchase of a fast growing target (high M/B ratio) f rms. Kohers and Kohers (2000) 
also show that the short run performance of acquiring firms is significantly positive 
when the targets are high-tech firms (high-tech firms usually have high M/B ratios.)  
 
Variable Payment is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the mthod of payment 
of the deal is cash, otherwise 0. There are a lot of s udies on the relation between the 
financing methods of M&A deals and firm M&A performance. The results of most 
studies show that the abnormal returns for acquiring f rms can vary significantly 
across the different payment methods. Franks, Harris nd Mayer (1988) find that the 
performance of the acquiring firms that conduct cash payment deals is better than 
that of the acquiring firms conducting equity payment deals. Travlos (1987) also 
report a significant difference in the abnormal retu ns of acquiring firms between 
stock offers and cash offers They find that the returns of the bidding firms with 
equity offer are significantly negative during the announcement period, while the 
returns of the firms with cash offers gain normal (zero abnormal) returns. Therefore, 
they propose that this result reflects the signallig effect that the stock offer conveys 
the negative signal that the bidding firm’s stock is overvalued, and therefore the 
market reacts negatively.  
 
In this model, I also control for the corporate governance quality by including the 
Variable CG in the regression. Some previous studies show thatcorporate 
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governance has a significant impact on firm M&A performance. For example, Byrd 
and Hickman (1992) find that bidding firms with good corporate governance (at least 
50% of the board seats held by independent outside directors) have a significantly 
higher announcement abnormal return than those with poor corporate governance 
(less than 50% of the board seats held by independent outside directors). They 
conclude that strong corporate governance can efficiently monitor the M&A 
decision-making process and help protect shareholders’ interests.  
 
4.4.2.2 The regression model used in examining the impact of acquiring firm 
CEO narcissism on acquiring firm long run post-acquisition performance 
 
The following regression model is used to examine the impact of acquiring firm CEO 
narcissism on acquiring firm long run post-acquisition performance. (Test for the 
hypothesis H3.)  
 
εγγγγ
γγγγγγα
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The independent variables follow the same definitions as in equation (2). 
 
The dependent variable in this regression is acquiring firm long run performance, the 
2-year window (+1, +24 month) buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
commencing one month after the event date. 1-year, 1.5-year and 3-year BHARs are 
also calculated for robustness check purposes. The method for calculating BHARs 
was introduced in section 4.3.3.  
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4.4.2.3 The regression model used in examining the impact of target firm CEO 
narcissism on the announcement return of the acquiring firm 
 
In the hypotheses development in Chapter 3 section 3.2.3, I have shown that not only 
acquiring firm CEO narcissism but also target firm CEO narcissism can have an 
impact on acquiring firm announcement performance. To examine such an impact, I 
use the following regression model to test the hypothesis H4:  
 
)4(111098
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Similar to equation (2), the dependent variable in th s regression is the 3-day event 
window (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the event day t=0 (5-day, 
7-day, 11-day, 21-day and 41-day CARs are also calculated for robustness check 
purposes).  
 
The variables SO, VO, CG, RSize, relatedness, Growth, Attitude, Payment, and Size 
follow the same definitions as in equation (2). 
 
AHN  and THN  are the main independent variables of interest. AHN  is the binary 
variable of acquiring firm CEO narcissism, which is equal to 1 for high narcissism 
acquiring firm CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. The value of AHN  is derived from 
three measures of CEO narcissism – Holder67, Media portrayal, and Content 
analysis of CEO speech separately. THN  is the parallel binary measure of target 
firm CEO narcissism, which is equal to 1 for high narcissism target firm CEOs, and 
equal to 0 otherwise. The value of THN  is derived from two measures for CEO 
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narcissism – Holder67 and Media portrayal. I did not use the Content analysis of 
CEO speech proxy as the measure of target firm CEO narcissism for two reasons. 
First, there is limited target firm CEO speech data v ilable. Second, and more 
importantly, target firm CEO speeches on the deal convey very limited information 
about their beliefs in their own ability to manage th firm, as target firm CEOs will 
not be in the CEO position after acquisitions, in most cases. In other words, unlike 
acquiring firm CEOs, target firm CEOs have rather passives role in acquisitions. 
Therefore their speeches often do not reflect the CEO’s volition and we would not 
expect to extract much information about their self-view from their speeches about 
the M&A deals.  
 
4.4.2.4 The regression model used in examining the impact of target firm CEO 
narcissism on acquiring firm long run post-acquisition performance 
 
The following regression model is used to examine the impact of target firm CEO 
narcissism on acquiring firm long run post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns. (Test for the hypotheses H5) 
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The dependent variable in this regression is acquiring firm long run performance, the 
2-year window (+1, +24 month) buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
commencing one month after the event date. 1-year, 1.5-year and 3-year BHARs are 
also calculated for robustness check purposes. All of the independent variables 
follow the same definition as in Equation (2).  
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4.4.3 Summary table of variables 
 
Table 4-2 provides a summary of the definitions of the variables used in the 
regression models.  
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Table 4-2 Definitions of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Y A binary variable, which equals 1 if the firm annou ced at least one deal (successful bid and completed deal) in a specific firm year. 
HN, A binary variable equals to 1 for high narcissism CEOs, and equals to 0 otherwise. The value is derived from three measures of CEO narcissism – 
Holder67, Media portrayal, and Content analysis of CEO speech separately. 
AHN  
 
A binary proxy variable for acquiring firm CEO narcissism, which is equal to 1 for high narcissism acquiring firm CEOs, and equal to 0 
otherwise. The value is derived from three measures of CEO narcissism – Holder67, Media portrayal, and Content analysis of CEO speech 
separately.   
THN  The parallel binary measure of target firm CEO narcissism, which is equal to 1 for high narcissism target firm CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
The value is derived from two measures of CEO narcissism – Holder67 and Media portrayal. 
CAR The 3-day event window (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal return around the event day t=0. Five-day, Eleven-day and Twenty-one-day CAR are also 
calculated for robustness check purposes. 
BHAR The acquiring firm’s 2-year window (+1, +24 month) buy-and-hold abnormal return commencing one month after the event date. 6 months,12 
months, 18 months, 30 months, 36 months BHARs are also c lculated for robustness check purposes.  
Size Equal to the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets at the end of the last fiscal year (before the deal announcement year).  
SO Equal to the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement year. 
VO Equal to the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. 
CF Equal to the normalized ratio of firm cash flow, given by earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, divided by the beginning of the 
year capital. 
Q (Tobin’s Q). It is defined as the market value of assets/the book value of assets. 
CG G-index: a number based on 24 different governance provisions in several governance areas and provides a comprehensive measurement of the 
quality of the firm’s governance mechanism (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). The G-index is construc ed in such a way that, the higher the 
G-index, the poorer the corporate governance quality.   
RSize The relative size of the target firm. It is defined as the ratio of the acquirer’s size to target size.  
relatedness A binary variable where 1 signifies that the first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and those f the target are the same, 0 otherwise. 
Growth The target firm’s market/book (M/B) ratio. 
Attitude A binary variable where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”. 
Payment A binary variable where 1 signifies that the payment method of the deal is cash, otherwise 0.  
1−yearreturn  1-year lagged stock return of acquiring firm. 
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4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the methodological issues associ ted with the measurement of 
CEO narcissism, the calculation of firm short run and long run M&A performance, 
and the testing of the hypotheses. First, starting with a detailed review of the proxies 
for CEO narcissism and related constructs in the extant strategic management and 
finance literature, I then introduce the ways to construct my three measures of CEO 
narcissism – Holder67, Media portrayal, and Content a alysis of CEO speech. 
Second, I describe the short run and long run event study methods employed to 
calculate firm M&A announcement cumulative abnormal return and long run 
post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal return. Finally, I present the logistic and 
OLS regression models used in hypothesis testing. The variables in the regression 
models are also defined and discussed.  
 
The following chapter will describe the data used in my empirical analysis. The data 
sources, sampling procedure, and sample descriptions are presented in detail. 
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Chapter 5 Data, data sources, sampling process, and sample 
description 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
To test the hypotheses developed in chapter 3, I conduct an empirical study on a large 
sample of CEOs and mergers & acquisitions. This chapter details the data sources, 
sampling process and data selection criteria. Data descriptions are also provided.  
 
As this study aims to examine CEO narcissism in decision-making and its impact on 
firm performance in the context of mergers and acquisitions, six broad categories of 
data are essential: (1) CEO data; (2) firm data (firm characteristics and performance 
data); (3) M&A data; (4) CEO media portrayal data; (5) CEO speeches about M&A 
deals; and (6) other supplementary data. The fourth and the fifth categories of data 
are used to construct my two measures of CEO narcissism: media portrayal and 
content analysis of CEO speech.  
 
Briefly, the data collection and sampling process consists of six steps. First, from 
ExecuComp database, CEOs at any time during the period 1993-2005 who meet my 
data selection criteria are identified, and their compensation and other relevant data 
are extracted from the ExecuComp database. At the same time, the firms’ CUSIP 
codes and tickers corresponding to these selected CEOs are also identified. Financial 
and utility firms are then excluded.35 Second, I search the Thompson One Banker 
(TOB) SDC database for the mergers or acquisitions conducted by the sample CEOs 
                                                   
35 Following Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004), I define firms 
with SIC codes outside the ranges 4900–4949 and 6000–6999 as financial and utility firms.   
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during their tenure. Deal announcement date, SDC deal number, target firm, deal 
value and other relevant characteristics are also obtained in this step. Third, I obtain 
the necessary stock return data from the CRSP database for event study purposes. 
Fourth, I then match various financial (accounting) items from COMPUSTAT with 
my CEO data set, M&A deals dataset, and CRSP data. Fifth, the CEO media 
coverage data required for constructing the alternaive CEO narcissism measure, 
media portrayal, is obtained from 37 financial media sources in the Factiva database 
through systematic keyword searches.36  Finally, the M&A deal-related CEO 
discourses (speeches) required for the construction of my content analysis-based 
CEO narcissism proxy measure are extracted from SEC form 8-K filings as well as 
the same 37 media sources as used in the derivation of the media portrayal measure 
(via the Factiva database). 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 describes the sampling process and 
selection criteria for CEO data and firm data; section 5.3 introduces the sampling 
process for M&A deals; section 5.4 presents the data sources, collection process and 
description of the media coverage data related to the CEO media portrayal measure; 
section 5.5 describes the data sources, data selection and description of CEO 
speeches (narratives) and about M&A deals; section 5.6 presents the data sources for 
other supplementary data; section 5.7 provides a description of my samples; and 
section 5.8 summarises the data and sample issues.  
   
 
                                                   
36 The 37 media sources are listed in Appendix 1.  
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5.2 CEO data and firm data 
 
In this study, CEO stock option holding data, stock wnership, tenure and some other 
CEO personal characteristics are essential to the construction of the CEO narcissism 
measure Holder67 and to the associated empirical analysis. Therefore, the starting 
point of the whole sampling process is Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database, 
which is one the most complete and comprehensive databases of executive 
compensation and other related data available. It includes more than 80 
compensation (salary, bonus, options and stock awards, etc) and personal information 
items on over 12,500 executives, and covers the companies included in the S&P 500, 
S&P 400 Midcap and S&P Smallcap 600 indexes and also those companies that were 
once part of the S&P 1500. The data is annual, collected from each company’s 
annual proxy statement,37 and dates back to 1992.   
 
To ensure that the CEO narcissism measure Holder67 is constructed appropriately, I 
only include in my sample CEOs whose compensation data meets the following two 
criteria:  
 
Criterion 1:  The CEO has at least 2 years’ compensation data in ExecuComp 
Criterion 2:  At least over a 2 year period, the CEO has some options that are both  
in-the-money and exercisable.  
 
Criterion 1 aims to ensure that I have enough data for constructing my CEO 
narcissism measure Holder67. Since I classify a CEO as “highly narcissistic” if the 
                                                   
37 DEF14A SEC form. 
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CEO failed to exercise his/her vested options when t options are more than 67% 
in-the-money at least twice during the sample period, I need at least 2 years of 
compensation data for a particular CEO in order to examine his/her option exercising 
behaviour.  
 
Criterion 2 also needs to hold in constructing my CEO narcissism measure Holder67, 
since it helps me to rule out the possibility that the CEO failed to exercise his options 
not because he was highly narcissistic but because the options were out of money or 
unexercisable. 
 
Initially, from the ExecuComp database, I identify 4,988 CEOs, 2,754 firms and a 
total of 29,464 observations from January 1992 to December 2005, where each 
observation represents the data serial for a particular CEO of a particular company in 
a particular year. On this basis, I exclude the observations that fail to meet my two 
CEO selection criteria and those firms not covered (tickers and CUSIP codes not 
recognized) by the Thomson One Banker SDC database.38 I also exclude financial 
and utility firms. This selection process leaves a total of 3,162 CEOs, 2,129 
companies, and 22,103 observations in my final sample. Table 5-1 provides the 
details of my sample selection process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
38 I require that the tickers or CUSIP codes of the sample firms must be recognised in the Thomson 
One Banker SDC (TOB SDC) database because I need to use these identifiers to extract the 
information of the M&A deals conducted by the sample firms from that database.   
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Table 5-1 Sample selection process – CEOs and firms 
 
Procedure Number of CEOs Number of firms Observations 
 
Available from the 
Execucomp database by 
December 2005 (starting 
from 1992) 
 
4,988 
 
2,754 
 
29,464 
 
Less CEOs not meeting 
criterion 1 
 
906 
 
192 
 
 
CEOs with a minimum of 2 
years compensation data in 
Execucomp 
 
4,082 
 
2,562 
 
 
Less CEOs not meeting 
criterion 2 
 
665 
 
214 
 
 
CEOs meeting my two 
selection criteria   
 
3,417 
 
2,348 
 
 
Less the firms with tickers or 
CUSIP codes not recognized 
by the Thompson One Banker 
SDC database 
 
21 
 
14 
 
 
Less the finance and utility 
firms 
 
234 
 
205 
 
 
Total 
 
3,162 
 
2,129 
 
22,103 
 
At this stage, the firms’ identifiers, such as firm names, tickers, and CUSIP codes 
corresponding to these sample CEOs, are also obtained. This identifying information 
is essential to the collection of other data.  
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5.3 Data about the mergers and acquisitions 
 
Based on the CEO-firm sample obtained from the ExecuComp database, I extract the 
M&A deals conducted by my sample CEOs during their tnures and announced 
between January 1 1993 and December 31 2005, from the Thompson One Banker 
SDC database. The announcement date of the deal follows the Thompson One 
Banker SDC “date announced” definition.39 Three types of transaction are included 
in my sample: merger, acquisition of majority interest, and acquisition of assets.40 
 
I require both acquirer and target to be public firms, for data requirement purposes. I 
also require that the deal value is at least $1 million. In addition, I only consider 
deals in which the value of the target is greater than 5% of the value of the acquirer, 
because acquisitions of small units of another company may not require direct input 
from the acquirer’s CEO. The 5% cut-off point follows Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1990).  
 
Table 5-2 shows the screening criteria for mergers and acquisition data.          
 
 
                                                   
39 Thompson One Banker SDC defines the “date announced” as “The date one or more parties 
involved in the transaction makes the first public disclosure of common or unilateral intent to pursue 
the transaction (no formal agreement is required).  Among other things, Date Announced is 
determined by the disclosure of discussions between parties, disclosure of a unilateral approach made 
by a potential bidder, and the disclosure of a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other 
agreement”. 
40 I follow the TOB SDC definitions of these three types of transactions as follows:  
Merger: “A combination of business takes place or 100% of the stock of a public or private company 
is acquired”; Acquisition of majority interest: “the acquirer must have held less than 50% and be 
seeking to acquire 50% or more, but less than 100% of the target company’s stock.”; Acquisition of 
assets: “deals in which the assets of a company, subsidiary, division, or branch are acquired. This code 
is used in all transactions when a company is being acquired and the consideration sought is not 
given”. 
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Table 5-2 Sample screening (mergers and acquisitions) 
 
        Request      Criteria 
Database All Mergers & Acquisitions  
Acquirer Nation  United States of America  
Target or Acquirer Public Status  Public  
Deal Status   Completed  
Deal Type  
Mergers, Acquisitions (acquisition of 
majority interest, and acquisition of assets) 
 
Date Announced 01/01/1993 to 12/31/2005 
Deal Value ($ Mil) Higher than 1 
The ratio of the value of the target to the 
value of the acquirer 
Greater than 5% 
 
From the TOB SDC database, I extract the following iformation about each M&A 
deal: deal number, announcement date, deal type, deal value, acquirer SIC code, 
target SIC code, and payment method (Cash/stock).  
 
5.4 Media data 
 
To construct the media portrayal measure of CEO narcissism, I collect data on how 
the media portrays each CEO over the sample period via the Factiva database.41 The 
37 media sources searched are shown in Table 5-3.  
 
                                                   
41 The Factiva database covers more than 25,000 leading news and business publications from around 
the world. Highly targeted and precise search results can be obtained through its advanced search 
tools. 
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Table 5-3 List of media sources 
  
Country  
 
1 (US) 
2 (US) 
3 (US) 
4 (US)  
5 (US) 
6 (US) 
7 (US) 
8 (US) 
9 (US) 
10 (US) 
11 (US) 
12 (US) 
13 (US) 
14 (US) 
15 (US) 
16 (US) 
17 (US) 
18 (US) 
19 (US) 
 
Name 
 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
The Baltimore Sun  
Barron's  
The Boston Globe   
BusinessWeek 
Charlotte Observer (N.C.)    
Chicago Sun-Times  
Chicago Tribune  
Daily News (New York)  
The Dallas Morning News  
Detroit Free Press 
Denver Post 
Dow Jones Business News  
Dow Jones News Service  
Forbes  
Fortune  
Los Angeles Times  
The Miami Herald  
The New York Times  
 
Country  
 
20 (US) 
21 (US) 
22 (US) 
23 (US) 
24 (US) 
25 (US) 
26 (US) 
27 (US) 
38 (US) 
29 (US) 
30 (US) 
31 (US) 
32 (US) 
33 (US) 
34 (US) 
35 (US) 
36 (UK) 
37 (UK) 
 
Name 
 
Newsday (N.Y.)   
Newsweek  
Orlando Sentinel (Fla.)  
The Philadelphia Inquirer 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette  
San Antonio Express-News  
San Jose Mercury News  
Seattle Post-Intelligencer  
South Florida Sun-Sentinel  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch  
St. Petersburg Times (Fla.)  
Time  
Times-Picayune   
USA Today  
The Wall Street Journal  
The Washington Post  
The Economist 
The Financial Times 
   
For each individual CEO, I conduct a systematic keywords search for articles and 
news in a range of 37 media sources. The set of keywords are: “optimistic” 
(including “optimism”), “confident” (including “confidence”), “reliable”, “cautious”, 
“conservative”, “steady”, “practical”, “frugal”, “disciplined”, “conscientious”, “not 
confident” and “not optimistic”. I tabulate the number of articles that describe a CEO 
as: (1) “optimistic” (including “optimism”) and “confident” (including “confidence”); 
(2) “reliable”, “cautious”, “conservative”, “steady”, “practical”, “frugal”, 
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“disciplined”,  “conscientious”, “not confident”, “not optimistic”. I exclude any 
article that contains mixed descriptions across thee two keyword groups. 
 
As I have mentioned in Chapter 4, considering the potential endogeneity problem 
that CEOs may change their tenor to send positive signals during M&A bids, or the 
media may be more likely to perceive acquiring CEOs as confident, I restrict the 
article coverage to those published in the period before the bid was announced. If a 
CEO conducted more than one M&A deal during his/her tenure, I restrict the sample 
to articles published up to his/her first merger or acquisition.  
 
Table 5-4 shows that my final data set of media coverage includes a total of 4,110 
articles. 2,548 articles describe CEOs as “optimistic” (including “optimism”) and 
“confident” (including “confidence”), covering 62% of the full sample. 1,562 articles 
describe CEOs as “reliable”, “cautious”, “conservatie”, “steady”, “practical”, 
“frugal”, “disciplined”, “conscientious”, “not confident”, and “not optimistic”, which 
covers 38% of the full sample of articles.        
 
Table 5-4 Description of media coverage (articles) 
 
Mention _ group (1) is the articles that describe a CEO as: “optimistic” (including 
“optimism”) and “confident” (including “confidence”). Mention _ group (2) is the articles 
that “reliable”, “cautious”, “conservative”, “steady”, “practical”, “frugal”, “disciplined”, 
“conscientious”, “not confident”, “not optimistic”. 
 Number of articles % of full sample of articles 
Mention _ group (1)  2,548 62% 
Mention _ group (2) 1,562 38% 
Total number of articles 4,110 100% 
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5.5 CEO speeches (narratives) about M&A deals 
 
To construct the direct CEO speech measure of CEO narcissism, I collect CEO 
discourses about M&A deals from 8-K (current event) filings, other documents (e.g. 
proxy statements) and media sources.    
Form 8-K is the "current report" that publicly traded companies are required to file 
with the SEC to announce major events, such as mergers or acquisitions. It usually 
includes a CEO’s comments on the reported merger or acquisition.  
If the 8-K document of a deal is unavailable from the TOB database or if the 8-K file 
does not include the CEO’s comments on the deal, I further search the firm’s other 
relevant SEC documents (e.g. proxy statement) for CEO narratives via the TOB 
database. If the CEO comments on the deal are not included in any documents in the 
TOB database, I conduct a further search across the ame wide-range of financial 
media sources (37 publications) used for deriving the media portrayal measure via 
the Factiva database to collect a CEO’s narratives about a specific M&A deal.  
After the extraction of the raw data of the CEO speech s (discourses) or statements 
about the deal from those sources, I remove non-narrative words or phrases in the 
raw CEO speech data, leaving only the actual narratives. For example, the raw CEO 
speech data is as follows: 
Homi B. Patel, president and chief executive of Hartm x said, “With this acquisition, 
our annualized women's segment revenues will exceed $100 million and will enable 
us to accomplish our long-term goal of a 50/50 split between men's tailored and 
non-tailored categories much sooner than originally anticipated”.  
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I remove the non-narrative text “Homi B. Patel, presid nt and chief executive of 
Hartmarx said” from the raw passage and only leave the naked actual narratives.  
Finally, I transform the file containing CEO narratives into the format required by 
Diction.   
 
Table 5-5 shows that the final sample includes a tot l f 1,229 narrative passages, 
with 204 extracted from 8-K SEC filing documents, 21 from other documents and 
1,004 from media publications via the Factiva databse. The average length of the 
narrative passages of the full sample is 63 words. The average length of the passages 
extracted from the Factiva database is only 52 words, which is significantly shorter 
than the narratives extracted from SEC documents via Thomson ONE Banker 
platform, as news journalists often quote only part of he CEO speeches. To ensure 
that Diction has sufficient words to analyse, I exclude any narratives shorter than 20 
words. The final sample of CEO narrative passages covers a total of 1,076 M&A 
deals. The number of CEO’s speeches is greater than the umber of deals because, in 
some cases, a CEO has more than one narrative passage about a specific deal.  
 
Table 5-5 Description of the sample of CEO narrative passages 
 
Data sources 
Total number of 
CEO passages 
Length of passages 
(Mean: words) 
Number of M&A 
deals 
8-K SEC filing 
documents 
204 114 204 
Other documents 21 106 21 
Other media sources 
(Factiva database) 
1,004 52 851 
Total 1,229 63 1,076 
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5.6 Data sources for other supplementary data 
 
I employ an event study approach to measure firm (stock) performance around the 
bid announcement event and for the post-acquisition period, using stock data 
obtained from CRSP. To calculate firm cash flow and Tobin’s Q, I also extract the 
following financial (accounting) data items from COMPUSTAT: total asset, earnings 
before extraordinary, depreciation, capital (property, plant and equipment), common 
share outstanding, fiscal year closing price, total liabilities, preferred stock, deferred 
taxes, and convertible debt. The proxy of quality of c rporate governance, the 
G-index,42 is obtained from the Investor Responsibility Research Centre.  
 
5.7 Sample description 
 
This section provides descriptions of the samples of firms, CEOs and M&A deals.  
 
5.7.1 Firms and CEOs  
 
Table 5-6 provides descriptive statistics on firm and CEO characteristics. The 
average acquiring firm has a total asset of $2,896 million and a market value of 
$4,151 million, with median of the total assets andmarket values of the sample firms 
are $971 million and $1,176 million respectively, which are much lower than their 
mean numbers. This demonstrates that the firm sample inc udes some very large 
firms, though most are medium- or small-sized firms. The average acquiring firm 
CEO owns around 3% of the firm’s shares and holds exercisable options that are 
                                                   
42 The G-index is firstly constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and then issued by the 
IRRC (Investor Responsibility Research Centre. It is an integral part of the IRRC Governance 
database (also known as the IRRC Takeover Defence database). This index is constructed based upon 
28 governance provisions.  
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approximately 1% of the firm’s common stocks outstanding. These statistics show 
that the CEO holds a very small portion of firm shares on average. In addition, the 
average CEO tenure is around 6 years and the mean age of my sample CEOs is 
approximately 57 years.      
 
 
 119 
Table 5-6 Summary statistics for firms (acquirers) and CEOs’ characteristics 
 
Size is the acquirer’s total assets at the end of the last fiscal year (before the deal 
announcement year). CG is the G-index, the proxy for corporate governance quality. CF is 
the normalized ratio of firm cash flow, given by earnings before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation, divided by beginning of the year capital (here, capital is measured as property, 
plant and equipment). Q represents Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of assets/book 
value of assets, where the latter = total assets, and the former = total assets + market equity - 
book equity. Market equity = common share outstanding× fiscal year closing price; and 
Book equity = total assets-total liabilities-preferred stock + deferred taxes. SO is the fraction 
of the firm’s stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal 
announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options, as a fraction of 
common shares outstanding.  
 
 
Variables 
       
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Total assets ($m) 2,896 971 8,083 
Market value ($m) 4,151 1,167 11,593 
Cash Flow 0.63 0.42 0.97 
Q 2.01 1.53 1.53 
 
Firm 
Characteristics  
CG 9.64 10 2.65 
SO 0.03 0.004 0.06 
VO 0.009 0.005 0.01 
Tenure (years) 6.23 6 2.76 
 
CEO 
characteristics 
Age (years) 57.44 57 7.6 
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5.7.2 M&A deals 
 
Table 5-7 presents the descriptive statistics of my sample of 1,888 mergers and 
acquisitions during the period January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2005. It shows that 
there is no significant time clustering problem in the sample of deals. The number of 
deals increases steadily from 22 deals in 1993 and peaks in 1999 with 191 deals (see 
Figure 5-1). The mean of deal values increased from $271.6 million in 1993 and 
peaks at $1,608 million in 1999, before falling until 2004 (see Figure 5-2). The 
median of deal values also increases gradually, from $121.5 million in 1993 to a 
peak of $289.3 million in 1999. These statistics illustrate that my sample well 
captures the fifth merger wave (1993-2000), that is well-documented in the literature 
(e.g. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005).  
 
Table 5-7 also presents the number of deals conducte  by S&P500 firms, S&P400 
Midcap firms, and S&P600 Smallcap firms respectively. Figure 5-3 shows that the 
general trends in the number of deals conducted by large (S&P500) and 
medium-sized firms (S&P400) are upwards until 2000, and then reverse. Unlike 
those by S&P500 and S&P400 firms, the number of deals conducted by S&P600 
Smallcap firms increases steadily throughout the sample period.  
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Table 5-7 Table Summary statistics for M&A deals 
 
This table presents the number of M&A deals, the mean deal value and the median deal value in my full sample by years. The numbers of deals conducted by 
S&P500, S&P400 Midcap, S&P600 Smallcap, and others sub-sample acquirers are also presented.    
 
Year 
No. of Deals  
(Full sample) 
Mean deal value 
($mil) 
Median deal value  
($mil) 
No. of deals 
(S&P500) 
No. of deals 
(Midcap) 
No. of deals 
(Smallcap) 
No. of deals 
(Others) 
 
 1993 
 
  22 
 
683.5 
 
296.8 
 
11 
 
3 
 
1 
 
7 
 1994   89 271.6 121.5 29 15 5 40 
 1995 139 634.9 130.0 36 22 5 76 
 1996 158 449.2 158.0 52 21 13 72 
 1997 152 520.2 165.5 29 28 24 71 
 1998 175 1,040.8 272.0 53 25 19 78 
 1999 191 1,608.0 289.3 55 29 35 72 
 2000 170 1,529.4 281.3 62 24 39 45 
 2001 171 800.2 177.0 36 44 52 39 
 2002 156 626.9 109.5 34 26 58 38 
 2003 155 458.2 142.5 40 36 54 25 
 2004 171 800.9 161.0 35 39 61 36 
 2005 139 1,596.6 230.0 40 28 52 19 
 
Total 
 
1,888 
 
   1,694.7 
 
      195.1 
 
    512 
 
   340 
 
    418 
 
618 
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Figure 5-1 Numbers of M&A deals across sample period 
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Figure 5-2 Mean and median deal value by year 
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Figure 5-3 Numbers of deals (sub-samples: S&P500, S&P400, and S&P600) 
 
 
 
Table 5-8 presents the yearly distribution of deals with high-tech acquirers and the 
deals with high-tech targets. It is clearly shown that the number and percentage of 
deals conducted by high-tech firms was increasing until 2001, and then declined (see 
Figure 5-4). This trend could be a reflection of the“bursting” of the dot.com bubble 
in 2001. Many high-tech firms lost the ability to make acquisitions, as they ran out of 
capital or even were liquidated when the bubble collapsed. Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that the number of deals conducted by high-tech firms fell between  
2001 and 2002.   
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Table 5-8  Yearly distribution of the deals with high-tech acquirers 
and the deals with high-tech targets 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Numbers and percentages of deals with high-tech acquirers across 
the sample period 
 
Year 
 
Deals with high 
tech acquirers 
 
 
% of 
sample 
 
Deals with high 
tech target firms 
  
% of 
  sample 
1993 10 45.45% 6 27.27% 
1994 50 56.18% 29 32.58% 
1995 76 54.68% 52 37.41% 
1996 71 44.94% 37 23.42% 
1997 61 40.13% 40 26.32% 
1998 77 44.00% 54 30.86% 
1999 84 43.98% 62 32.46% 
2000 89 52.35% 74 43.53% 
2001 102 59.65% 87 50.88% 
2002 84 53.85% 64 41.03% 
2003 84 54.19% 70 45.16% 
2004 84 49.12% 76 44.44% 
2005 80 57.55% 68 48.92% 
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Table 5-9 presents the distribution of cash payment deals and non-cash payment 
deals between 1993 and 2005. As shown in figure 5-5, before 2002, approximately 
60% of the sample deals are non-cash payment deals and the remaining 40% are cash 
deals, while, after 2002, cash payment has replaced non-cash payment as the more 
popular payment method in mergers and acquisitions. A potential explanation of this 
trend is that, during the high valuation period (the bull stock market) before 2001, 
acquirers tend to use their overvalued stock as “cheap currency” to acquire a business 
or asset. In 2001, as the dot.com bubble deflated, th  stock market turned from a bull 
into a bear market, and stock was no longer “cheap currency”. As such since 2003 
acquirers appear to prefer cash to stock as the payment method.   
 
It worth mentioning here that, although I use the two-payment-mechanism 
categorisation (cash payment deals and non-cash payment deals) due to the data 
availability in this study, it would be interesting to further explore the impact of 
payment method on firm M&A performance based on the thr e-payment-mechanism 
categorisation (pure cash payment deals, pure stock payment deals, and mixed 
payment deals). Sudarsanam (2003) shows that the mixed offers increased in number 
between 1995 and 1999 and the M&A short run (announcement) returns of pure 
(cash or stock) offers and mixed offers have different patterns. Therefore, further 
breaking down the non-cash payment deals into two categories – pure stock payment 
deals and mixed payment deals in future study may help us to gain more insights into 
the impact of payment method on M&A performance.        
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Table 5-9  Yearly distribution of cash payment and non-cash payment deals 
 
 
Figure 5-5 Distribution of payment methods (cash Vs non-cash deals) 
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Year Full sample Cash deals % of sample Non-Cash deals % of sample 
1993 22 7 31.82% 15 68.18% 
1994 89 42 47.19% 47 52.81% 
1995 139 53 38.13% 86 61.87% 
1996 158 68 43.04% 90 56.96% 
1997 152 66 43.42% 86 56.58% 
1998 175 62 35.43% 113 64.57% 
1999 191 78 40.84% 113 59.16% 
2000 170 70 41.18% 100 58.82% 
2001 171 66 38.60% 105 61.40% 
2002 156 65 41.67% 91 58.33% 
2003 155 84 54.19% 71 45.81% 
2004 171 98 57.31% 73 42.69% 
2005 139 77 55.40% 62 44.60% 
Total 1,888 836 44.28% 1,052 55.72% 
 127 
 
Table 5-10 Panel A shows that the mean deal value is $1,695 million. The mean 
market value (4 weeks prior to deal announcement) of the acquirers is $4,191 million, 
which is about 2.6 times that of the target firm.  
 
Panel B presents the distribution of transaction types in the deal sample. The full deal 
sample consists of 912 mergers (approximately 48% of the deal sample) and 976 
acquisitions (incl. acquisition of majority interest and acquisition of assets) 
(approximately 52% of the deal sample), indicating a well-balanced deal sample 
between different transaction types.  
 
Panel C presents the distribution of payment methods across two categories of deals: 
tender offer and non-tender offer. There are 178 tender offers and 1,710 non-tender 
offers in the deal sample. The statistics show that e majority of tender offers 
(approximately 58% of the total) are cash payment deals and only 42% of tender 
offers are non-cash payment deals. In contrast to tender offers, only 43% of 
non-tender offers are cash deals and the majority (57%) are non-cash payment deals. 
This is consistent with previous studies and observations that tender offers are 
usually financed via cash, whereas most mergers use common stocks as the method 
of payment (Datta, Iskanda-Datta, and Raman, 2001; Travlos, 1987). One possible 
explanation for this phenomenon is associated with the regulatory acts. A cash tender 
offer is subject only to the Williams Act,43 and the filing of relevant documents with 
                                                   
43 In the 1960s, a large number of takeovers occurred unannounced. This created difficulties for 
managers and stockholders, who were forced to make crucial decisions with very little preparation. 
The Williams Act was created in order to protect investors from these occurrences. The Williams Act 
of 1968 amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq.) to require the 
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the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and then the offer may start after 
the required waiting period, whereas mergers and non-cash tender offers are subject 
to the Securities Act of 1933, which usually involves a long review process and often 
causes a significant delay (Gilson, 1986). This practic l effect of the subjections to 
different regulatory acts is that we observe more cash payment deals in tender offers.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
mandatory disclosure of information regarding cash tender offers. The act requires any person who 
makes a cash tender offer (which is usually 15 to 20 percent in excess of the current market price) for 
a corporation that is required to be registered under federal law to disclose to the federal 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) the source of the funds used in the offer, the 
purpose for which the offer is made, the plans the purchaser might have if successful, and any  
contracts or understandings concerning the target corporation (Sources: Investopedia and 
http://law.jrank.org/pages/11330/Williams-Act.html). 
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Table 5-10 Summary statistics of the characteristics of sample M&A deals 
 
My sample consists of 1,888 completed M&A deals during the period January 1, 1993, to 
December 31, 2005. Three types of transaction are included in my sample: merger, 
acquisition of majority interest, and acquisition of assets. I follow the Thomson One Banker 
and SDC platinum definitions of these three types of transaction as follows: merger – a 
combination of businesses takes place or 100% of the stock of a public or private company is 
acquired, the acquisition of majority interest – the acquirer must have held less than 50% and 
be seeking to acquire 50% or more, but less than 100% of the target company’s stock, and 
acquisition of assets – deals in which the assets of a c mpany, subsidiary, division, or branch 
are acquired. Both acquirer and target are public firms and the deal value is at least $1 
million. The value of the target is greater than 5% of the value of the acquirer.  
 
Panel A: Deal value and market value of the acquiring firm and target firm 
 
Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Deal value ( $ mil) 1,695 195 13,028 
Acquirer Market Val 4 Weeks Prior 
to Announcement ($ mil) 
4,151 1,168 11,594 
Tgt. Market Val 4 Weeks Prior to 
Announcement($ mil) 
1,602 379 4,801 
 
Panel B: Distribution of transaction types 
Transaction type Number of deals Proportion (%) 
Merger  912 48.31 
Acquisition of 
majority interest 
55 2.91  
Acquisition 
Acquisition of 
assets 
921 48.78 
Total  1888       100.00 
 
Panel C: Distribution of payment methods 
Payment 
method 
Tender offer 
deal 
Percentage  
Non-tender offer 
deals 
Percentage  
Cash 103 57.87% 742 43.39% 
Non-cash 75 42.13% 968 56.61% 
Total 178     100.00% 1710   100.00% 
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5.8. Summary 
 
This chapter presents the data sources, selection crteria, collection process and 
sample descriptions for CEO, firm, and M&A deal datasets respectively. Media 
coverage data and CEO speeches, the two types of data required in the construction 
of my two narcissism measures – Media portrayal andContent analysis of CEO 
speech – are also discussed.    
 
In summary, my samples have the following features: 
 
First, the full samples cover 2,129 firms across the full size spectrum – S&P 500, 
S&P 400 Midcap, and S&P 600 Smallcap firms. This allows me to consider the size 
effect when I explore the role and impact of CEO narcissism in M&A activities.  
    
Second, my M&A sample includes 1,888 mergers and acquisitions during the period 
January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2005. The statistics for both deal numbers and 
deals values show that this sample successfully captures the recent (fifth) merger 
wave between 1993 to 2000.  
 
Third, the yearly distribution of the deals with hig-tech acquirers shows that both 
the number and the percentage of deals involving high-tech acquirers had been 
increasing until 2001, and then declined dramatically between 2001 and 2002, well 
reflecting the dot.com “Bubble Bursts” in 2001.  
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Fourth, my sample of M&A deals consists of 912 mergers (approximately 48% of 
the full sample) and 976 acquisitions (approximately 52% of the full sample), and 
therefore it is well-balanced in terms of transaction type.  
 
Finally, my sample of M&A deals consists of 836 cash payment deals (44.28% of the 
full sample) and 1,052 non-cash payment deals (55.72% of the full sample). The 
trends in the weights of these two payment methods over time show that the stock 
payment method is dominant before 2001, while, betwe n 2001 and 2002, the weight 
of cash deals had increased dramatically. From 2003, the cash replaced stock as the 
dominant payment method.  
 
Using the samples I introduced in this chapter and employing the event study method 
and the regression models, I conduct a series of empirical analyses to examine the 
role and impact of CEO narcissism in M&A activities. The next chapter presents and 
discusses my regression results (test of hypotheses) and the results of event studies 
on firm M&A performance.  
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Chapter 6 Results and Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
To examine the role of CEO narcissism in M&A decision-making and its impact on 
firm M&A performance, I first evaluate firm short run (announcement) M&A 
performance and long run post-acquisition performance by conducting event studies 
on my sample of M&A deals. Then, I examine the potential link between CEO 
narcissism and a firm’s M&A activities through regrssion analysis. Therefore, in 
this chapter, I first present the results of firm short run (announcement) M&A 
performance and long run post-acquisition performance. Then, I present the results of 
my regression analyses (tests of my hypotheses).  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the results of firm M&A 
performance, consisting of three sub-sections. Sub-section 6.2.1 discusses the results 
of the event studies on firm short run (announcement) M&A performance. Acquiring 
firm abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal retu n (CAR) based on two 
models (the Market Model and the Scholes-Williams Model) and two market indices 
(CRSP equally weighted index and value weighted index) are reported respectively. 
In sub-section 6.2.2, the results of event studies on firm long run post-acquisition 
performance (abnormal return and buy-and-hold abnormal eturn) are presented. In 
sub-section 6.2.3, I compare my CAR and BHAR results of acquirers with previous 
studies. Section 6.3 reports the results of my regression analyses to test the 
hypotheses developed in chapter 3. This section includes four sub-sections. In 
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sub-section 6.3.1, the correlations between the indpendent variables are presented. 
In sub-section 6.3.2, I discuss the results about the link between the level of CEO 
narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO conducting M&A deals. Sub-section 6.3.3 
examines the market reaction to the M&A deals conducted by highly narcissistic 
CEOs. Sub-section 6.3.4 discusses the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissistic 
tendency on firm long run post-acquisition performance. Sub-section 6.3.5 focuses 
on the potential role and impact of target firm CEO narcissistic tendency on 
acquiring firm announcement and long run post-acquisition performance. Section 6.4 
provides a summary of my results.       
     
 
6.2 Firm M&A performance 
 
6.2.1 Firm short run (announcement) M&A performance 
 
In this sub-section, I examine the market reaction o the M&A announcement by 
conducting event studies on my sample M&A deals. Although my basic event study 
uses the standard market model and CRSP equally weighted index, I also run 
additional event studies using the Scholes-Williams arket model and CRSP value 
weighted index as robustness checks, as some prior studies suggest that the choice of 
market models or market indices may affect the results of event studies. For example, 
Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) show that the estimates of market 
model parameters based on OLS are biased when there is nonsynchronous trading, 
and  propose ways to address the potential thin trading problem. In addition, Brown 
and Warner (1980) demonstrate that the evaluation of security price performance 
may be affected by the choice of market indices (e.g. qually weighted index vs 
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value weighted index). For these reasons, I run my event studies by employing both 
the standard market model and the Scholes-Williams market model, and using both 
CRSP equally weighted and CRSP value weighted indices.                                                                                    
 
Table 6-1 presents the short run (announcement) daily mean abnormal returns of my 
sample deals based on the CRSP equally weighted indx over the 41 day (-20, +20) 
time window. Column 2-4 demonstrate the results based on the market model. They 
show that the significant mean abnormal returns from day -1 to day 2 are -0.13%, 
0.10%, 0.39%, and 0.16%, respectively. Column 5-7 present the results based on the 
Scholes-Williams Market Model, which shows that there are significant abnormal 
returns from day -1 to day 2, with -0.14%, 0.10%, 0.40%, and 0.16% respectively. 
The results based on both models show that the most significant abnormal returns are 
detected over the (-1, +2) day time window and the highest mean abnormal return is 
observed in day 1, one day after the deal announcement. The highly consistent results 
based on both models suggest that thin trading may not be a serious problem in my 
sample of deals.          
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Table 6-1 Acquiring firm abnormal returns around M& A deal announcement 
(Market index: CRSP Equally Weighted Index) 
 
This table provides the daily mean abnormal returns (AR) of the sample deals around the M&A 
announcement date. The calculation is based on the use of the CRSP equally weighted index as the 
market index. Column 1 is the day relative to the deal announcement date (day=0). Column 2 shows 
the mean abnormal return for each day. Columns 3 and 4 present the Patell Z statistic and generalized 
sign Z statistic respectively. The results in Columns 2-4 are based on the employment of the market 
model. Columns 5-7 report parallel results and test statistics based on the employment of 
Scholes-Williams Market Model.  
 
Market Model 
         Mean        Patell    Generalized  
Day   Abnormal Return    Z       Sign Z  
Scholes-Williams Market Model 
   Mean          Patell     Generalized  
Abnormal Return     Z         Sign Z  
 
-20       0.03%       0.663       0.952      
-19      -0.04%       -0.291      -0.229    
-18      -0.02%       -0.869      -0.606      
-17       0.12%       0.952      -0.276      
-16       0.07%       0.694       1.094     
-15       0.04%       0.493      -0.606      
-14       0.12%       1.698*      1.802*     
-13      -0.24%       -2.566**    -2.259*     
-12       0.01%       0.102     0.196      
-11      -0.12%       -1.801*     -2.023*     
-10      -0.03%       -0.561       0.905    
-9        0.14%       2.018*      0.763      
-8        0.03%       0.358     0.102      
-7       -0.05%       -0.823      -0.323      
-6        0.05%       1.268     0.857      
-5       -0.03%       -0.366    0.008      
-4       -0.05%       -0.385    0.432      
-3        0.14%       1.730*    1.377$     
-2        0.08%       0.713      0.810      
-1       -0.13%       -2.082*    -1.362$     
0        0.10%        2.567**    2.227*     
+1       0.39%        9.230***  5.626*** 
+2       0.16%        4.003***   1.377$     
+3       0.01%        0.947    0.810      
+4       0.13%        2.032*     2.274*     
+5       0.01%        0.141     -0.134      
+6       0.00%        0.247      0.244      
+7       0.00%       -0.033     0.244      
+8       0.01%        0.426      1.330$     
+9      -0.01%        -0.100     -0.087      
+10     -0.02%        -0.023     -0.040      
+11     -0.01%        0.415     0.291      
+12     -0.02%        0.168      -0.229      
+13     -0.04%       -0.016       0.999      
+14      0.01%       0.109       0.480      
+15      0.06%       0.873       -0.701      
+16     -0.05%       -0.581       -0.701     
+17     -0.02%       -0.263        0.291      
+18     -0.05%       -0.498       -0.276      
+19     -0.05%       -1.059       -2.070*     
+20     -0.15%       -2.012*      -0.842      
0.03%       0.754          0.743         
   -0.04%       -0.181         -0.343      
   -0.02%       -0.842         -0.673      
  0.12%       1.112         -0.343      
   0.08%       0.793          0.696      
  0.04%       0.445         -0.673      
0.13%       1.792*         2.490**    
 -0.25%       -2.686**       -2.373**    
    0.01%       0.089         -0.059      
 -0.11%       -1.743*        -1.901*     
   -0.04%       -0.672          0.554      
    0.14%       1.993*         1.168      
    0.03%       0.319          0.366      
   -0.04%       -0.693         -0.107      
    0.05%       1.215         0.979      
 -0.03%       -0.399        0.271      
 -0.05%       -0.443        0.271      
    0.13%       1.542$       1.027      
   0.06%       0.553        0.271      
   -0.14%       -2.150*        -1.004      
    0.10%       2.588**        2.160*     
    0.40%       9.305***      5.371***   
  0.16%       3.904***      1.357$     
  0.00%       0.865         0.696      
    0.13%       2.075*        2.443**    
    0.02%       0.183         -0.201      
  0.00%       0.253         0.366      
  0.00%      -0.075          0.413      
  0.02%       0.451          1.404$     
 -0.01%       -0.129         -0.390      
 -0.02%       -0.037         -0.059      
    0.00%       0.405          -0.012      
   -0.02%       0.245          -0.201      
   -0.04%       -0.106          0.932      
  0.01%       0.034          0.224      
  0.05%       0.851          -0.012     
  -0.05%       -0.571          -0.107      
-0.02%       -0.264          -0.390      
  -0.04%       -0.520          -0.720      
   -0.05%       -1.009          -1.712*     
  -0.15%       -2.027*         -0.815      
 
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical sign ficance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, r spectively, using a 1-tail 
test.
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As mentioned above, considering the potential effects of the choice of market index 
on the evaluation of firm performance, I run additional event studies based on the 
CRSP value weighted index. Table 6-2 presents the short run (announcement) daily 
mean abnormal returns of my sample deals over the 41 day (-20, +20) time window. 
Columns 2-4 demonstrate the results based on the market model. They show that the 
significant mean abnormal returns from day -1 to day 2 are -0.15%, 0.05%, 0.38%, 
and 0.16%, respectively. Columns 5-7 present the results based on the 
Scholes-Williams Market Model, which show that there are significant abnormal 
returns from day -1 to day 2, with -0.14%, 0.05%, 0.38%, and 0.15% respectively. 
The signs of the abnormal returns over the (-1, +2) time window are exactly the same 
as those reported in Table 6-1. The magnitudes of such abnormal returns are very 
close to those based on the CRSP equally weighted index. In addition, the results 
also show that most significant abnormal returns are detected over the (-1, +2) day 
time window and the highest mean abnormal return is observed in day 1, one day 
after the deal announcement. The high consistency of the results based on the CRSP 
equally weighted index and CRSP value weighted index suggests that the choice of 
market index has no significant effect on my results.
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Table 6-2 Acquiring firm abnormal returns around M& A deal announcement 
(Market index: CRSP Value Weighted Index) 
 
This table provides the daily mean abnormal returns (AR) of the sample deals around the M&A 
announcement date. The calculation is based on the use of the CRSP value weighted index as the 
market index. Column 1 is the day relative to the deal announcement date (day=0). Column 2 shows 
the mean abnormal return for each day. Columns 3 and 4 present the Patell Z statistic and Generalized 
sign Z statistic respectively. The results in Columns 2-4 are based on the employment of the market 
model. Columns 5-7 report parallel results and teststa istics based on the employment of the 
Scholes-Williams Market Model.  
 
Market Model 
         Mean        Patell    Generalized  
Day   Abnormal Return    Z       Sign Z  
Scholes-Williams Market Model 
   Mean          Patell     Generalized  
Abnormal Return     Z         Sign Z  
 
-20    0.00%        0.389       0.331      
-19   -0.06%        -0.729       -0.047      
-18   -0.03%        -1.205       -0.661     
-17    0.08%        0.527       -0.708      
-16    0.08%        0.697       0.236      
-15    0.07%        0.756        0.425      
-14    0.10%        1.205       0.897      
-13   -0.24%        -2.834**     -3.399***   
-12   -0.01%        -0.343       -0.378      
-11   -0.10%        -1.576$      -2.030*     
-10   -0.08%        -1.318$       0.661      
-9     0.15%        1.963*      0.897      
-8     0.04%        0.515       0.614      
-7    -0.04%        -0.856       -0.236      
-6     0.07%        1.458$      0.425      
-5    -0.05%        -0.927       -0.897      
-4    -0.07%        -1.035        0.189      
-3     0.14%        1.435$       1.464$   
-2     0.08%        0.461        0.472  
-1    -0.15%        -2.502**     -1.747*     
0     0.05%         1.456$       1.652*     
+1    0.38%        8.877***     4.721***  
+2    0.16%         3.692***     1.700*     
+3   0.01%         0.955         0.142   
+4    0.14%        1.976*       1.983*     
+5   -0.01%        -0.339        -0.283      
+6   -0.03%        -0.135        -0.094      
+7   -0.01%        -0.285        -0.425      
+8    0.01%        0.464         1.558$     
+9   -0.03%        -0.448         0.095      
+10  -0.07%        -0.680        -1.039      
+11  -0.01%         0.271        -0.142      
+12  -0.04%        -0.157        0.614      
+13  -0.06%        -0.340        0.142      
+14   0.01%        -0.005         0.567      
+15   0.02%        0.012         -0.850      
+16  -0.09%        -1.521$       -1.463$     
+17  -0.02%        -0.344         0.095      
+18  -0.03%        -0.382         0.519      
+19  -0.07%        -1.563$       -1.794*     
+20  -0.17%        -2.553**      -0.991      
   0.01%        0.503        0.375      
  -0.07%        -0.708       -0.003      
  -0.02%        -1.120       -0.522      
  0.10%        0.813       -0.333      
   0.07%        0.565      0.045      
   0.08%        0.812      0.469      
   0.11%        1.281      1.413$     
  -0.25%        -2.968**     -2.977**    
  -0.02%        -0.357       -0.805      
 -0.08%        -1.382$      -1.938*     
  -0.08%        -1.408$     0.705      
   0.15%        1.924*       1.649*     
   0.04%        0.511       0.753      
  -0.04%        -0.755       -0.239      
   0.07%        1.461$      0.705      
  -0.05%        -0.861       -0.239      
  -0.07%        -1.050       -0.286      
   0.13%        1.290$      0.753      
   0.06%        0.309       0.469      
  -0.14%        -2.408**     -1.513$     
   0.05%        1.600$     2.216*     
   0.38%        8.868***     4.907***   
   0.15%        3.553***    1.225      
  0.01%        0.930       0.328      
   0.14%        2.041*       2.216*     
  -0.01%        -0.359       0.045      
-0.02%        -0.082       0.045      
-0.01%        -0.345       0.045      
 0.01%        0.436       1.886*     
  -0.03%        -0.502       -0.144      
-0.06%        -0.578       -1.372$     
 0.00%        0.427        -0.003      
  -0.04%        0.011         0.753      
  -0.06%        -0.358        0.092      
   0.01%        0.037        0.705      
   0.02%        0.054        -0.569      
-0.09%        -1.540$       -1.749*     
  -0.02%        -0.384        -1.136      
  -0.03%        -0.573       0.139      
  -0.06%        -1.505$       -1.702*     
-0.17%        -2.409**      -0.616      
 
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical sign ficance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, r spectively, using a 1-tail 
test. 
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To evaluate the aggregate effects of M&A announcement on acquiring firm stock 
price, I then calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for the sample deals over a 
series of different time windows. The results are summarised in Table 6-3. Panel A 
presents acquiring firm mean cumulative abnormal returns based on the use of the 
CRSP equally weighted index as the market index. It shows significant CARs of 
0.36%, 0.60%, 0.74%, 0.82%, and 0.93% for (-1, +1),(-2, +2), (-3, +3), (-5, +5), and 
(-10, +10) time windows respectively (based on the standard market model). These 
CARs are significant at the 0.1% level. This finding suggests that, at the aggregate 
level, the market views M&A announcements as good news and reacts positively to 
them, as consistent with most prior studies (e.g. Malatesta, 1983; Sicherman and 
Pettway, 1987; Leeth and Borg, 2000; and Rosen, 2003). My results show that there 
is no significant cumulative abnormal return detected for the 41 day time window 
(-20, +20). Actually, as demonstrated in Tables 6-1 and 6-2, the observed cumulative 
abnormal returns mainly come from the significant abnormal returns generated from 
day -1 to day 2. In other words, the time window (-1, +2) captures most of the 
announcement effects. In addition, I do not find any significant change in my results 
when using the Scholes-Williams Market Model.  
 
Panel B presents acquiring firm mean cumulative abnormal returns based on the use 
of the CRSP value weighted index as the market index. Though slightly lower in 
magnitude, the results are similar to those based on the CRSP value weighted index, 
which again suggests that the choice of market index has no significant impact on my 
results.           
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Table 6-3 Acquiring firm cumulative abnormal return s (CAR) around M&A deal announcements 
(Market index: Equally Weighted Index and CRSP Value Weighted Index) 
 
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the sample deals around the M&A annou cement date. Panel A shows the results 
based on the use of the CRSP equally weighted index as the market index. Column 1 is the time window used to calculate CARs (the deal 
announcement date is day 0). Column 2 shows the mean cumulative abnormal return for each time window. Columns 3 and 4 present the Patell Z 
statistic and Generalized sign Z statistic respectiv ly. The results in Columns 2-4 are based on the employment of the market model. Columns 5-7 report 
parallel results and test statistics based on the employment of the Scholes-Williams Market Model. Panel B reports the parallel results based on the use 
of the CRSP value weighted index as the market index.   
 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns ( Market index: Equally Weighted Index) 
                            Market Model                   
Days        Mean CAR         Patell Z       Generalized Sign Z 
         Scholes-Williams Market Model       
Mean CAR        Patell Z       Generalized Sign Z 
 
(-1,+1)        0.36%           5.609***         5.14***   
(-2,+2)        0.60%           6.454***         5.296***   
(-3,+3)        0.74%           6.466***         6.051***   
(-5,+5)        0.82%           5.587***         5.485***   
(-10,+10)      0.93%           4.650***         5.296***   
(-20,+20)      0.58%           2.736            4.446*   
 
0.36%           5.625***         4.993***   
0.58%           6.351***         5.087***   
0.72%           6.277***         6.315***   
0.80%           5.434***         5.607***   
0.91%           4.506***         5.040***   
0.57%           2.689            3.812*   
   
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns ( Market index: Value Weighted Index) 
                         Market Model                      
Days         Mean CAR        Patell Z       Generalized Sign Z 
            Scholes-Williams Market Model        
Mean CAR        Patell Z       Generalized Sign Z 
 
(-1,+1)         0.27%           4.521***         4.721***   
(-2,+2)         0.51%           5.359***         4.296***   
(-3,+3)         0.66%           5.433***         5.240***   
(-5,+5)         0.66%           4.236***         5.240***   
(-10,+10)       0.68%           3.214***         4.957***   
(-20,+20)       0.12%           0.786            2.219*     
 
0.29%           4.653***         4.576***   
0.50%           5.331***         4.435***   
0.64%           5.345***         5.048***   
0.66%           4.195***         5.379***   
0.68%           3.181***         4.907***   
0.17%           0.902            1.933*     
 
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical sign ficance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, r spectively, using a 1-tail test.  
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6.2.2 Firm long run post-acquisition performance 
 
One of the aims of my study is to investigate the impact of CEO narcissism on firm 
performance over a relatively long time horizon after M&A. To examine such an 
effect empirically, I first need to evaluate firm long run post-acquisition stock returns. 
Therefore, in this sub-section, I calculate acquiring firm post-acquisition 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) by conducting an event study on my 
sample M&A deals. The calculation method was introduced in section 4.3.3.    
 
Table 6-4 presents the results of acquiring firm long run post-acquisition 
performance. Column 2 shows the mean abnormal returns (ARs) for each month. 
Columns 3 and 4 give the statistics for the Patell Z and generalized Sign Z test. The 
results show that the mean abnormal returns are negativ  in most months after the 
M&A announcement, while the ARs show positive signs in the months (-1, -2, -3, -4, 
-5, -6) prior to the M&A deal announcement. Table 6-5 further shows these effects on 
an aggregate level. Negative mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns are detected over 
all time windows (6 months, 12 months, 18 months, 24 months, and 36 months). 
Although only the BHARs over 18 months, 24 months, and 36 months time windows 
are significant, all BHARs show strong significance (at 0.1% level) in the 
Generalized Sign Z tests. These results suggest that, at the aggregate level, acquiring 
firm long run post-acquisition performance is negative. In other words, the acquiring 
firms underperform their benchmark portfolios in the long run.  
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Table 6-4 Acquiring firm post-acquisition abnormal returns 
 
This table provides the monthly mean abnormal returns (AR) of the sample deals after the 
M&A deal announcement. Column 1 is the month relative o the deal announcement date. 
Column 2 shows the mean abnormal return for each month. Columns 3 and 4 present the 
Patell Z statistic and Generalized sign Z statistic respectively.  
 
                        Mean               Patell            Generalized  
        Month       Abnormal Return         Z                Sign Z  
                                             
          -6            0.76%                 1.522$                -0.670       
          -5            0.94%                 2.459**                0.737       
          -4            0.88%                 3.080**                0.034       
          -3            0.61%                 1.605$                 0.128       
          -2            0.53%                 1.671*                -1.748*     
          -1            0.98%                 3.052**                0.362       
           0            1.49%                 5.024***               2.191*      
          +1            0.10%                 0.446                 -1.982*      
          +2           -0.09%                 0.081                 -2.358**    
          +3            0.28%                 0.610                 -1.092       
          +4           -0.27%                 -0.217                -2.311*      
          +5           -0.54%                 -1.901*               -2.545**     
          +6           -0.27%                 -1.712*               -2.663**     
          +7           -0.30%                 -0.207                -1.162       
          +8           -0.26%                 -0.578                -2.687**     
          +9           -0.47%                 -1.741*               -2.078*      
         +10            0.02%                 0.378                -1.607$      
         +11           -0.10%                 -1.175                -2.267*      
         +12           -0.59%                 -1.568$               -2.951**     
         +13           -0.04%                  0.382                -2.435**     
         +14           -0.32%                 -0.862                -3.765***    
         +15           -0.36%                 -2.326**              -3.151***    
         +16           -0.72%                 -1.941*               -3.701***    
         +17            0.23%                  0.371                -2.967**     
         +18           -0.16%                  0.060                -0.962       
         +19           -0.39%                 -0.696                -2.804**     
         +20           -0.26%                 -1.032                -2.351**     
         +21            0.39%                 1.137                -1.968*      
         +22            0.16%                 1.239                -1.366$      
         +23           -0.54%                 -0.923                -1.970*      
         +24           -0.08%                  0.387                -1.196       
         +25           -0.13%                 -1.003                -1.608$      
         +26            0.35%                 0.548                 -0.705       
         +27           -0.13%                  0.164                -2.416**     
         +28            0.30%                 1.095                 -0.748       
         +29           -0.12%                 70.171                -3.701***   
         +30           -0.30%                 -2.323*               -2.670**     
         +31            0.66%                 2.607**               -0.397      
         +32           -0.47%                 -1.771*               -3.198***    
         +33            0.46%                 1.505$                -0.590       
         +34            0.06%                 -0.241                -1.460$      
         +35           -0.02%                 -0.137                -1.959*      
         +36            0.58%                 2.215*                0.370       
 
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical sign ficance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail test.  
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Table 6-5 Acquiring firm post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) 
 
This table presents the mean post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of 
the sample deals. Column 1 is the time window used to calculate the BHARs (deal 
announcement month is month 0). Column 2 shows the mean buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns for each time window. Columns 3 and 4 present the Patell Z statistic and 
Generalized sign Z statistic respectively.  
 
                         
                      Mean               Patell            Generalized  
     Months          BHAR                Z                 Sign Z  
                                             
 
(+1,+6)            -0.83%             -1.099            -5.734*** 
    (+1,+12)           -2.34%             -2.185            -7.750*** 
(+1,+18)           -3.68%             -2.800**            -11.548*** 
    (+1,+24)           -3.64%             -2.432**            -11.173*** 
(+1,+36)           -2.77%             -1.604$          -10.751*** 
 
  
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical sign ficance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail test.  
 
 
For robustness checks, I also calculate acquiring firm post-acquisition buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) by including a momentum factor in the construction of an 
alternative benchmark portfolio. There is not significant changes in my results. 
(Results are presented in Table 6-6 and 6-7. . 
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Table 6-6 Acquiring firm post-acquisition abnormal returns 
       (based on the alternative benchmark portfolio) 
 
This table provides the monthly mean abnormal returns (AR) of the sample deals after the 
M&A deal announcement. Column 1 is the month relative o the deal announcement date. 
Column 2 shows the mean abnormal return for each month. Columns 3 and 4 present the 
Patell Z statistic and Generalized sign Z statistic respectively. 
  
                         Mean             Patell          Generalized  
        Month      Abnormal Return          Z             Sign Z                                      
          -6               0.80%             2.373**          -0.262      
          -5               0.92%             2.968**          0.328      
          -4               0.91%             3.698***         0.286      
          -3               0.63%             2.147*           0.117      
          -2               0.58%             2.201*           -1.780*                   
          -1               0.99%             3.645***         0.539           
          0                1.12%             4.177***         1.129      
          +1               0.11%             0.661            -2.750**    
          +2              -0.10%             0.083           -2.412**    
          +3               0.35%             1.469$           -1.738*     
          +4              -0.10%             0.388           -2.455**    
          +5              -0.54%            -2.077*           -2.792**    
          +6              -0.38%            -2.260*           -3.720***   
          +7              -0.10%             0.780           -0.472      
          +8              -0.35%            -1.055           -3.257***   
          +9              -0.54%            -2.343**          -3.787***   
         +10               0.06%             0.678            -1.735*     
         +11              -0.09%            -1.411$           -2.879**    
         +12              -0.42%            -0.570           -3.134***   
         +13              -0.07%             0.317            -2.796**    
         +14              -0.39%            -1.412$           -4.395***   
         +15              -0.18%            -1.415$           -2.606**    
         +16              -0.74%            -2.477**          -4.508***   
         +17               0.18%             0.162            -3.699***   
         +18              -0.11%             0.340            -1.256      
         +19              -0.38%            -0.779           -3.920***   
         +20              -0.33%            -1.607$           -3.644***   
         +21               0.21%             0.690            -3.021**    
         +22              -0.05%            -0.097           -1.723*     
         +23              -0.50%            -1.069           -3.395***   
         +24              -0.21%            -0.249           -2.505**    
         +25              -0.14%            -0.909           -1.828*     
         +26               0.10%            -0.151            -2.156*     
         +27              -0.16%            -0.105           -2.882**    
         +28               0.30%            1.191             -1.051      
         +29              -0.32%            -1.002           -4.236***   
         +30              -0.51%            -3.439***         -3.487***   
         +31               0.82%            3.984***         -0.820      
         +32              -0.39%            -1.935*           -3.316***   
         +33               0.28%            0.846            -1.574$     
         +34               0.21%            0.844            -1.348$     
         +35              -0.28%            -1.509$           -2.694**    
         +36               0.33%            1.439$           -1.118      
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical sign ficance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail test.  
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Table 6-7 Acquiring firm post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal returns     
           (BHAR based on the alternative benchmark portfolio) 
 
This table presents the mean post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of 
the sample deals. Column 1 is the time window used to calculate the BHARs (deal 
announcement month is month 0). Column 2 shows the mean buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns for each time window. Columns 3 and 4 present the Patell Z statistic and 
Generalized sign Z statistic respectively.  
 
                       Mean              Patell            Generalized  
     Months           BHAR               Z                 Sign Z  
 
     (+1,+6)            -0.46%            -0.708           -5.237*** 
     (+1,+12)           -1.49%            -1.629$           -7.303*** 
     (+1,+18)           -2.66%            -2.383**            -8.905*** 
     (+1,+24)           -3.48%            -2.702**           -11.518*** 
 (+1,+36)           -3.68%            -2.393**           -12.024*** 
 
  
The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical sign ficance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail test.  
 
 
6.2.3 Comparison between my CAR and BHAR results of acquirers with 
previous studies 
 
In order to compare my CAR and BHAR results with previous studies, I first 
summarize previous studies of M&A performance in Table 6-8. As shown in the table, 
the majority of studies report negative abnormal returns over the post-M&A (long 
run) period and suggest that M&A deals, on average, under-perform in the long-run. 
As for the M&A short-run (announcement) performance, most of the previous 
studies report significant positive cumulative abnormal returns around the deal 
announcement, although the empirical results are someh w mixed and less clear than 
those about long-run performance. As shown in Table 6-8, in my review, 18 studies 
report positive announcement returns and 14 studies detect negative announcement 
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returns. 
  
My results of short run (announcement) M&A performance show significant positive 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for acquirers at M&A announcements, which 
suggest that the market views M&A announcements as good news and reacts 
positively to them. This finding is consistent with most previous studies.  
 
For the long run post-M&A performance, my study reports significant negative 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) over the long run post-M&A time window.  
These findings are consistent with the majority of previous studies.  
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Table 6-8 Summary of the studies about acquiring firms long-run and short-run (announcement) performance 
 
 
Long run performance 
 
 
Short run performance 
The sign (+/-) 
of abnormal 
return 
(number of the 
studies) 
           
Studies 
 
The sign (+/-) 
of abnormal 
return 
(number of 
the studies) 
 
Studies 
 
 
                
 
     + 
 
  (4 studies ) 
 
Mandelker (1974); 
Magenheim and Mueller (1988); 
Loughran and Vijh (1997);                                              
Rau and Vermaelen (1998). 
 
 
                
 
     +
  
(18 studies ) 
 
Malatesta (1983);  
Kummer and Hoffmeister 
(1978); 
Sicherman and Pettway (1987); 
Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail 
(1998); 
Kohers and Kohers (2000);  
Jarrell and Bradley (1980); 
Leeth and Borg (2000);  
Floreani and Rigamonti (2001); 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1982); 
Kohers and Kohers (2001). 
 
 
Rosen (2003); 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002); 
Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2003); 
Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah 
(2005); 
Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989); 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2005); 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989); 
Bradley (1980). 
 
 
 
- 
 
 (13 studies) 
 
Dodd and Ruback (1977); 
Conn, Cosh, Guest, and  
Hughes (2003); 
Asquith (1983); 
Loderer and Martin (1992); 
Malatesta (1983); 
Kennefy and Limmack; 
Gregory (1997); 
Agrawal, Jaffe, and 
Mandelker (1992); 
  
 
Kohers and Kohers (2000); 
Louis (2002); 
Varaiya and Ferris (1987); 
Ferris and Park (2001); 
Rosen (2003); 
Langetieg (1978). 
 
 
 
- 
 
(14 studies) 
 
Delong (2001); 
Byrd and Hickman; (1992) 
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 
(1987); 
Houston, James, and Ryngaert 
(2001); 
Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1997); 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1990); 
Delong (2003); 
 
Servaes (1991); 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992);  
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992); 
Mulherin and Boone (2000); 
Walker (2000); 
Kuipers, Miller, and Patel (2003); 
Moeller (2005). 
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6.3 Regression results 
 
To examine the role of CEO narcissism in M&A decision-making and in explaining 
firm M&A performance empirically, I run a series ofregression analyses to test   
the hypotheses established in chapter 3. In this section, the regression results are 
presented and discussed. The three parallel measures of CEO narcissism – Holder67, 
media portrayal, and content analysis of CEO speech – are used in each regression. 
In each result table, the parameter estimates, t-Statistic (or Z-Statistic), and F-test (or 
LR statistic) are reported.  
 
6.3.1 Correlation matrix 
 
Table 6-9 shows the correlations between the independent variables used in my 
regression models. In general, the correlations betwe n most of the variables are very 
low. Three variables (VO, CG, and Payment) have correlations higher than 0.1 with 
variable HN (proxy for high level of CEO narcissism). The correlation between VO 
(CEO’s vested option holding) and HN is 0.17. This correlation may result 
mechanistically from the method of variable HN construction, since classification as 
HN CEOs according to the Holder67 measure requires th  CEOs to hold the highly 
in-the-money vested options for longer, which may lead to the high CEO’s vested 
option holding. The correlation between CG index (the higher the index, the poorer 
the corporate governance quality) and variable HN is 0.12, which may suggest the 
positive role of the corporate governance mechanism in curbing the CEO narcissistic 
tendency. That is, the poorer the corporate governance quality, the higher the HN. 
Finally, the correlation between variable Payment (Payment=1 for cash financing 
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deals) and variable HN is 0.18. One possible explanation of this positive correlation 
is that, due to his/her inflated self-view and excessive confidence, the highly 
narcissistic CEO often feels that his/her firm’s stock is undervalued and therefore 
they would be reluctant to use stock as the payment method in M&As. In other 
words, in the eyes of narcissistic CEOs, using the undervalued stock to make the 
payment is relatively expensive compared with a cash payment.       
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Table 6-9 Correlation matrix 
 
HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. (HN is derived from Holder67.) Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets 
at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement year. SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal ye r before the deal 
announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options, as a fraction of common shares outtanding. CF is the normalized ratio of firm cash flow, given by 
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, divided by beginning of the year capital.  (Here, capital is measured as property, plant and equipment.)  Q represents 
the Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of assets/book value of assets, where the book value of assets = total assets, and the market value of assets = total assets + market 
equity - book equity. Market equity = common share outstanding x fiscal year closing price, and book equity = total assets-total liabilities - preferred stock + deferred taxes. 
CG is the GIM’s G index, the proxy for corporate governance quality (the higher the index score, the poorer the corporate governance quality). Rsize is the relative size of the 
target firm. 
1−yearreturn  represents the 1-year lagged stock return. Growth is t e target’s M/B ratio, which is used to proxy for a firm’s growth options. Attitude is a binary 
variable, where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”. Payment is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the method 
of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and those of the target are the 
same.  
 
 HN Size 
 
SO 
 
VO 
 
CF 
 
Q 
 
CG RSize 1−yearreturn  Growth Attitude Payment relatedness 
 
HN 1             
Size 
 
0.09* 1            
SO -0.03* -0.16* 1           
VO 0.17* -0.15* 0.09* 1          
CF 0.09 0.07* 0.05* 0.13* 1         
Q 0.07* -0.27* 0.08 0.07* 0.26* 1        
CG 0.12* 0.16* -0.09* -0.10* -0.05* -0.11* 1       
RSize 0.09 -0.32** -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.06 0.09 1      
returnt-1 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.11* 0.13* -0.06 0.03 1     
Growth 0.04 0.05 0.05* 0.06* 0.05 0.04* -0.05 -0.08 0.04 1    
Attitude 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04* -0.03 0.05 1   
Payment 0.18* -0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08* -0.09 0.04 -0.31* 0.06 0.06 -0.16 1  
relatedness 
 
0.09 -0.09* 0.05 0.08 -0.07* -0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 1 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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6.3.2 The impact of CEO narcissism on M&A decision-making 
 
My first logistic regression analysis is to test the hypothesis H1 relating to the impact 
of CEO narcissism on M&A activity, and aims to answer the question “Are highly 
narcissistic CEOs more likely to conduct mergers than lowly narcissistic CEOs?” 
Table 6-10 provides the results of this regression.  
 
In model 1, I find a positive and significant (at the 5% significance level) coefficient 
0.32 on variable HN (Holder67), which suggests a positive relationship between the 
level of CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO conducting M&A deals. This 
result supports my first hypothesis H1. It appears that a high narcissism CEO is more 
likely to conduct M&A deals than a low narcissism CEO. To gain better intuition, I 
convert the parameter estimates to odds ratios. On this basis, the odds ratio of 1.38 
indicates that the odds of an HN CEO conducting a deal are around 40% higher than 
the odds of an LN CEO doing so. This result is consistent with Malmendier and Tate 
(2008), and provides new evidence to support previous theoretical propositions (e.g., 
Roll, 1986; Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2003). We might explain this apparent 
strong relation between CEO narcissism and the acquisitiveness of a firm in four 
ways. First, HN CEOs, by virtue of their personality, have excessive confidence in 
their own abilities, and believe that they will perform better than the target CEOs.  
Therefore, they are more likely to conduct a merger or acquisition. Second, CEO 
narcissism leads to an increase in the bid premium that he/she is prepared to pay, 
which increases the probability of winning the auction (conducting the deal). Third, 
importantly, my results are consistent with HN CEOs using M&A activity as their 
stage on which to act out a drama to gain attention and admiration (Chatterjee and 
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Hambrick, 2007). Finally, as highly narcissistic CEOs are usually glory-seekers and 
have a strong need for a “rapid change of course” (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; 
Lubit 2002), they tend to use M&A activity as a way of building up their glories and 
feeding their need for excitement.  
    
My results also show that three control variables are significant. The odds ratio for 
Size is 1.26, and significant at the 1% significance leve , suggesting that the CEOs of 
larger firms are a quarter more likely to conduct mergers or acquisitions compared 
with those of smaller ones, which is consistent with the prior literature. One possible 
explanation for the firm size effect on firm acquisitiveness is that large firms have 
fewer financial constraints (i.e., more internal and external resources) than smaller 
firms in making M&A deals.  In addition, we may surmise that the CEOs of larger 
firms are likely to have a greater propensity to exhibit high levels of narcissism 
because of their associated greater power, authority, compensation, reputation and 
public profile compared to the CEOs of smaller firms, and thus be more likely to 
conduct M&A deals. Another control variable, CF, is also found to be positively 
related to firm acquisitiveness. The parameter estimate for CF is 0.22 and significant 
at the 10% level. This finding is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis in the 
literature. That is, firms with large amounts of excssive cash flow tend to invest in 
such projects as mergers or acquisitions, as they have abundant internal resources to 
conduct such deals. I also find a significant (at the 5% level) positive coefficient of 
0.17 for Q. This suggests that firms with a higher value of Tobin’s Q are more likely 
to conduct a merger, which is consistent with the Q theory of mergers (Servaes, 
1991). It seems that a firm’s M&A activity may partly be a response to profitable 
reallocation opportunities (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). In addition, the one-year 
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lagged stock return is positively associated with frm acquisitiveness at the 10% 
significance level. We may explain this from two aspects. On the one hand, 
inefficient markets often overvalue good past performance, and the consequently 
overvalued stock is then used as “cheap currency” by CEOs to conduct M&A deals 
(Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006). Onthe other hand, we may 
speculate that good recent stock market performance may serve to provide positive 
feedback reinforcing a CEO’s narcissistic personality characteristics, further inflating 
his/her self-view leading to additional M&A deals. 
 
Table 6-10 also presents the regression results of model 2 that uses media portrayal 
as the CEO narcissism measure. The results are similar to those of model 1, although 
the significance level for some parameter estimates changes slightly. The coefficient 
on HN is still positive and significant (at the 10% level), although the odds ratio is 
slightly lower, down from 1.38 using the Holder67 measure to 1.27, and the 
significance level decreases from 5% to 10%. On the w ole, my results are not 
sensitive to the change of measure for CEO narcissism.  
 
As mentioned before, the content analysis of CEO speech measure is not used here, 
as the construction of this measure is based on the analysis of CEO speech about a 
specific deal, and it is impossible to have such a speech from the CEO who has never 
conducted an M&A deal. (In this regression, the observations include both CEOs 
who have conducted deals and those who have not.)    
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Table 6-10 Logistic regression: CEO narcissism and M&A decision making 
        
Y=
876543210 ββββββββα ++++++++ QCFVOSOSizeCGHN ε+−1yearreturn  
 
The dependent variable Y is a binary variable which equals 1 if the firm announced at least one deal (successful bid and completed deal) in a specific firm year 
during the period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2005, otherwise 0. HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 
otherwise. (HN is derived from Holder67 in model 1 and the media portrayal narcissism proxy measures in model 2). CG is the GIM’s G index, the proxy for 
corporate governance quality. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement year. SO is the 
fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options, 
as a fraction of common shares outstanding. CF is the normalized ratio of firm cash flow, given by earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, divided by 
the beginning of the year capital. (Here, capital is measured as property, plant and equipment.)  Q repres nts Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of assets/book 
value of assets, where the book value of assets = total assets, and the market value of assets = total assets + market equity - book equity. Market equity = common 
share outstanding x fiscal year closing price, and book equity = total assets-total liabilities-preferred stock + deferred taxes. I report the regression results based on 
using Holder67 and media portrayal as the measures of CEO narcissism respectively.  returnyear-1 represents the 1-year lagged stock return.  This table also shows 
the coefficients in the form of odds ratios.  
 
Model 1  
(Based on Holder67) 
   Model 2 
(Based on media portrayal) 
 
Variables 
Coefficient Odds ratio z-Statistics Coefficient Odds ratio z-Statistics 
HN 0.32 
 
1.38 2.51** 0.24 
 
1.27 1.76* 
CG 0.01 
 
1.01 0.64 0.00 
 
1.00 0.48 
Size 0.23 
 
1.26 2.76*** 0.22 
 
1.24 2.54** 
SO -0.89 
 
0.41 -0.76 -0.94 
 
0.39 -0.66 
VO -0.53 
 
0.59 -0.61 -0.51 
 
0.60 -0.44 
CF 0.22 
 
1.24 
 
1.80* 0.20 
 
1.22* 1.77* 
Q 0.17 
 
1.19 2.08** 0.18 
 
1.20 2.11** 
returnyear-1 0.10 
 
1.10 1.73* 0.08 
 
1.08 1.75* 
       
LR statistic    64.12***     59.71***   
Observations    22,103      16,418   
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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6.3.3 The impact of CEO narcissism on M&A short run (announcement) 
performance  
 
To examine empirically the market reactions to the M&A deals announced by highly 
narcissistic CEOs, I conduct a multiple regression analysis to test my second 
hypothesis H2 relating to the impact of CEO narcissism on M&A annou cement 
performance. The results are presented in Table 6-11.  The dependent variable is the 
3-day (-1, +1) event window CAR. The binary variable HN is derived from three 
measures of CEO narcissism-Holder67, media portrayal, and content analysis of 
CEO speech in models 1, 2, and 3, respectively.  
 
The regression results of model 1 show a significant ( t the 5% level) negative 
coefficient of -0.015 for variable HN (Holder67). I also find a significant (at the 
5% level) negative coefficient of -0.037 for variable CG (proxy for quality of 
corporate governance).44 In addition, the coefficients of two other control variables, 
Payment and Size, are also found to be significant. The coefficient o  variable 
Payment (the payment method of a deal) is 0.013 and it is significant at the 1% 
level. The coefficient of the variable Size is -0.190 and significant at the 5% level. 
When using the media portrayal measure (model 2), Ifind a coefficient of -0.009 
for variable HN and the significance level decreases to 10%. When content 
analysis of the CEO speech measure is used in model 3, a significant (at the 5% 
level) negative coefficient of -0.013 is reported, similar to the result for model 1. 
On the whole, the use of different proxies for the level of CEO narcissism does not 
have significant effects on my results, though the magnitude of the coefficients and 
                                                   
44 The CG index is constructed in such a way that, the higher the index, the lower the corporate 
governance quality.  
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the significant level for some coefficients do change slightly.  
 
The results thus suggest that CEO narcissism has a significant negative impact on 
acquiring firm short run cumulative abnormal returns, which support my hypothesis 
H2. It seems that the market is able to identify the M&A deals announced by HN 
CEOs and responds accordingly, which is consistent with the findings of Malmendier 
and Tate (2008). 
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Table 6-11 Multiple regression: the impact of acquir ng firm CEO narcissism on firm short run (announcement) M&A performance 
     
εγγγγγγγγγγα +++++++++++= SizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNCAR 109876543210  
 
The dependent variable is the 3-day (-1, 1) event wi dow CAR for the acquiring firm. HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for highly narcissistic 
CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. (HN is derived from Holder67 in model 1, media portrayal in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourse in 
model 3.) CG is GIM’s G index, a proxy for corporate governance quality.  SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the 
last fiscal year before the deal announcement year.VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of common the shares outstanding.  
Attitude is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a 
binary variable, where 1 signifies that the method of eal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a b nary variable where 1 signifies that the first
two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and those f the target are the same. Rsize is the relative size of the target firm. Growth is the target’s M/B 
ratio, which is used to proxy for firm growth options. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets.  
 
Model 1 
(Based on Holder67) 
Model 2 
(Based on media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(Based on content analysis of CEO speech) 
Variable 
Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics 
 
HN     
CG 
SO 
VO 
Attitude 
Payment 
relatedness 
RSize 
Growth 
Size 
 
 
-0.015 
-0.037 
0.078 
0.112 
     -0.002 
0.013 
0.007 
0.145 
0.121 
-0.190 
 
  -2.336** 
  -2.492** 
1.227 
1.021 
-0.177 
   2.845*** 
1.001 
0.183 
0.328 
 -2.481** 
 
-0.009 
-0.039 
0.080 
0.107 
-0.001 
0.012 
0.006 
0.147 
0.130 
    -0.183 
 
  -1.920* 
   -2.399** 
1.106 
1.193 
-0.183 
     2.737*** 
  0.974 
0.179 
0.301 
   -2.330** 
 
-0.013 
-0.021 
0.057 
0.120 
      -0.000 
0.015 
0.004 
0.129 
0.172 
-0.158 
 
 -2.581** 
-1.779* 
0.971 
1.204 
     -0.149 
   2.911*** 
0.834 
0.163 
0.297 
-1.905* 
Adjusted 2R       0.06       0.05         0.05  
F- test   9.67***    9.58***    13.49***  
Observations 1,888 
 
     1,722        1076  
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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To further investigate the market reaction to CEO narcissism tendency in M&A 
deals, I divide the full M&A sample into two groups: deals conducted by high 
narcissism CEOs and those conducted by low narcissism CEOs. Then I calculate 
the average cumulative abnormal returns to the acquiring firms in each group 
respectively. Table 6-12 presents the results. The average three-day cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) in my full sample is 0.36% (significant at 1% level). The 
average CAR to the deals conducted by high narcissism CEOs is 0.12% 
(significant at 5% level) and it is 0.73% (significant at 1% level) for the deals 
conducted by low narcissism CEOs. The average CAR for the deals by HN CEOs 
is 24 basis points below the full sample average and 61 basis points below the 
average CAR for the deals by LN CEOs. There are two potential interpretations of 
this negative impact of CEO narcissism on firm short run performance. First, high 
narcissism CEOs make a bid due to their inflated self-vi ws and excessive 
confidence and the market can identify this unrealistic expectation and react 
negatively. Second, as high narcissism CEOs are prone to the overbidding problem, 
the market views the bids by HN CEOs as bad news.        
 
Table 6-12 Average CARs of the deals conducted by HN and LN CEOs 
 
This table presents the results of the mean cumulative bnormal returns (over the three-day 
announcement time window) of the full sample deals, the deals conducted by highly 
narcissistic CEOs and the deals conducted by lowly narcissistic CEOs, respectively.  
 
 Full sample 
(%) 
Deals conducted 
by HN CEOs (%) 
Deals conducted 
by LN CEOs (%) 
 
Mean CAR 
(-1, +1) day 
 
0.36 
 
0.12 
 
0.73 
 
Patell Z 
Statistics 
 
5.609*** 
 
2.793** 
 
4.368*** 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Besides HN, my regression results also show that some control variables have a 
significant impact on firm short run M&A performance.  
 
The quality of corporate governance has the expected effect: better corporate 
governance (lower CG) is associated with better short-term (announcement) 
performance, which is consistent with the generally ccepted argument that good 
corporate governance can mitigate the agency problem and enhance firm value.  
 
My results also demonstrate that the short-term (annou cement event window) 
market reaction to firms conducting cash payment deals is better than that to firms 
conducting non-cash (mainly stock financing) payment deals. This finding is 
consistent with most of the previous M&A literature (e.g., Travlos, 1987; Asquith, 
Bruner, and Mullins, 1987). One explanation for thepayment method effect is the 
signalling hypothesis: if the CEO believes that the firm’s stock is overvalued in the 
market, he/she would prefer to use equity to finance the deal. If the CEO believes 
that the firm’s stock is undervalued, he/she would prefer cash payment to stock 
payment. Therefore, in the eyes of investors, the firm’s decision to use cash to 
finance the deal constitutes a positive signal about the real value of the firm’s stock, 
and, in parallel, the firm’s decision to use stock financing conveys a negative signal 
about its future prospects.  
 
In addition, my finding that the acquirer’s size is negatively associated with M&A 
announcement performance at the 5% level is consiste t with the results of Moeller, 
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Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004).45  A possible explanation of this size effect from a 
narcissism perspective is that, once again, the CEOs of large firms usually receive 
higher rewards and more attention than those of small firms, thus increasing their 
tendency to adopt narcissistic beliefs and behaviour, and generally reinforcing their 
narcissistic personality. Consequently, the CEOs of large firms are more likely to 
conduct value-destroying deals than those of smaller firms, driven by their greater 
propensity towards destructive narcissism.  
 
6.3.4 The impact of CEO narcissism on firm long run post-M&A performance 
 
In examining the impact of CEO narcissism on firm long run post-M&A 
performance, my hypothesis H3 is tested through regression analysis using equation 
(3). In this case, the dependent variable is the 2-year (1, 24 month) post-M&A deal 
event window BHAR. The binary variable HN is derived from three measures of 
CEO narcissism – Holder67, media portrayal, and the content analysis of CEO 
speech in models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The results are reported in Table 6-13.  
  
I find significant and negative coefficients -0.019, -0.017 and -0.024 on variable 
HN in all three models, significant at the 5% level using Holder67, and at the 10% 
level using media portrayal and content analysis of CEO speech. This finding 
suggests that, on average, a high level of CEO narcissism has a significantly 
negative impact on acquiring firm long run post-M&A performance. This result 
supports my hypothesis H3 and is consistent with the findings of previous finance 
and management studies (e.g. Aktas et al, 2005; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007).  
                                                   
45 They find that the acquirer announcement return is roughly two percentage points higher for small 
acquirers than large acquirers, irrespective of the orm of financing. 
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Table 6-13 Multiple regression: the impact of acquir ng firm CEO narcissism on firm long run post-acquisition performance 
 
εγγγγγγγγγγα +++++++++++= SizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNBHAR 109876543210  
 
The dependent variable is the 2-year (1, 24 month) BHAR for the acquiring firm. HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, 
and equal to 0 otherwise. (HN is derived from Holder67 in model 1, media portrayal in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourses in model 3.) 
CG is GIM’s G index, a proxy for corporate governance quality.  SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal 
year before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of the common shares outstanding.  Attitude 
is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary 
variable, where 1 signifies that the method of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the first two 
digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and those of the target are the same. Rsize is the relative size of the target firm. Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, 
which is used to proxy for a firm’s growth options. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total asset .  
 
Model 1 
(Based on Holder67) 
Model 2 
(Based on media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(Based on content analysis of CEO 
speech) Variable 
Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics 
 
HN 
CG 
SO 
VO 
Attitude 
Payment 
Relatedness 
RSize 
Growth 
Size 
 
 
    -0.019 
    -0.023 
0.068 
0.174 
0.000 
0.015 
0.049 
0.065 
   -0.031 
   -0.091 
 
  -2.444** 
  -2.571** 
0.794 
   2.939*** 
0.109 
 1.769* 
0.877 
0.157 
   -0.210 
   -0.844 
 
     -0.017 
     -0.020 
0.065 
0.169 
0.000 
0.015 
0.052 
0.057 
     -0.033 
     -0.088 
 
-1.743* 
 -2.336** 
0.647 
   2.788*** 
0.117 
  2.417** 
0.909 
0.174 
     -0.312 
     -0.902 
 
      -0.024 
      -0.016 
0.053 
0.148 
0.000 
0.011 
0.061 
0.049 
      -0.021 
      -0.069 
 
-1.828* 
 -2.203** 
0.564 
  2.510** 
0.097 
 1.836* 
0.845 
0.148 
-0.316 
-0.887 
Adjusted 2R      0.05        0.04  0.05  
F- test   8.96***     8.73***    11.44***  
Observations    1,888  1,722        1076  
 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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To investigate further the impact of CEO narcissism tendency on firm long run 
post-acquisition performance, I compare the buy-and-hol  abnormal returns to the 
deals conducted by high narcissism CEOs and those condu ted by low narcissism 
CEOs. Table 6-14 shows the results. The average two-year buy-and-hold abnormal 
return (BHAR) in my full sample is -3.64% (significant at 5% level). The average 
BHAR for the deals conducted by high narcissism CEOs is -4.74% (significant at the 
5% level) and it is -2.43% (significant at the 5% level) for the deals conducted by 
low narcissism CEOs. The average BHAR for the deals by HN CEOs is 110 basis 
points below the full sample average and 231 basis points below the average BHAR 
for the deals by LN CEOs. This result further confirms my regression results, and 
suggests a negative association between level of CEOnarcissism and firm long run 
post-acquisition performance.  
 
Table 6-14 Average BHARs of the deals conducted by HN and LN CEOs 
 
This table presents the results of the mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (over a one-year 
post-acquisition time window) of the full sample deals, the deals conducted by highly 
narcissistic CEOs and the deals conducted by lowly narcissistic CEOs, respectively.  
 
 
Full sample 
(%) 
Deals conducted 
by HN CEOs (%) 
Deals conducted 
by LN CEOs (%) 
 
Mean (+1, +12) 
month BHAR 
 
-3.64 
 
-4.74 
 
-2.43 
 
Patell Z Statistics 
 
-2.432** 
 
-2.397** 
 
-2.361** 
Cross-correlation 
adjusted t-test46 
-2.365** -2.328** -2.272* 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
                                                   
46 I also report the adjusted t-test using Mitchell and Stafford (2000) to account for cross-correlation 
(cross-sectional dependence) of BHARs    
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A possible interpretation of the negative relationship between CEO narcissism 
tendency and firm long run post-M&A performance is as follows. The M&A decision 
of HN CEOs may often be driven by their destructive narcissistic personalities, with 
them mistakenly believing that they have superior abilities, and that “they can run the 
acquired firm better than the incumbent management” (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 
2007). However, in reality, HN CEOs are “frequently weak at implementing 
programs” as “their lack of attachment to a set of values” often leads to sudden 
changes in organizational plans, “never finishing the process of building needed core 
competencies” (Lubit, 2002). The poor post-M&A integration problem, reported in 
the strategic management literature, clearly reflects this attribute of CEO narcissistic 
personality, and is a plausible explanation for the long run M&A underperformance. 
 
My results also show significant positive coefficients of 0.174 (significant at the 
1% level), 0.169 (significant at the 1% level), and 0.148 (significant at the 5% 
level) for variable VO (CEO vested option holdings) in model 1 (based on 
Holder67), model 2 (based on media portrayal), and model 3 (based on content 
analysis of CEO speech). This finding suggests that te higher the CEO vested 
option holdings are, the better the long run post-merger performance. A possible 
explanation for this is that the CEO’s stock option compensation package aligns 
his/her interests with those of the shareholders, thereby improving firm 
performance.  
 
Another control variable, Payment (the payment method of a deal), is also found to 
be significantly positively associated with firm long run post-M&A buy-and-hold 
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abnormal returns. The coefficients of the variable Payment are 0.015 (significant at 
the 10% level), 0.015 (significant at the 5% level), and 0.011 (significant at the 10% 
level) in models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These reults are consistent with findings in 
previous studies (Franks, Harris and Mayer, 1988; Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mendelker, 
1992) and suggest that, as in the regression analysis of firm short run performance, 
firms that conduct cash deals also perform better in the longer run than those that 
conduct non-cash (mainly stock) deals. A possible explanation of this is as follows: a 
firm whose stock is undervalued in the market is more likely to finance a deal by 
cash, because stock financing would be relatively more expensive. After a period of 
time, the price of the undervalued stock will gradully move up to a more normal 
level, and therefore we observe better long-term post-M&A performance in cash 
deals. Similarly, a firm whose stock is overvalued by the market is more likely to 
finance a deal through equity, since this is relatively “cheap currency”. However, 
after a period of time, the price of the overvalued stock will gradually move down to 
a more normal level. In this case, we would observe the relatively poorer long-term 
post-M&A performance of equity deals compared with the performance of cash 
deals. 
 
Finally, the significant negative coefficients -0.023, -0.020, and -0.016 for the 
variable CG are reported in models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The significance 
levels are 5% across all models. This result confirms the generally accepted view 
that a good corporate governance mechanism can monitor the M&A 
decision-making, mitigate agency problem, and consequently enhance firm value. 
 164 
6.3.5 The impact of target firm CEO narcissism on M&A announcement and 
long run post-M&A performance 
 
As mentioned before, previous studies only focus on the CEO narcissism (or related 
constructs) of acquiring firm, with any potential parallel impact of the narcissistic 
personality of the target firm CEO not considered. In this study, I argue that CEO 
narcissistic tendency, as a personality trait, can equally exist among target firm CEOs. 
Therefore, in this sub-section, I include variable THN  (target firm CEO narcissism 
dummy) in my multiple regression model to examine th parallel impact of target 
firm CEO narcissism on M&A announcement and long run post-acquisition 
performance. My two hypotheses, H4 and H5, are tested.  
 
Results are presented in Tables 6-15 and 6-16. The dep ndent variable is again the 
3-day (-1, 1) event window CAR when examining the impact of target firm CEO 
narcissism on acquiring firm M&A announcement performance in Table 6-15, and 
the 2-year (1, 24 month) event window BHAR when examining the impact of target 
firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm long run post-M&A performance in Table 
6-16. The value of HNA is derived from the Holder67 measure in model 1, the media 
portrayal measure in model 2, and the content analysis of CEO speech measure in 
model 3. The value of HNT is derived from the Holder67 measure in model 1, and the 
media portrayal measure in models 2 and 3. Here, I do not use the content analysis of 
CEO speech proxy to measure the level of target firm CEO narcissism.  The reasons 
for this have been discussed in section 4.4.2.3.  
 
Table 6-15 shows the results of model 1 which report a significant (at the 10% level) 
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negative coefficient -0.007 for variable AHN , while the coefficient for variable 
THN is -0.008 but not significant. The results for models 2 and 3, however, report 
significantly negative coefficients for both variables. In model 2, the coefficient of 
AHN  is -0.012, which is more negative than that of model 1, but the significance 
level decreases from 5% to 10%. The coefficient of THN  is -0.005 and significant 
at the 5% level. In model 3, the coefficient of AHN  is -0.009 and significant at the 
5% level. The coefficient of THN  is still negative (-0.003), though the significance 
level decreases from 5% to 10%. In brief, the coeffici nts for the variables AHN  and 
THN are reported as being significantly negative across all three models except for 
the coefficient of THN in model 1. This exception might be a reflection of the small 
sample size in model 1, with only 342 observations. The sample size of model 1 
(based on Holder67) is smaller than that of models 2 and 3 because the model 
requiring the construction of Holder67 for both the acquiring and target CEO limits 
my sample to a small number of cases in which one of my sample firms acquired 
another one of my sample firms. In other words, I only have 342 such acquirer-target 
CEO (firm) pairs in my CEO dataset.  
 
The results for models 2 and 3 thus support my hypothesis H4, and suggest a 
negative impact of such a narcissistic tendency on acquiring firm cumulative 
abnormal returns during the announcement period. A possible explanation could be 
the overpayment (overbidding) problem.  More narcissistic target firm CEOs are 
likely to have an inflated idea of their own self-worth and abilities, and believe that 
they can perform at least as well as, or even better than, the potential takeover 
management. They will therefore require a higher price during the bidding process, 
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leading to the acquirer having to pay a higher than optimal premium to complete the 
deal successfully. The market seems to have the ability to detect such a potential 
overpayment, and consequently, target firm CEO narcissism is reflected in the firm’s 
cumulative abnormal returns during the short run deal announcement period 
negatively. My regression results on M&A short run performance thus highlight the 
role of target firm CEO narcissism in explaining M&A short run performance and 
provide empirical evidence for the original prediction made by Malmendier and Tate 
(2003), but not empirically tested by them.  
   
Table 6-16 shows the regression results for the test of target firm CEO narcissism on 
acquiring firm long run post-acquisition performance. I do not find any significant 
link between target firm CEO narcissism and acquiring firm long run 
post-acquisition BHARs. Although three negative coeffici nts (-0.001, -0.003, and 
-0.002) for variable THN  are reported in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively, none f 
them is statistically significant. However, it is possible that the impact of target firm 
CEO narcissism on firm long run post-acquisition performance is overwhelmed by 
many other effects as there are so many other factors that could affect firm long run 
performance.   
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Table 6-15 Multiple regression: the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm short run (announcement) M&A performance 
 
εγγγγγγγγγγγα ++++++++++++= SizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNHNCAR TA 11109876543210  
 
The dependent variable is the 3-day (-1, 1) event wi dow CAR for the acquiring firm. HNA measures the acquiring firm CEO narcissism, and HNT the 
equivalent for the target firm. HNA and HNT are dummy variables equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. HNA is derived from 
Holder67 in model 1, media portrayal in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourse in model 3. HNT is derived from Holder67 in model 1, and media 
portrayal in models 2 and 3. CG is the GIM’s G index, a proxy for corporate governance quality.  SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO 
at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of common shares 
outstanding.  Attitude is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  
Payment is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that e method of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. r latedness is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that 
the first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and target are the same. Rsize is the relative size of the target firm. Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, 
which proxies for firm growth options. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets.  
 
Model 1 
(
AHN : Holder67,  
THN : Holder67) 
Model 2 
(
AHN : media portrayal, 
THN : media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(
AHN : content analysis of CEO speech, 
   
THN : media portrayal) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient  t Statistics Coefficient     t Statistic      Coefficient    t Statistics 
 
HNA 
HNT 
CG 
SO 
VO 
Attitude 
Payment 
relatedness 
RSize 
Growth 
Size 
 
 
-0.007 
-0.008 
-0.028 
0.025 
0.055 
-0.000 
0.017 
0.010 
0.155 
0.188 
-0.130 
 
  -2.092* 
 -1.509 
 -1.396 
  1.171 
  0.924 
      -0.095 
    2.470** 
  1.397 
  0.148 
  0.299 
  -1.973* 
 
     -0.012 
     -0.005 
     -0.030 
0.067 
0.113 
     -0.002 
0.011 
0.007 
0.132 
0.127 
     -0.174 
 
-2.140* 
 -2.227** 
-1.742* 
1.203 
1.011 
-0.142 
   2.682*** 
1.416 
0.177 
0.357 
 -2.482** 
 
-0.009 
-0.003 
-0.017 
0.049 
0.098 
-0.000 
0.013 
0.006 
0.100 
0.153 
-0.149 
 
  -2.236** 
 -1.880* 
-1.429 
1.193 
0.979 
-0.127 
   2.593*** 
 1.725* 
0.165 
0.318 
 -2.230** 
Adjusted 2R        0.07        0.06  0.06  
F- test   9.17***     12.46***    10.71***  
Observations 
 
      342       1316         661  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6-16 Multiple regression: the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm long run post-acquisition performance 
 
εγγγγγγγγγγγα ++++++++++++= SizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNHNBHAR TA 11109876543210  
 
The dependent variable is the 2-year (1, 24 month) BHAR for the acquiring firm. HNA measures acquiring firm CEO narcissism, and HNT the equivalent 
for the target firm. HNA and HNT are dummy variables equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. HNA is derived from Holder67 in 
model 1, media portrayal in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourse in model 3. HNT is derived from Holder67 in model 1, and media portrayal in 
models 2 and 3. CG is the GIM’s G index, a proxy for c rporate governance quality. SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of 
the last fiscal year before the deal announcement yar. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of common shares outstanding.  
Attitude is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary 
variable, where 1 signifies that the method of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the first two digits of 
the SIC code of the acquirer and target are the same. Rsize is the relative size of the target firm. Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, which proxies for firm 
growth options. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets.  
Model 1 
(
AHN : Holder67,  
THN : Holder67) 
Model 2 
(
AHN : media portrayal, 
THN : media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(
AHN : content analysis of CEO speech, 
  
THN : media portrayal) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics 
 
HNA 
HNT 
CG 
SO 
VO 
Attitude 
Payment 
relatedness 
RSize 
Growth 
Size 
 
 -0.028 
 -0.001 
 -0.029 
 0.086 
 0.146 
 0.000 
 0.020 
 0.031 
 0.022 
      0.001 
      -0.037 
 
 -1.791* 
-0.916 
 -1.812* 
 0.701 
  1.861* 
 0.134 
 1.509 
 0.587 
 0.133 
 0.147 
-0.662 
 
 
      -0.031 
      -0.003 
      -0.018 
0.056 
0.152 
0.001 
0.011 
0.045 
0.064 
     -0.028 
     -0.071 
 
  -2.220** 
-0.987 
  -2.438** 
 0.803 
    2.606*** 
 0.185 
   2.214** 
 0.792 
 0.194 
-0.217 
-0.829 
 
-0.025 
-0.002 
-0.025 
0.071 
0.137 
0.001 
0.009 
0.057 
0.038 
-0.015 
-0.064 
 
    -0.819* 
    -0.933 
 -2.301** 
0.785 
  2.362** 
0.160 
 1.836* 
0.613 
0.168 
-0.194 
-0.714 
Adjusted 2R        0.06        0.05  0.06  
F- test   8.99***    13.75***    11.50***  
Observations       342 
 
      1,316         661  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 169 
6.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, I first investigate acquiring firm short run (announcement) M&A 
performance and long run post-acquisition performance by conducting event studies 
based on different models and market indices. Then, I mpirically examine the role 
of CEO narcissism in M&A decision-making and its impact on firm M&A 
performance by conducting a series of multiple regression analyses. My five 
hypotheses are tested respectively.  
 
My results from the event studies report significant cumulative abnormal returns 
around the M&A announcement, which suggest that, at the aggregate level, the 
market views an M&A announcement as good news and reacts positively. On the 
other hand, in the long run event studies, significant negative mean BHARs are 
reported, which suggest that, at the aggregate level, acquiring firms underperform 
their benchmark portfolios in the long run. My result  are not sensitive to the choice 
of different models and market indices.  
 
Following the evaluation of firm M&A performance, I examine the role and impact 
of CEO narcissism in M&A activity. The main results of my multiple regression 
analyses are as follows: 
 
First, in my logistic regression analysis, a significantly positive relationship between 
the level of CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO conducting M&A deals is 
detected, which supports my first hypothesis H1. The result suggests that a high 
narcissism CEO is more likely to conduct M&A deals than a low narcissism CEO, as 
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consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2008). My results also suggest that the CEOs 
of larger firms are a quarter more likely to conduct mergers or acquisitions compared 
with those of smaller ones; CEOs of firms with abundant cash flows are more likely 
to conduct M&A deals; and CEOs of firms with a high Tobin’s Q are more likely to 
conduct M&A deals. The results of the two models using Holder67 and media 
portrayal as CEO narcissism measures are very similar.  
 
Second, my result of OLS multiple regression analysis of firm short run M&A 
performance supports my hypothesis H2, and suggests that acquiring firm CEO 
narcissism has a significant negative impact on acquiring firm short run 
(announcement) cumulative abnormal returns. The thre parallel measures of CEO 
narcissism – Holder67, media portrayal, and content analysis of CEO speeches – are 
used in the regression analysis, and the results are imilar across all three measures. 
In addition, I find that, in the short run, cash financing deals perform better than 
non-cash financing deals; smaller acquirers perform better than large acquirers; and 
the market reaction to a deal conducted by a firm with good corporate governance is 
better than that conducted by the firm with poor corporate governance.     
 
Third, my multiple regression analysis of firm long run post-M&A performance 
reports a significantly negative relationship between acquiring firm CEO narcissism 
and firm post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal retu n. This result supports my 
hypothesis H3 and suggests that, on average, CEO narcissism negatively impacts on 
firm long run performance. In addition, my results suggest that the CEO vested 
option holding is positively associated with firm long run post-acquisition 
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performance; acquirers with good corporate governance have better long run 
post-acquisition performance; and cash payment deals perform better than non-cash 
payment deals in the long run.  
   
Finally, the results of my parallel multiple regression, including target firm CEO 
narcissism, support my hypothesis H4, and show a significantly negative relationship 
between target firm CEO narcissism and acquiring firm cumulative abnormal returns 
during the announcement period. On the other hand, there is no significant 
relationship detected between target firm CEO narcissism and acquiring firm long 
run post-acquisition performance.   
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Chapter 7 Additional analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In last chapter, I examined the role of acquiring firm and target firm CEO narcissism 
in M&A decision-making and their impact on acquiring firm M&A short run and 
long run performance by testing a series of hypotheses. The main research questions 
of this study have been addressed and discussed. However, there are three interesting 
questions needing to be further investigated. First of all, does CEO narcissism in 
large firms have the same (or same degree of) impact on M&A decision-making and 
firm performance as that in small firms? Second, can good corporate governance 
help to ameliorate the negative impact of CEO narcissism in M&A? And finally, 
what is the impact of CEO narcissism on firm M&A performance when such a 
narcissistic tendency exists in both the acquiring firm and the target firm 
concurrently?     
 
To address these questions in this chapter, I first develop a set of hypotheses and then 
conduct a series of additional regression analyses to test these hypotheses. I also 
calculate and compare the average CG score of the firms with high narcissism CEOs 
and that of the firms with low narcissism CEOs to investigate the potential 
association between corporate governance and CEO narcissistic tendency.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 7.2 develops a set of hypotheses 
regarding the three additional research questions. Section 7.3 present the regression 
models employed in additional analyses. Section 7.4 reports and discusses the results 
of the additional regression analysis. Section 7.5 summarises the chapter.    
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7.2 Hypotheses  
 
7.2.1 CEO narcissism in large firms and small firms 
 
In this sub-section, I develop my hypotheses regarding the relation between firm size 
and CEO narcissism and its impact on a firm’s M&A activity, based on three 
perspectives – CEO compensation, public attention, and comprehensiveness.  
 
There is a rich literature (e.g. Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Murphy 1985; Gomez-Mejia, 
Tosi, and Hinkin, 1987; Kostiuk 1989; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Zhou, 2000) 
exploring the link between firm size and CEO compensation and the majority of 
previous studies suggest a strong positive relationship between CEO pay and firm 
size. That is, CEOs of large firms receive higher compensation than those of small 
firms. High CEO compensation may provide positive fedback (Paredes, 2005), 
which could promote excessive CEO confidence (a key characteristic of a narcissistic 
personality) about his/her own abilities or reinforce his or her already existing 
narcissistic tendency. Therefore, it is reasonable to xpect that on average the CEOs 
of large firms have a higher degree of CEO narcissism than those of smaller firms 
and consequently this may have a larger impact on firm M&A decision-making and 
performance.    
 
Besides CEO compensation, the different degrees of public attention received by 
CEOs of large and small firms could be another reason why we expect different 
degrees of CEO narcissism in firms of different size. The literature (e.g. Hayward, 
Rindov, and Pollock, 2004) shows that CEOs of large firms are more likely to attract 
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public attention (media coverage) and to become “celebrity” than those of small 
firms. Such media eulogising may again lead to a CEO overestimating his/her 
abilities and promoting an inflated self-image, which consequently triggers, or 
further enhances existing narcissistic tendencies. Therefore, I propose that such 
public attention and praise could be a second channel leading to a higher degree of 
CEO narcissistic tendency in large firms compared to that in small firms.  
 
Finally, previous studies suggest that psychological factors have a stronger impact on 
decision-making when an individual faces a situation with higher degree of 
complexity (Nofsinger, 2005). The literature (e.g. Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989) 
shows that the complexity is positively related to firm size. In other words, the larger 
the firm, the more complex the situation that a decision-maker faces. Therefore, we 
may expect that CEO narcissism has a stronger impact on M&A decision-making in 
large firms than that in small firms as the situation n large firms is usually more 
complex.  
 
Although the potential links between the impact of CEO narcissism and firm size in 
the context of M&A have not been formally examined so far, some related 
suggestions have been raised in previous studies. For example, Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) find that large firms often pay a higher premium than 
small firms in an M&A deal; they explain their finding as evidence that managerial 
overconfidence (a key characteristic of a narcissistic personality) has a stronger 
impact on M&A decision-making and performance in large firms.   
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Drawing on these perspectives, I establish the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The positive link between CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO 
conducting a deal is stronger in large firms than that in small firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Acquiring firm CEO narcissism has a more negative impact on firm 
short run M&A announcement performance in large firms than that in small firms.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Acquiring firm CEO narcissism has a more negative impact on firm 
long run post-M&A performance in large firms than that in small firms. 
 
7.2.2 Corporate governance and CEO narcissism 
 
 
The empirical results in Chapter 6 have shown that tere is a positive relation 
between CEO narcissism and firm acquisitiveness, and such a CEO narcissistic 
tendency has a significantly negative impact on firm M&A performance in both the 
short run and long run. If CEO narcissism reduces th firm value in M&A, can good 
corporate governance curb such a destructive narcissistic tendency?  This question 
can be broken down into two sub-questions: (1) what is the relation between the 
quality of corporate governance and the existence of highly narcissistic CEOs? (2) 
what is the role of corporate governance in ameliorat ng the negative impact of CEO 
narcissism in M&A? To address these questions, I first develop further hypotheses 
around the two questions in this sub-section, and then I empirically test these 
hypotheses in next section.  
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According to the theory of corporate governance, th basic function of corporate 
governance is to ensure that managers maximize shareholder value, and 
value-destroying managers should be removed through the governance mechanisms. 
However, many ineffective managers (e.g. CEOs with hig ly destructive narcissistic 
tendency) may survive due to weak corporate governance. For example, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988; 1989) show that strong managerial entrenchment (usually closely 
associated with poor corporate governance) can reduce the probability of an 
ineffective manager to be replaced. Weisbach (1988) finds that the association 
between firm performance and CEO turnover is stronger at the firms that have 
“outsider-dominated” boards than the firms that have “insider-dominated” boards. In 
addition, Ippolito (2005) suggests that managers often use anti-takeover mechanisms 
(e.g. poison pills, staggered boards, anti-greenmail, etc) to prevent themselves from 
being taken over, even with evidence of poor performance.  
 
So weak corporate governance could be a possible explanation for the continued 
existence of CEOs with high narcissistic tendency in firms although they have a 
negative impact on firm performance as my results in previous analyses have shown. 
On the other hand, strong corporate governance mechanisms may effectively identify 
and remove CEOs with high narcissistic tendency, or even prevent highly narcissistic 
managers rising to the position of CEO in the first place.   
 
Hence, I set up the following hypothesis which is related to my first sub-question:  
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Hypothesis 4. The relationship between CEO narcissism and the quality of corporate 
governance is negative. That is, high CEO narcissism is associated with poor 
corporate governance and low CEO narcissism is associated with good corporate 
governance.  
 
Besides the role that corporate governance plays in ide tifying and removing highly 
narcissistic CEO or even preventing highly narcissistic ndividuals from rising to the 
position of CEO in the first place, good governance m chanisms may also play an 
important role in curbing CEO narcissistic tendency in the process of M&A 
decision-making in two ways. First, effective corporate governance mechanisms may 
help to correct the distorted beliefs of highly narcissistic CEOs consequently 
preventing them from making value-destroying decision . For example, a strong 
board with a large proportion of outside directors may be capable of “drawing 
managerial attention to information that might indicate that their perceptions are 
wrong” (Heaton, 2002). Second, good corporate governance can help keep a CEO’s 
power under control (curb his/her absolute power), which means that even if a CEO 
has a highly narcissistic tendency and tends to make value-destroying decisions, 
he/she will lack the absolute or dominant power to get his/her proposal approved. 
Indeed, not only the CEO’s narcissistic tendency but also “the ability of the CEO to 
impose his or her views on the firm’s decisions” (Brown and Sarma, 2007) matters. 
In these ways, then, effective governance mechanisms may serve to curb the adverse 
impact of CEO narcissism in M&A decision-making, consequently ameliorating its 
negative impact on firm performance. Hence, the following hypotheses are laid out: 
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Hypothesis 5. The positive link between CEO narcissism and the likelihood of CEO 
conducting a deal is weaker in firms with good corporate governance, and such link 
is stronger in firms with poor corporate governance.  
 
Hypothesis 6. Acquiring firm CEO narcissism has less negative impact on firm short 
run M&A announcement performance in firms with good corporate governance than 
in firms with poor corporate governance.  
 
Hypothesis 7. Acquiring firm CEO narcissism has less negative impact on firm long 
run post-M&A performance in firms with good corporate governance than in firms 
with poor corporate governance. 
 
7.2.3 The impact of the coexistence of acquiring firm CEO narcissism and target 
firm CEO narcissism   
 
In this study, I argue that not only acquiring firm CEOs, but also target firm CEOs 
can be prone to a highly narcissistic tendency. In the regression analysis in Chapter 6, 
I examine the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism and target firm CEO 
narcissism on M&A respectively. The empirical result  show that both acquiring firm 
and target firm CEO narcissism have a negative impact on firm short run and long 
run M&A performance (though the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on firm 
long run M&A performance is not significant). In this chapter, I will go one step 
further by raising the question – what is the impact of CEO narcissism on a firm 
M&A performance when CEO narcissism exists in both the acquiring firm and the 
target firm concurrently?     
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As already discussed (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3; Chapter 6, Section 6.3.5), highly 
narcissistic target firm CEOs are likely to overestimate the value of their firm to a 
bidder and to be overconfident about their own ability to create value (they believe 
they can create as much as or even higher value than the potential acquiring firm’s 
management team). Consequently, such target firm CEOnarcissism can push the bid 
premium up. Facing a much higher than optimal bid premium, potential acquiring 
firm CEOs with high narcissistic tendency may be more likely to accept this than 
CEOs with low narcissistic tendency as they will overestimate their ability to recoup 
the high premium paid or feel entitled to be successful in completing the deal. In this 
sense, we may expect that the most serious overpayment problem occurs, with most 
negative impact on firm M&A performance, when both acquiring firm and target 
firm CEO narcissism exist concurrently. This leads to my last two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 8. The negative impact of CEO narcissism on firm short run M&A 
announcement performance is strongest when both acquiring firm and target firm 
CEO narcissism exist concurrently.  
 
Hypothesis 9. The negative impact of CEO narcissism on firm long run post-M&A 
performance is strongest when both acquiring firm and target firm CEO narcissism 
exist concurrently.  
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7.3 Regression models in additional analysis 
 
To examine the set of hypotheses developed in last section, I run a series of 
additional regressions using my earlier models with relevant interaction terms.   
 
Specifically, I add three interaction terms in the models used in Chapter 6:  
HN*Size, HN*CG, HNA*HNT. The interaction of HN with Size is used to examine 
if CEO narcissism in large firms has the same (or same degree of) impact on M&A 
decision-making and firm performance as that in small firms (Hypotheses 1, 2, 3). 
The interaction of HN with CG is employed to explore if good corporate 
governance can help to ameliorate the negative impact of CEO narcissism in M&A 
(Hypotheses 5, 6, 7). The purpose of the interaction term HNA*HNT is to examine 
the impact of CEO narcissism on firm M&A performance when such narcissistic 
tendency exists in both the acquiring firm and the arget firm concurrently 
(Hypotheses 8 and 9). The five regression models of my additional analysis are as 
follows: 
 
Model 1: (Logit regression): to test the relationship between CEO narcissism and 
M&A decision-making       
   
1876543210 −++++++++= yearreturnQCFVOSOSizeCGHNY ββββββββα     
          εβββ ++++ CGHNSizeHNdummytechHigh **__ 11109       (1) 
 
Model 2: to test the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on firm M&A short run 
(announcement) performance     
)2(**__ 13121110
9876543210
εγγγγ
γγγγγγγγγα
+++++
+++++++++=
CGHNSizeHNdummytechHighSize
PaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNCAR
 181 
 
Model 3: to test the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on firm long run 
post-acquisition performance    
)3(**__ 13121110
9876543210
εγγγγ
γγγγγγγγγα
+++++
+++++++++=
CGHNSizeHNdummytechHighSize
PaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNBHAR
 
Model 4: to test the impact of the (concurrent) coexistence of both acquiring and 
target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm short run (announcement) performance 
εγγγγγγ
γγγγγγγγγα
+++++++
+++++++++=
TAAA
TA
HNHNCGHNSizeHNdummytechHighSizePayment
AttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNHNCAR
***__ 151413121110
9876543210   (4) 
 
Model 5: to test the impact of the (concurrent) coexistence of both acquiring and 
target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm long run post-M&A performance 
εγγγγγγ
γγγγγγγγγα
+++++++
+++++++++=
TAAA
TA
HNHNCGHNSizeHNdummytechHighSizePayment
AttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNHNBHAR
***__ 151413121110
9876543210   (5) 
 
Different from the definitions in previous chapters, in this chapter, Size is defined as 
the natural logarithm of acquirer market capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal 
year and RSize is the relative size of the target firm, which is defined as the ratio of 
the acquirer’s size (market capitalisation) to target’s size (market capitalisation).    
 
7.4 Results of additional analysis 
 
This section presents and discusses the results of the regressions that address my 
three additional research questions. Tables 7-1, 7-2, -3, 7-5, and 7-6 report the 
regression results.  
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7.4.1 CEO narcissism in large firms and small firms  
 
To investigate the hypotheses (1, 2, and 3) regarding the role and impact of CEO 
narcissism on M&A decision-making and performance in firms of different sizes, I 
run additional regressions analyses by including the interaction term HN*Size in 
my models.  
 
In the logistic regression analysis which examines the relationship between level of 
CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO conducting a  M&A deal (Table 7-1), I 
find that the coefficient on the interaction of HN with Size is positive (0.15 based on 
Holder67 measure and 0.13 based on media portrayal measure) and highly 
significant (significant at 1% level). This result supports Hypothesis 1 and suggests 
that the relationship between the level of CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a 
CEO conducting M&A deals is stronger in large firms than that in small firms. 
Besides the three explanations (CEO compensation, public attention, and complexity 
of situation) discussed in section 7.2 on the development of hypotheses above, we 
may also interpret this finding from another two aspects. First, in general, CEOs of 
large firms often have a higher reputation and public profile and greater power and 
authority, which makes them more likely to dominate th  M&A decision-making 
process, while CEOs of small firms usually lack such dominant power. In other 
words, CEOs of small firms may lack the power to get th ir M&A proposal approved 
even if they have a highly narcissistic tendency. Second, large firms usually have 
fewer financial constraints (i.e., more internal and external resources) than small 
firms when making M&A decisions. In small firms, the highly narcissistic CEOs 
who would conduct an M&A deal if they had sufficient financial resources may not 
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be able to do so due to financial restraints. Therefore we may observe a weaker link 
between level of CEO narcissism and firm acquisitiveness in small firms than large 
firms.   
 
I also run another two additional regressions to investigate if CEO narcissism in large 
firms have the same (or same degree of) impact on firm M&A performance as that in 
small firms. The results are presented in Table 7-2 (short run performance) and Table 
7-3 (long run performance).  The negative coefficients on the interaction term 
HN*Size are reported in both short run and long run performance regressions and 
they are highly significant across all of the three m asures of CEO narcissism 
(Holder67, media portrayal, and content analysis of CEO speech). Specifically, in the 
CAR regression, the coefficients on the term HN*Size are -0.032 (significant at 5% 
level), -0.040 (significant at 1% level), and -0.036 (significant at 5% level) based on 
the Holder67 measure, media portrayal measure, and co tent analysis of CEO speech 
measure respectively (Table 7-2). In the BHAR regression, the comparative 
coefficients on the term HN*Size are -0.073 (significant at 5% level), -0.081 
(significant at 1% level), and -0.068 (significant at 5% level) based on Holder67 
measure, media portrayal measure, and content analysis of CEO speech measure 
respectively (Table 7-3). These results suggest that the negative relationship between 
CEO narcissism and M&A performance is stronger in large firms. In other words, 
CEO narcissism has more negative impact on M&A performance (both short run and 
long run) in large firms than in small firms. This fnding supports Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3.  
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Table 7-1 Additional logit regression: CEO narcissism and M&A decision making 
  
1876543210 −++++++++= yearreturnQCFVOSOSizeCGHNY ββββββββα εβββ ++++ CGHNSizeHNdummytechHigh **__ 11109     
 
The dependent variable Y is a binary variable which equals 1 if the firm announced at least one deal (successful bid and completed deal) in a specific firm year during 
the period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2005, otherwise 0. HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 fr highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. (HN 
is derived from Holder67 in model 1 and the media portrayal narcissism proxy measures in model 2). CG is the GIM’s G index, the proxy for corporate governance 
quality. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer market capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal year.  SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the 
end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. CF is the 
normalized ratio of firm cash flow, given by earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, divided by the beginning of the year capital. (Here, capital is 
measured as property, plant and equipment.)  Q repres nts Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of assets/book value of assets, where the book value of assets = 
total assets, and the market value of assets = total assets + market equity - book equity. Market equity = common share outstanding x fiscal year closing price, and 
book equity = total assets-total liabilities-preferred stock + deferred taxes. We report the regression results based on using Holder67 and media portrayal s the 
measures of CEO narcissism respectively. returnyear-1 represents the 1-year lagged stock return. High_tecdummy equals to 1 if the acquiring firm is classified as 
high-tech firms by Thomson One Banker, otherwise 0. This table also shows the coefficients in the form f odds ratios.  
 
Model 1 
(Based on Holder 67) 
Model 2 
(Based on media portrayal)    Variables 
Coefficient Odds ratio z-Statistics Coefficient Odds ratio z-Statistics 
       
HN 0.29  1.34   2.44**  0.22 1.25  1.74* 
CG 0.02  1.02 0.89  0.02 1.02 0.59 
Size 0.23  1.26    2.69***  0.20 1.22   2.48** 
SO -0.89  0.41     -0.69 -0.92 0.40     -0.63 
VO -0.52  0.59     -0.61 -0.49 0.61     -0.38 
CF 0.20  1.22  1.78*  0.23 1.26  1.82* 
Q 0.15  1.16   2.02**  0.18 1.20   2.13** 
returnyear-1 0.11  1.12  1.81*  0.08 1.08  1.70* 
High_tech_dummy 0.02 1.02 0.76  0.03 1.03 0.82 
HN*CG 0.13 1.14   2.11**  0.11 1.12  1.83* 
HN*Size 0.15 1.16    2.92***  0.13 1.14    2.74*** 
       
LR statistic   69.17***      62.84***   
Observations     22,103   16,418   
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 7-2 Additional regression: the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on firm short run (announcement) M&A performance 
 
       εγγγγγγγγγγγγγα ++++++++++++++= CGHNSizeHNdummytechHighSizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNCAR **__ 131211109876543210  
 
The dependent variable is the 3-day (-1, 1) event wi dow CAR for the acquiring firm. HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and 
equal to 0 otherwise. (HN is derived from Holder67 in model 1, media portrayal in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourse in model 3.) CG is 
GIM’s G index, a proxy for corporate governance quality.  SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before 
the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of common the shares outstanding.  Attitude is a binary variable, 
where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary variable, where 1 signif es that 
the method of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary variable where 1 signifies that e first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer 
and those of the target are the same. RSize is the relative size of the target firm, which is defined as the ratio of the acquirer’s size to target’s size. Growth is 
the target’s M/B ratio, which is used to proxy for irm growth options. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer market capitalisation. High_tech_dummy 
equals to 1 if the target firm is classified as high-tech firms by Thomson One Banker, otherwise 0. 
 
Model 1 
(Based on Holder 67) 
Model 2 
(Based on media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(Based on content analysis of CEO 
speech) Variable 
Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics 
 
 HN     
 CG 
 SO 
 VO 
 Attitude 
 Payment 
 relatedness 
 RSize 
 Growth 
 Size 
 
-0.014 
-0.036 
0.072 
0.104 
-0.000 
0.009 
0.007 
0.138 
0.117 
    -0.184 
 
  -2.31** 
  -2.38** 
 1.14 
 1.01 
-0.17 
    2.62*** 
 0.84 
 0.18 
 0.28 
  -2.32** 
 
-0.010 
-0.038 
0.084 
0.100 
-0.001 
0.007 
0.006 
0.140 
0.121 
     -0.176 
 
    -1.99** 
    -2.40** 
       0.97 
       1.19 
       -0.18 
      2.59*** 
       0.90 
       0.17 
       0.20 
    -2.17** 
 
-0.012 
-0.022 
 0.054 
 0.109 
     -0.002 
 0.010 
 0.004 
 0.125 
 0.159 
 -0.161 
 
  -2.50** 
 -1.78* 
 0.97 
 1.04 
     -0.16 
    2.60*** 
 0.77 
 0.16 
 0.20 
  -2.13** 
High_tech_dummy     0.008   1.31   0.012    1.69*      0.009  1.48 
HN*CG    -0.021  -1.38  -0.014   -1.29      -0.027 -1.41 
HN*Size 
 
   -0.032  -2.58**  -0.040      -2.64***      -0.036   -2.58** 
 Adjusted 2R       0.06        0.08        0.07  
 F- test   11.39***   12.96***     14.53***  
 Observations 
 
    1,888       1,722       1076  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 7-3 Additional regression: the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on firm long run post-acquisition performance             
εγγγγγγγγγγγγγα ++++++++++++++= CGHNSizeHNdummytechHighSizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNBHAR **__ 131211109876543210 
The dependent variable is the 2-year (1, 24 month) BHAR for the acquiring firm. HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
(HN is derived from Holder67 in model 1, media portrayal in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourses in model 3.) CG is GIM’s G index, a proxy forc rporate 
governance quality.  SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal ye r before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings 
of exercisable options as a fraction of the common shares outstanding.  Attitude is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 
signifies “friendly” or “neutral”. Payment is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the method of eal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary variable, where 
1 signifies that the first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and those of the target are the same. RSize is the relative size of the target firm, which is defined as the 
ratio of the acquirer’s size to target’s size.  Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, which is used to proxy for a firm’s growth options. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer 
market capitalisation. High_tech_ dummy equals to 1if the target firm is classified as high-tech firms by Thomson One Banker, otherwise 0. 
 
Model 1 
(Based on Holder67) 
Model 2 
(Based on media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(Based on content analysis of CEO 
speech) Variable 
  Coefficient    t Statistics    Coefficient   t Statistics   Coefficient    t Statistics 
       
HN        -0.016 -2.38** -0.019 -1.99** -0.020 -1.78* 
CG    -0.020 -2.46** -0.019 -2.30** -0.017 -2.24** 
SO     0.080 1.01 0.070 0.74 0.068 0.68 
VO     0.173 2.81*** 0.169 2.80*** 0.157 2.61** 
Attitude     0.000 0.12 0.001 0.12 0.001 0.13 
Payment     0.019 1.80* 0.017 2.47** 0.014 1.99** 
relatedness     0.039 0.79 0.048 0.89 0.056 0.75 
RSize     0.066 0.20 0.058 0.18 0.045 0.19 
Growth -0.032 -0.19 -0.039 -0.44 -0.025 -0.40 
Size -0.087 -0.79 -0.092 -0.92 -0.069 -0.85 
High_tech_dummy -0.015 -0.95 -0.019 -1.00 -0.016 -0.10 
HN*CG -0.041 -1.25 -0.018 -1.13 -0.035 -1.20 
HN*Size -0.073 -2.43** -0.081 -2.89*** -0.068 -2.41** 
       
Adjusted R2 0.07  0.06  0.06  
F- test 11.07***  10.96***  13.99***  
Observations 
 
   1,888     1,722      1076  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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7.4.2 The role and impact of corporate governance in ameliorating the adverse 
impact of CEO narcissism in M&A.  
 
In this section, I examine the role of corporate governance in curbing CEO 
narcissistic tendency and in mitigating the impact of such tendency on M&A 
decision-making and performance.  As mentioned before, this additional research 
question can be decomposed into two sub-questions: (1) what is the relation between 
the quality of corporate governance and the level of CEO narcissism? (2) what is the 
role of corporate governance in ameliorating the negative impact of CEO narcissism 
in M&A? I present and discuss my results regarding these two questions in the 
following two sub-sections respectively.  
 
7.4.2.1 The relation between the quality of corporate governance and the level of 
CEO narcissism. 
 
To investigate the relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate governance, I 
divide my full sample of CEOs into two groups: the HN group (high narcissism 
CEOs) and the LN group (low narcissism CEOs). Then I compare the value of CG 
(the proxy for the quality of corporate governance) in the HN group with that in the 
LN group, based on the use of Holder67, media portrayal, and content analysis of 
CEO speech as respective measures of CEO narcissism. The independent-sample t 
test and Mann-Whitney test (z test) are used as paramet ic and non-parametric tests 
here.  
 
Results are presented in Table 7-4. The mean value of CG is 9.92 (based on the 
Holder67 measure), 9.76 (based on the media portrayal measure), and 9.86 (based on 
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the content analysis of CEO speech measure) in the HN group. The mean value of 
CG is 9.50 (based on the Holder67 measure), 9.38 (based on the media portrayal 
measure), and 9.47 (based on the content analysis of CEO speech measure) in the LN 
group. The median value of CG is 11 in the HN group and 10 in the LN group, and 
this result is consistent across all of three CEO narcissism measures. These results 
show that both the mean and the median value of the CG of the HN group are higher 
than that of the LN group across all three CEO narcissism measures. The CG score 
(mean and median) difference between HN group and LN group is highly significant 
(at the 1% significance level) using both the independent-sample t test and 
Mann-Whitney test (z test). As the CG index is constructed in such a way that, the 
higher the value of CG, the poorer the quality of crporate governance, this finding 
suggests that, on average, the corporate governance of th  firms with high narcissism 
CEOs is significantly poorer than that of firms with low narcissism CEOs. In other 
words, low CEO narcissism is associated with relatively better corporate governance 
and high CEO narcissism is associated with relatively poorer corporate governance, 
which supports my Hypothesis 4.These results might indicate that good corporate 
governance mechanisms may help effectively remove value-destroying high 
narcissism CEOs or even prevent the individuals with h ghly narcissistic tendency 
from rising to the post of CEO.  
 
We may speculate that some important components of a corporate governance 
regime may help to curb CEO narcissism and mitigate its negative effects. For 
example, an appropriate performance measurement and compensation scheme may 
provide CEOs with feedback that avoids reinforcing a CEO’s narcissistic tendency; 
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effective board monitoring may be able to identify CEO narcissistic tendencies at 
early stage and prevent narcissistic CEOs from making value-destroying decisions; 
and well-structured external governance mechanisms (e.g. the market for corporate 
control) may help remove value-destroying narcissistic CEOs in a timely manner. At 
the same time, we need to be aware that it is also po sible that an HN CEO may tend 
to ensure a weaker corporate governance regime so he/she is under less control. 
Therefore, the causality between the level of CEO narcissism and the quality of 
corporate governance mechanisms needs to be further investigated in future study.
 190 
Table 7-4 Value of the CG index (high narcissism Vs low narcissism CEOs) 
 
The full sample of CEOs is divided into two sub-samples according to their level of narcissistic tendency – the HN (high narcissism) sub-sample and 
LN (low narcissism) sub-sample. Column 2-7 presents the mean CG (corporate governance index), the median CG, the standard deviation of CG for 
each sub-sample. Column 2 and 3 are based on the use of Holder67 as the CEO narcissism measure; column 4 a d 5 are based on the use of media 
portrayal as a CEO narcissism measure; and column 6 and 7 are based on the use of content analysis of CEO speech as the CEO narcissism measure. 
The independent-sample t test is reported as the test of the difference between the means of the two sub-samples. The non-parametric test – Mthe 
ann-Whitney test z-test) is also reported.  
 
CEO narcissism measure 
 Holder 67   Media portrayal   
Content analysis of CEO speech 
 
   
HN 
sub-sample 
(n=1014) 
LN 
sub-sample 
(n=2148) 
HN 
sub-sample 
(n=792) 
LN 
sub-sample 
(n=1517) 
HN 
sub-sample 
(n=298) 
LN 
sub-sample 
(n=476) 
Mean CG  
9.92 9.50 9.76 9.38 9.86 9.47 
Median CG 
11 10 11 10 11 10 
Standard deviation 
2.44 2.86 2.79 2.71 2.58 2.62 
       
T-test 
   2.97***     3.14***     2.91***  
Mann-Whitney Test (Z-test) 
  -2.71***    -2.58***    -2.64***  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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7.4.2.2 What is the role of corporate governance in ameliorating the negative 
impact of CEO narcissism in M&A? 
 
To further investigate the role of corporate governance in ameliorating the negative 
impact of CEO narcissism in M&A, I run additional reg ssions analyses including 
the interaction term HN*CG in the models. The results of these regressions are 
presented in Table 7-1, 7-2 and 7-3.  
 
In the logistic regression analysis which aimed to examine the relationship between 
the level of CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO conducting M&A deals 
(Table 7-1), I find that the coefficient on the interaction of HN with CG is positive 
(0.13 based on the Holder67 measure and 0.11 based on the media portrayal measure) 
and significant (significant at 5% level based on the Holder67 measure and 
significant at 10% level based on the media portrayal measure). This result supports 
Hypothesis 5 and suggests that the relationship between the level of CEO narcissism 
and the likelihood of a CEO conducting M&A deals is stronger in firms with poor 
corporate governance than in the firms with good corporate governance.  
 
In the CAR and BHAR regressions, I find consistently egative coefficients on the 
interaction term HN*CG though none of them is significant.  In the CAR regression 
(Table 7-2), the coefficients are -0.021, -0.014, and -0.027 based on Holder67, media 
portrayal, and content analysis of CEO speech measur respectively. In the BHAR 
regression (Table 7-3), the coefficients are -0.041, -0.018, and -0.035 based on the 
three CEO narcissism measures. It seems that poor corporate governance strengthens 
the negative relationship between CEO narcissism and M&A performance (both 
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short run and long run) and good corporate governance ameliorates such negative 
relationships, although this finding is not statistically significant.   
 
7.4.3 The impact of the coexistence of acquiring firm CEO narcissism and target 
firm CEO narcissism 
 
To examine Hypotheses 8 and 9 regarding the impact of CEO narcissism on M&A  
performance when acquiring firm and target CEO narcissism coexist, I run 
additional regressions analyses by including the int raction term HNA*HNT in the 
models. The results of regression are presented in Table 7-5 and 7-6.  
 
In the short run performance regression, I report significant negative coefficients on 
the interaction term HNA*HNT.  They are -0.103 (significant at 5% level), -0.125 
(significant at 1% level), and -0.117 (significant at 5% level) based on Holder67, 
media portrayal, and content analysis of CEO speech measure respectively. This 
result suggests that the negative impact of CEO narcissism on firm short run M&A 
performance is strongest when both acquiring firm and target firm CEO narcissism 
exist concurrently. It appears that the market can ide tify the serious overpayment 
problem resulting from the coexistence of acquiring firm and target firm CEO 
narcissism and consequently discount it more heavily in share price. On the other 
hand, in the long run M&A performance regression, I do not find any significant 
coefficients on the interaction term HNA*HNT. As mentioned in last chapter, the 
insignificance of the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on firm long run 
post-acquisition performance might simply reflect that the overpayment problem 
resulting from target firm CEO narcissism may be swamped by many other factors in 
the long run.
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Table 7-5 Additional regression: the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm short run (announcement) M&A performance 
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+++++++++=
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The dependent variable is the 3-day (-1, 1) event wi dow CAR for the acquiring firm. HNA measures the acquiring firm CEO narcissism, and HNT the equivalent for the 
target firm. HNA and HNT are dummy variables equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. HNA is derived from Holder67 in model 1, media 
portrayal in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourse in model 3. HNT is derived from Holder67 in model 1, and media portrayal in models 2 and 3. CG is the 
GIM’s G index, a proxy for corporate governance quality. SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal 
announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of common shares outstanding.  Attitude is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that 
the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the method of eal payment is 
cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary variable, wh re 1 signifies that the first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and target are the same. RSize is the relative 
size of the target firm, which is defined as the ratio of the acquirer’s size to target’s size. Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, which proxies for firm growth options. Size is 
the natural logarithm of acquirer market capitalisation. High_tech_dummy equals to 1 if the target firm is classified as high-tech firms by Thomson One Banker, 
otherwise 0. 
Model 1 
(
AHN : Holder 67, 
THN : Holder 67) 
Model 2 
(
AHN : media portrayal, 
THN : media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(
AHN : content analysis of CEO speech, 
     
THN : media portrayal) 
 
Variable 
  Coefficient   t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics 
 
  HNA 
  HNT 
  CG 
  SO 
  VO 
  Attitude 
  Payment 
  relatedness 
  RSize 
  Growth 
  Size 
 
-0.006 
   -0.007 
-0.024 
0.026 
0.048 
   -0.000 
0.014 
0.009 
0.161 
0.187 
   -0.127 
 
-1.93* 
-1.49 
-1.38 
1.16 
0.72 
-0.09 
      2.37** 
1.39 
      0.15 
      0.29 
     -1.93* 
 
-0.011 
-0.003 
-0.028 
0.071 
    0.098 
-0.000 
0.011 
0.008 
0.139 
0.119 
-0.172 
 
-2.16* 
 -2.21** 
-1.74* 
1.40 
0.79 
     -0.12 
   2.69*** 
1.38 
0.19 
0.28 
 -2.40** 
 
-0.008 
-0.002 
-0.015 
0.049 
0.101 
-0.001 
0.013 
0.005 
0.112 
0.142 
-0.147 
 
      -2.25** 
     -1.87* 
    -1.40 
     1.19 
     0.97 
    -0.13 
        2.59*** 
      1.71* 
     0.21 
     0.32 
      -2.23** 
 High_tech_dummy    0.007    1.31 0.011 1.70* 0.010      1.42 
 HNA*CG   -0.017    -1.37 -0.015 -1.31 -0.024     -1.39 
 HNA*Size   -0.028      -2.48** -0.033 -2.60*** -0.031       -2.57** 
 HNA*HNT   -0.103       -2.26** -0.125 -2.98*** -0.117       -2.38** 
       
  Adjusted 2R         0.08  0.07  0.08  
  F- test      11.72***         14.66***         13.52***  
  Observations        342     1316       661  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Table 7-6 Additional regression: the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm long run post-acquisition performance 
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The dependent variable is the 2-year (1, 24 month) BHAR for the acquiring firm. HNA measures acquiring firm CEO narcissism, and HNT the equivalent for the target 
firm. HNA and HNT are dummy variables equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. HNA is derived from Holder67 in model 1, media portrayal 
in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourse in model 3. HNT is derived from Holder67 in model 1, and media portrayal in models 2 and 3. CG is the GIM’s G 
index, a proxy for corporate governance quality. SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement 
year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of common shares outstanding.  Attitude is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that t e deal attitude 
is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the method of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. 
relatedness is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and target are the same. RSize is the relativ  size of the target 
firm, which is defined as the ratio of the acquirer’s size to target’s size. Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, which proxies for firm growth options. Size is the natural 
logarithm of acquirer market capitalisation. High_tech_dummy equals to 1 if the target firm is classified as high-tech firms by Thomson One Banker, otherwis  0. 
 
Model 1 
(
AHN : Holder 67, 
THN : Holder 67) 
Model 2 
(
AHN : media portrayal, 
THN : media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(
AHN : content analysis of CEO speech, 
THN : media portrayal) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient    t Statistic Coefficient t Statistics 
 
  HNA 
  HNT 
  CG 
  SO 
  VO 
  Attitude 
  Payment 
  relatedness 
  RSize 
  Growth 
  Size 
 
-0.019 
-0.002 
-0.025 
0.085 
0.148 
0.001 
0.019 
0.025 
0.024 
-0.009 
    -0.036 
 
     -1.72* 
    -0.92 
     -1.77* 
     0.71 
      1.83* 
     0.14 
1.48 
     0.53 
     0.14 
    -0.15 
-0.63 
 
-0.024 
-0.004 
-0.016 
0.061 
0.157 
0.001 
0.015 
0.039 
0.062 
-0.016 
-0.069 
 
     -2.18** 
   -0.99 
     -2.45** 
    0.88 
       2.59*** 
    0.17 
      2.25** 
    0.74 
    0.20 
   -0.17 
   -0.81 
 
-0.017 
-0.002 
-0.022 
0.072 
0.136 
0.000 
0.013 
0.050 
0.041 
-0.007 
-0.061 
 
       -1.74* 
-0.93 
  -2.20** 
 0.77 
   2.31** 
 0.15 
  1.90* 
 0.58 
 0.17 
 -0.18 
 -0.68 
 High_tech_dummy   -0.009   -1.32     -0.014  -1.46    -0.011     -1.39 
 HNA*CG       -0.033   -1.18  -0.017  -1.12  -0.029      -1.17 
 HNA*Size       -0.069     -2.39**  -0.076     -2.76***  -0.063     -2.38** 
 HNA*HN T 
 
  -0.091    -0.17     -0.087  -0.16     -0.079      -0.10 
       
  Adjusted 2R      0.07   0.08     0.06  
  F- test        11.83***     16.32***       14.58***  
  Observations 
 
        342    1,316  661  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
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7.5 Summary 
          
This chapter explores three additional research questions: (1) Does CEO narcissism 
in large firms have the same (or same degree of) impact on M&A decision-making 
and firm performance as that in small firms?  (2) Can good corporate governance 
help to ameliorate the negative impact of CEO narcissism in M&A? (3) What is the 
impact of CEO narcissism on firm M&A performance when such narcissistic 
tendency exists in both the acquiring firm and the arget firm concurrently? To 
address these questions I first develop a set of hypot eses and then conduct a series 
of additional regression analyses which include relevant interaction terms to test 
these hypotheses.  
 
In summary, my key findings are as follows: 
 
First, the positive link between CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO 
conducting an M&A deal is stronger in large firms than that in small firms. I also 
find that   acquiring firm CEO narcissism has more negative impact on firm M&A 
performance (both short run announcement performance and long run post-M&A 
performance) in large firms than that in small firms. These results suggest that the 
problems associated with high level of CEO narcissism in the context of M&A may 
be severer in large firms than in smaller firms. Higher CEO compensation, more 
public attention, higher complexity of situation, more dominant power of CEO, and 
less financial constraints associated with large firms might be some possible 
explanations for these results. Therefore curbing the absolute power of a CEO, 
effectively monitoring the use of financial resources, and setting an adequate level of 
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CEO compensation in large firms may help ameliorate the strong adverse impact of 
CEO narcissism on M&A decision-making and performance i  these firms.   
 
Second, I find evidence that the level of CEO narcissism is negatively associated 
with the quality of corporate governance. That is, hgh CEO narcissism is associated 
with poorer corporate governance and low CEO narcissism is associated with 
stronger corporate governance. My results also show t at the positive link between 
CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO conducting a  M&A deal is weaker in 
firms with stronger corporate governance, and such link is stronger in firms with 
poor corporate governance.  These empirical results might suggest that effective 
corporate governance mechanisms may help to curb a CEO’s narcissistic tendency 
and ameliorate, to some extent, the negative impact of high level of CEO narcissism 
on firm M&A decision-making. Specifically, strong corporate governance 
mechanisms may be able to effectively remove value-destroying high narcissism 
CEOs, prevent high narcissism individuals from rising to the post of CEO in the first 
place, or correct the distorted beliefs of high narcissism CEOs in the process of 
decision-making.  
 
Finally, I find evidence that the negative impact of CEO narcissism on firm short run 
M&A performance is strongest when both acquiring firm and target firm CEO 
narcissism coexist concurrently. This result may suggest that target firm CEO 
narcissism might further exacerbate the overpayment problem. On the one hand, high 
narcissism target firm CEOs tend to require higher tan optimal premium as they are 
likely to overvalue their firm or they believe they can create at least as much value as 
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bidders’ management team. On the other hand, high narcissism CEOs of potential 
acquiring firms may be more likely to accept the higher than optimal bid premium as 
they are overconfident about their ability to extrac  value from the deal. 
Consequently this may cause a more serious overpayment problem. The market 
appears to be able to detect such exacerbated overpayment problem and discount it 
more heavily in share price. Realising the coexistence of acquiring firm and target 
firm CEO narcissism and understanding its impact on firm M&A performance could 
be useful for investors to make investment decisions.  
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Chapter 8 Summary, conclusion and future research 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis aims to investigate the role of a CEO’s personality characteristic – CEO 
narcissism – in explaining the motives and the performance of M&A activity. 
Specifically, this study intends to address the following four main research questions: 
(1) are HN (high narcissism) CEOs more likely to conduct mergers and acquisitions 
than LN (low narcissism) CEOs? (2) what is the impact of the degree of CEO 
narcissism on the market reaction to the M&A announcement? (3) what is the impact 
of the extent of CEO narcissism on acquirer long run post-acquisition performance? 
(4) what is the impact of the level of target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm 
M&A performance?   
 
In addition, to further investigate the impact of CEO narcissism on M&A activities in 
firms of different sizes, the relationship between the quality of corporate governance 
and CEO narcissism, and the impact of the concurrent coexistence of acquiring firm 
CEO narcissism and target firm CEO narcissism, I raise three additional questions as 
follows: (1) Does CEO narcissism in large firms have th  same (or same degree of) 
impact on M&A decision-making and firm performance as that in small firms? (2) 
Can good corporate governance help to ameliorate the negative impact of CEO 
narcissism in M&A? (3) What is the impact of CEO narcissism on firm M&A 
performance when such a narcissistic tendency exists in both the acquiring firm and 
the target firm concurrently?      
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These research questions are raised on the basis of a comprehensive review of the 
literature. First, I review the literature about long run and short run (announcement) 
M&A performance. Second, previous studies about the drives (or motives) of M&A 
deals are reviewed. Third, I explore the concept of narcissism and related studies in 
personality, psychology, and the strategic management lit rature. Finally, I review the 
role of CEO narcissism and related constructs in M&A activity.       
 
Based upon the review and discussion of the relevant literature, a set of hypotheses is 
developed in Chapter 3 and 7. To test these hypotheses, or, more specifically, to 
empirically explore the role and impact of CEO narcissism in M&A decision-making 
and performance, I need to address three methodologica  issues: (1) the measurement 
of CEO narcissism; (2) the evaluation of firm M&A performance; and (3) the way to 
examine the link between CEO narcissism and M&A decision-making and 
performance. Therefore, Chapter 4 introduces my resea ch methods from the 
following three aspects. First, I describe the way I construct my three CEO 
narcissism measures: Holder67, media portrayal, and co tent analysis of CEO speech 
respectively. Second, I introduce the event study methods employed to evaluate firm 
short run (announcement period) M&A performance and long run post-M&A 
performance. Finally, I present my logistic and OLS multivariate regression models 
used to test the hypotheses. The dependent variables, independent variables, and 
control variables are also introduced.  
 
The test of the developed hypotheses and the construction of my CEO narcissism 
measures require six types of data: CEO data, firm data (stock price and financial 
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items), M&A data, CEO media portrayal dada, CEO speech s about M&A deals, and   
other supplementary data. Thus, in Chapter 5, the data sources, sampling procedure, 
data selection criteria, data descriptions and other related issues are introduced in 
detail. 
 
Chapter 6 presents and discusses the main empirical results of this study. To examine 
the impact of CEO narcissism personality on firm M&A performance, I first conduct 
a series of event studies on M&A deals to evaluate firm short run (announcement) 
M&A performance and long run post-acquisition performance.  Specifically, I 
calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around deal announcement and 
long run buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for each M&A deal. Then I 
examine the link (if any) between the level of CEO narcissism and likelihood of a 
CEO conducting a deal through logistic regression analysis, and investigate the 
impact of CEO’s narcissistic tendency on firm M&A short run and long run 
performance through a set of OLS multivariate regression analyses. The key findings 
and associated analyses are summarised in the following section.  
 
On the basis of the main empirical analyses presentd in chapter 6, I go one step 
further in chapter 7 to address my three additional research questions. I first develop 
a set of additional hypotheses relating to the impact of CEO narcissism on M&A 
activities in firms of different sizes, the relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance and CEO narcissism, and the impact of the concurrent coexistence of 
acquiring firm and target firm CEO narcissism. Then I conduct a series of additional 
analyses to test these hypotheses by including relevant interaction terms in my 
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regression models. In addition, I explore the potential association between the quality 
of corporate governance and CEO narcissism tendency through the calculation and 
comparison of average CG (corporate governance index) scores of firms with high 
narcissism CEOs and that of firms with low narcissism CEOs. The empirical results 
of these additional analyses and the associated discussion are summarised in the 
following section.   
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: section 8.2 presents a summary and 
discussion of the empirical findings in this study. Section 8.3 shows the main 
contributions and implications of this research. Section 8.4 discusses the limitations 
of current study and section 8.5 outlines the potential directions for future research.     
  
8.2 Summary and discussion of the key results 
 
There are a lot of studies on the performance of mergers and acquisitions in the 
finance literature. As shown in the literature review, the majority of studies suggest 
that M&A deals under-perform on average in the long run. Although some studies 
report positive short run announcement abnormal returns, most gains go to the 
shareholders of the target firms and the shareholders of the acquiring firms do not 
benefit from such deals.  
 
In this study, I argue that the personality characteris ic of CEO narcissism can play 
an important role in explaining the cause and consequence of M&A activities. A high 
level of CEO narcissism, among others, can be one driv r of M&A deals and may 
have a significant impact on firm M&A performance. Drawing on literature from the 
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fields of finance, strategic management and psychology, a set of hypotheses are 
developed to test if there is a relationship between CEO narcissism and the likelihood 
of a CEO conducting a deal; if the level of CEO narcissism has an impact on firm 
M&A short run and long run performance; and if the arget firm CEO narcissism also 
matters in explaining M&A performance. These hypotheses are tested through a 
series of regression analyses based upon a large sample of 3,162 CEOs and 1,888 
M&A deals from 1993 to 2005. 
 
One of the most challenging parts of this study is the construction of my CEO 
narcissism measures. Three measures are used in this study: Holder67, media 
portrayal, and content analysis of CEO speech. Holder67 uses the CEO’s own option 
exercise timing behaviour to identify a high level of CEO narcissism, while media 
portrayal measures CEO narcissistic tendency based on how CEOs are perceived by 
outsiders (media). These two measures have been used before. In this study, I 
construct a third new measure for CEO narcissism based upon the content analysis of 
CEO speeches on M&A deals. More specifically, I identify a CEO’s high narcissistic 
tendency through examining the verbal tone of CEO narratives related to a specific 
M&A deal using the software Diction 5.0. Interestingly, in most cases, I report 
similar results when using these three measures, which confirms the construct 
validity of these measures to some extent.    
 
To test these hypotheses, I first evaluate firm short run and long run M&A 
performance through event studies. I calculate the short run (announcement) daily 
mean abnormal returns of my sample deals based on the market model and CRSP 
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equally weighted index from day -20 to day +20. The results show that the most 
significant mean abnormal returns are detected overthe (-1, +2) day time window 
and they are -0.13% in day -1, 0.10% in day 0, 0.39% in day +1, and 0.16% in day 
+2, respectively. The highest mean abnormal return is observed in day 1, one day 
after the deal announcement. On the basis of this calculation, to examine the 
aggregate effects of M&A announcement on the firm’s stock price, I then compute 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the sample deals over different time 
windows. The results (based on a market model and CRSP equally weighted index) 
show significant positive (at 0.1% significant level) CARs 0.36%, 0.60%, 0.74%, 
0.82%, and 0.93% for (-1, +1), (-2, +2), (-3, +3), (-5, +5), and (-10, +10) time 
windows respectively, which suggests that, on average, the market views the M&A 
announcement initially as good news and reacts positively. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Malatesta (1983), Sicherman and Pettway (1987), 
Leeth and Borg (2000), and Rosen (2003).  
 
On the other hand, in the long run event studies, my results show that the mean 
abnormal returns are positive in the months (-1 month, -2 month, -3 month, -4 month, 
-5 month, -6 month) before M&A deal announcement and re significantly negative 
in most months after M&A announcement, which indicates the negative effects of 
M&A on firm long run performance. To evaluate aggregate long run effects, I 
calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) of each M&A deal over 
different time windows (6 months, 12 months, 18 months, 24 months, and 36 
months). Significantly negative mean BHARs are repoted over 18 months, 24 
months, and 36 months time windows, which suggest that in the long run horizon, on 
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average, acquiring firms under-perform their benchmark portfolios. This result 
further confirms the general findings in the literature that most mergers and 
acquisitions destroy firm value in the long run (Asquith, 1983; Loderer and Martin, 
1990; Malatesta, 1983; Louis, 2002; Varaiya and Ferris, 1987; Ferris and Park, 2001; 
Langetieg, 1978). If mergers and acquisitions do not benefit the shareholders of 
acquiring firms, what is the driver of such deals? To investigate this question, I then 
test my first hypothesis to examine the potential link between CEO narcissism and 
firm acquisitiveness.   
 
My logistic regression analysis reports a significantly positive relationship between 
the level of CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a CEO conducting M&A deals. I 
find the odds ratio of variable HN (Holder67) is 1.38 (significant at the 5% level), 
which indicates that the odds of a high narcissism CEO conducting a deal are 38% 
higher than the odds of a low narcissism CEO doing so. The odds ratio of variable 
HN is 1.27 and significant at 10% level, when media portrayal is used as the measure 
of CEO narcissism. These findings are consistent withMalmendier and Tate (2008), 
and support the propositions in Roll (1986) and Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2003). I 
interpret this result from the following four aspects: (1) high narcissism CEOs 
usually have excess confidence in their abilities due to their inflated self image, and 
they mistakenly believe that better performance will be achieved under their 
leadership; (2) a high level of CEO narcissistic tendency often makes a CEO willing 
to pay more than the optimal price, which consequently i creases the chance to win 
the auction. Therefore, we observe more successful bids by high narcissism CEOs; (3) 
using M&A as their stage, CEOs act out a drama in order to feed their needs for 
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attention and admiration (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007); and (4) this result is a 
good reflection of some key characteristics of a narcissistic personality, such as 
“glory-building”, “excitement-seeking” and “rapid change of course” (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, 2007; Lubit 2002).   
 
In the logistic regression, I also find that some control factors are significantly 
associated with firm acquisitiveness. My result suggests that the CEOs of large firms 
are about a quarter more likely to conduct mergers or acquisitions than small firms. 
One interpretation is that large firms often face fewer financial constrains than small 
firms when making decisions. In addition, it is found that the firms with a higher 
level of cash flow are more likely to conduct M&A deals, which is consistent with 
the traditional free cash flow hypothesis that firms with large excessive cash flow 
tend to invest in more projects. My results also suggest that firms with a high Tobin’s 
Q are more likely to conduct M&A deals, which provide supporting evidence for the 
Q theory of mergers developed by Servaes (1991) and are consistent with the 
proposition of Jovanovic and Roussear (2002), that a firm’s M&A activity may partly 
be a response to profitable reallocation opportunities.  
 
Following the logistic regression analysis, I conduct multivariate OLS regression 
analyses to further examine the short run (announcement) market reaction to the 
deals conducted by high narcissism CEOs. My regression results show a 
significantly negative association between CEO narcissism and firm 
announcement cumulative abnormal returns. The coeffiient of variable HN (high 
narcissism) is -1.5% (based on holder 67 measure), -0.9% (based on media 
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portrayal measure) and -1.3% (based on content analysis of CEO speech measure) 
respectively. This negative relationship holds across all three models (based on 
three alternative CEO narcissism measures). Furthermor , I calculate the average 
announcement cumulative abnormal returns for the deals conducted by high 
narcissism CEOs and low narcissism CEOs respectively, and find the average 
three-day CAR for the deals by HN CEOs is 0.12%, 24 basis points below the full 
sample average (0.36%) and 61 basis points below the average CAR to the deals 
by LN CEOs (0.73%). These results thus suggest a significant negative impact of 
CEO narcissism on acquiring firm short run (announcement) performance, which 
is consistent with the findings of Malmendier and Tate (2008). Two possible 
explanations are given in my analysis: (1) high narcissism CEOs make a bid in line 
with their inflated self-image and excessive confidence in their own abilities, and 
therefore the market identifies this unrealistic exp ctation and discounts the CEOs’ 
distorted self-views in the stock price; and (2) the market reacts to the potential 
overpayment problem associated with bids by high narcissism CEOs.         
 
In this regression analysis, some other control factors are also reported to be 
significantly associated with M&A short run performance. First, I find cash financing 
deals perform better than non-cash financing deals in the short run, which is 
consistent with the results in Travlos (1987) and Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1987). 
This finding provides the supporting evidence to the signalling hypothesis that the 
market views firm’s decision to use stock financing as a negative signal about its 
future prospects. In other words, if the firm’s stock is overvalued, the firm would 
prefer to use overvalued stock as “cheap currency” to finance the M&A deal, and 
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therefore the market will know that the firm’s stock is overvalued through the firm’s 
stock financing decision. Second, I find that smaller acquirers perform better than 
large acquirers in the short run, which is consistent with the finding in Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). A potential interprtation of this size effect is that 
the CEOs of large firms have a greater propensity to destructive narcissism than 
those of small firms, as they usually receive higher rewards and more attention, 
which increases and reinforces their tendency towards narcissistic beliefs and 
behaviour, and consequently towards making more value-destroying deals. Finally, I 
find that the market reaction to the deals conducted by firms with good corporate 
governance is better than that towards those conducte  by firms with poor corporate 
governance, which supports the generally accepted argument that good corporate 
governance can mitigate the agency problem somewhat and therefore enhance firm 
value.  
 
In my long run post-acquisition performance regression analysis, I report a 
significantly negative relationship between acquiring firm CEO narcissism and the 
firm’s 2 year post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal return. The coefficient of 
variable HN (high narcissism) is -1.9% (based on the Holder67 measure), -1.7% 
(based on the media portrayal measure) and -2.4% (based on the content analysis of 
CEO speech measure) respectively. To further investigate the impact of CEO 
narcissism tendency on firm long run post-acquisition performance, I calculate and 
compare the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the deals conducted by high 
narcissism CEOs and those by low narcissism CEOs respectively. The results show 
that the average BHAR for the deals conducted by high narcissism CEOs is -4.74%, 
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231 basis points below the average BHAR for the deals by LN CEOs (-2.43%) and 
110 basis points below the full sample average (-3.64%). These results thus suggest 
that, on average, CEO narcissism has a significantly negative impact on firm long 
run post-acquisition performance, and provide new empirical evidence to support the 
propositions of Aktas et al (2005) and Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007). Such 
problems associated with the CEO’s narcissistic personality as overconfidence in 
their management ability and poor implementation skills are plausible interpretations 
of the long run underperformance of the deals conducted by high narcissism CEOs.    
 
In my long run regression analysis, my results alsosuggest that some control factors 
have a significant impact on firm long run post-acquisition performance. First, a 
significantly positive association between CEO vested option holding and firm long 
run post-acquisition performance is detected, which could be a reflection of the 
positive role of CEO stock option incentive package in aligning the CEO’s interests 
with those of the shareholders thereby improving firm long run performance. Second, 
similar to the finding about short run performance, I also find that a cash payment 
deal performs better in the long run. As mentioned b fore, a firm would prefer to 
finance an M&A deal by cash if its stock is undervalued and by stock (non-cash) if 
its stock is overvalued. After a period of time, weould expect that undervalued 
stock (in cash payment deals) will move up to a “normal” value and overvalued stock 
(in stock payment deals) will move down to its “normal” value, if the market is 
efficient. Therefore, we observe that cash payment dals perform better than stock 
payment deals in the long run. Finally, I find that the quality of corporate governance 
has a significantly positive impact on firm long run post-acquisition performance, 
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which again confirms the generally accepted view that good corporate governance 
mechanisms can effectively monitor managers’ behaviour, thereby enhancing firm 
value.  
 
Besides the CEO narcissism of acquiring firms, in ths study, I also argue that CEO 
narcissistic tendency can equally exist among targe firm CEOs and may have an 
impact on M&A performance. To empirically test such an effect, I conduct 
multivariate regression analysis including the target firm CEO narcissism 
(variable THN ) in the model. In the short run regression analysis, a negative 
relationship between target firm CEO narcissism and acquiring firm M&A 
announcement period CAR is reported across all three models (based on the 
Holder67 measure, media portrayal measure, and content analysis of CEO speech 
measure). Such a relationship is significant when usi g media portrayal and content 
analysis on CEO speech as the CEO narcissism measures, though it is not significant 
when using the Holder67 measure. The finding thus suggests a negative impact of 
target firm CEO narcissistic tendency on the market r action to the deal 
announcement. One plausible interpretation for this negative association is the 
“overpayment” problem resulting from the highly narcissistic personality of a target 
firm CEO. That is, high narcissism target firm CEOs tend to require a very high 
premium, as they believe that they can perform at le st as well as the bidding firm 
management due to their inflated view of their self-worth and abilities, which will 
lead successful acquirers to have to pay more than t e optimal price. The market 
appears to be able to identify and to respond to such potential overpayment problems 
associated with a high level of target firm CEO narcissistic tendency. This finding 
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supports my argument that target firm CEO narcissism can also help explain the 
M&A short run performance and provides original evidence for the prediction made 
by Malmendier and Tate (2003).  
 
In addition to the tests of my hypotheses relating o my main research questions in 
Chapter 6, in Chapter 7 I also test a set of additional hypotheses relating to the 
impact of CEO narcissism on M&A activities in firms of different sizes, the 
relationship between the quality of corporate governance and CEO narcissism, and 
the impact of the concurrent coexistence of acquiring firm and target firm CEO 
narcissism.  
 
In my first additional analysis (the test of a set of additional hypotheses relating to 
the impact of CEO narcissism on M&A activities in firms of different sizes), I find a 
significant positive coefficient (0.15 based on Holder67 measure and 0.13 based on 
media portrayal measure) on the interaction of HN with Size in my additional logistic 
regression. This result suggests that the positive link between CEO narcissism and 
the likelihood of a CEO conducting a deal is stronger in large firms than that in small 
firms. In my additional M&A short run (announcement) and long run performance 
regressions, I find significantly negative coefficients on the interaction term HN*Size 
across all of the three measures of CEO narcissism. In CAR regression, the 
coefficients are -0.032 based on the Holder67 measur , -0.040 based on the media 
portrayal measure, and -0.036 based on the content analysis of CEO speech measure; 
in BHAR regression, the coefficients are -0.073 based on the Holder67 measure, 
-0.081 based on the media portrayal measure, and -0.068 based on the content 
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analysis of CEO speech measure. These results support my hypothesis that CEO 
narcissism has more negative impact on firm short run and long run M&A 
performance in large firms than in small firms. In sum, my findings might suggest 
that the problems associated with the high level of CEO narcissism in M&A 
activities are severer in large firms than in smaller firms. Higher CEO compensation 
and more public attention might be possible explanatio s for my results. Specifically 
higher compensation and more public attention associated with CEOs of large firms 
may further promote a CEO’s inflated self-image, leading to a higher degree of CEO 
narcissism in large firms compared with that in small firms and consequently causing 
a more negative impact on firm M&A decision-making and performance. Therefore a 
well-designed CEO compensation package and an effective monitoring mechanism 
that can correct a CEO’s distorted self-view may help ameliorate the strong adverse 
impact of CEO narcissism in large firms.   
 
My second additional analysis further explores the rol of corporate governance in 
ameliorating the negative impact of CEO narcissism in M&A. I report evidence that 
a high level of CEO narcissism is associated with poor corporate governance. The 
mean value of CG of the HN group (9.92 based on the Holder67 measure, 9.76 based 
on the media portrayal measure, and 9.86 based on the content analysis of CEO 
speech measure) are significantly higher than that of the LN group (9.50 based on the 
Holder67 measure, 9.38 based on the media portrayal me sure, and 9.47 based on the 
content analysis of CEO speech measure) across all three CEO narcissism measures, 
which suggests that corporate governance of the firms with high narcissism CEOs is 
significantly poorer than that of firms with low narcissism CEOs. In addition, I find 
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that the positive link between the level of CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a 
CEO conducting M&A deals is stronger in firms with poor corporate governance 
than in firms with good corporate governance. In my additional logistic regression 
analysis, significantly positive coefficients (0.13 based on the Holder67 measure and 
0.11 based on the media portrayal measure) on the in eraction of HN with CG are 
reported.  
 
These results might indicate that strong corporate governance mechanisms may help 
to mitigate CEO narcissism and ameliorate the negative impact of CEO narcissism in 
M&A decision-making to some extent. Effective governance mechanisms may be 
able to identify highly narcissistic individuals at early stage and prevent them from 
rising to the position of CEO in the first place and be able to remove 
value-destroying high narcissism CEOs before they do more harm. In addition, 
strong board monitoring may help to curb the absolute power of high narcissism 
CEOs in M&A decision-making.    .   
 
My final additional analysis is to examine the impact of the concurrent coexistence 
of acquiring firm and target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm M&A 
performance. The result of my additional short run M&A performance regression 
shows that the impact of CEO narcissism on firm short run M&A performance is 
most negative in the case of both acquiring firm and target firm CEO narcissism 
coexisting concurrently. We might interpret this result as the exacerbated 
overpayment problem resulting from the coexistence of acquiring firm and target 
firm CEO narcissism. It appears that the market can detect this more serious 
overpayment problem and consequently discount it more heavily in share price. 
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In conclusion, this study empirically examines the role of CEO narcissism in M&A 
decision-making and its impact on firm M&A short run and long run performance. 
My main findings are as follows. First, high narcissism CEOs are more likely to 
conduct mergers and acquisitions than low narcissism CEOs. Second, acquiring firm 
CEO narcissism has a significantly negative impact on firm short run announcement 
performance and long run post-acquisition performance. Third, target firm CEO 
narcissism also has a significantly negative impact on the acquiring firm short run 
announcement performance, while it has no significant impact on acquiring firm long 
run post-acquisition performance.  
 
I also find that the positive link between CEO narcissism and the likelihood of a 
CEO conducting an M&A deal is stronger and CEO narcissism has a more negative 
impact on firm M&A performance in large firms than that in smaller firms. The 
result of my additional analysis also shows that the negative impact of CEO 
narcissism on firm short run M&A performance is strongest when both acquiring 
firm and target firm CEO narcissism coexist concurrently. However, I find that level 
of CEO narcissism is negatively associated with the quality of corporate governance 
and the positive link between CEO narcissism and the lik lihood of a CEO 
conducting an M&A deal is weaker in firms with good corporate governance than 
that in firms with poorer corporate governance. These findings may suggest that 
effective corporate governance mechanisms might play ositive roles in curbing 
CEO narcissistic tendencies and in helping to ameliorate, to some extent, the adverse 
impact of high level of CEO narcissism on firm M&A decision-making.  
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8.3 Contributions 
 
The contribution of this study is six-fold: 
 
First, my results provide new empirical evidence on the role of CEO narcissism in 
M&A decision making and its impact on firm M&A performance. Compared with 
Malmendier and Tate (2008), which is based on a sample of 477 large Forbes 
companies and 3,900 firm-year observations for the period 1980-1994, my study 
encompasses all non-financial, non-utility firms covered by ExecuComp that meet 
the necessary data requirements, and covers the period 1993-2005, including the 
recent M&A wave and the Dot-com bubble.  In total, I work with a total of 2,129 
firms across the full size spectrum (S&P500, S&P 400 midcap, and S&P600 
smallcap) and 22,103 firm-year observations. As such, my more comprehensive 
sample structure allows me to investigate my research questions more completely, 
and draw stronger conclusions from my analysis.  
 
Second, prior studies only focus on acquiring firm CEO narcissism in M&A deals, 
failing to take potential target firm CEO narcissism into account. In this study, I 
argue that such CEO narcissistic personality can equally exist among the CEOs of 
target firms. High narcissism target firm CEOs’ inflated self-views (self-worth and 
ability) can make them believe that they can perform at least as well as the potential 
acquirer’s CEOs and therefore require a higher price, which may lead to the 
acquiring firms paying too much to win the bids. This overpayment (overbidding) 
problem may consequently impact on firm M&A performance. In my empirical test, 
the result shows that target firm CEO narcissism does have a significant negative 
 215 
effect on firm M&A short run announcement performance. Furthermore, I find that 
the negative impact of CEO narcissism on firm M&A short run performance is 
strongest when both acquiring firm and target firm CEO narcissism coexist 
concurrently. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to empirically test 
the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on M&A performance.  
 
Third, most previous studies in this area focus on the impact of CEO narcissism on 
firm short run announcement performance. The impact of such narcissistic tendency 
on firm long run post-acquisition performance has received very limited attention. In 
this study, I empirically test the effect of CEO narcissistic tendency on firm M&A 
performance over both the short run and long run horizon.  
 
Fourth, I develop a new measure of CEO narcissism based on the formal content 
analysis of CEO speeches and discourses about the specific M&A deal. This measure 
is appealing for three reasons. First, compared with the Holder67 (option 
exercise-based measure) and media portrayal measures used in the literature to date, 
which are only able to measure CEO narcissism in a general way, this new proxy is a 
measure of CEO narcissism as it relates directly to the particular acquisition.  In 
other words, this new measure can help to overcome the “non-specific” problem. 
Second, this new measure can help to surmount the data availability problem 
associated with the construction of the Holder67 measure as there is no need for 
CEO option holding data. Third, this new measure leverag s the strength of 
psychological and linguistic studies to help research the implications of CEO 
personality characteristics in the finance area. That such rich information about 
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managerial psychological propensities can be provided by a formal content analysis 
of his/her own words suggests that this approach can also have value in researching 
other corporate finance-related decision domains. However, I also acknowledge that, 
like most other measures used to date, this content analysis measure is also noisy as 
the tone of a CEO’s speech can be influenced by many other factors.   
 
Fifth, my results have potential implications for the construction of corporate 
governance mechanisms and investment practice. Realising the existence of CEO 
narcissism in M&A decision-making, firms may need to emphasize particular 
governance mechanisms, for example, real board independence, to mitigate this 
problem and reduce any potential adverse costs. In addition, from an investment 
perspective, if an investor can detect CEO narcissism ( .e., identify high narcissism 
CEOs) and understand the impact of such a narcissistic tendency on firm short run 
and long run performance, inter alia, in the context of M&A bids, then this insight 
could usefully be brought to bear when making investm nt decisions.  
 
Finally, I introduce the well-established psychology-based concept of narcissistic 
personality as relating to firm CEOs engaged in M&A deals into my study.  This 
concept has both motivational and cognitive dimensio s, and its characteristics are 
well described in both the psychological and strategic management literature.  
Narcissism provides a richer and more valid construct to work with than the terms 
hubris and overconfidence used to date in the literature which suffer problems due to 
their inconsistent and lack of precise definitions.  In fact, narcissism provides an 
overarching measure, incorporating what both concepts are seeking to convey, and 
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potentially enabling us to make a further connection between different aspects of 
CEO behaviour in corporate decision-making.  
 
In addition, I summarise the differences between my work and Malmendier and Tate 
(2008), a pioneering work in this area, in the following table.  
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Table 8-1 Differences between Malmendier and Tate (2008) and my study 
(My incremental contribution to knowledge) 
 
 
Malmendier and Tata (2008) 
 
 
My study 
 
Sample size 
A sample of 477 large Forbes firms and 
3,900 firm-year observations 
 
Larger sample across the full size spectrum (S&P 500 largecap, S&P 
400, madcap, and S&P600 small cap): 2,129 firms 
22,103 firm-year observations 
 
Time period 1980-1994 
 
1993-2005 
 
Concept/term used CEO overconfidence 
 
CEO narcissism-a richer concept to work with than CEO overconfidence 
 
 
Acquiring firm / target 
firm 
 
Only focus on acquiring firm CEO 
narcissism.  
 
Both acquiring firm and target firm CEO narcissism are empirically 
tested.  
 
Short run / long run 
performance 
Only focus on short run M&A 
announcement period performance 
 
The impact of CEO narcissism on both short run M&A announcement 
period and long run post-M&A performance are examined.  
 
Measures 
 
Two measures used: Holder67, media 
portrayal  
 
 
Three measures used: Holder67, media portrayal, and a third new 
measure based on the formal content analysis of CEOspeeches and 
discourses.  
 
Media sources 
 
Media portrayal measure is based on the 
keywords searching in five leading business 
publications: The wall Street Journal, The 
New York Times, BusinessWeek, Financial 
Times and The Economist. 
 
 
Media portrayal measure is based on the keywords searching in a much 
wider range of media sources (37 business publications).   
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8.4 Limitations  
 
Due to data availability and some practical reasons, thi  study may suffer from the 
following limitations:  
 
First of all, the proxies for CEO narcissism are notperfect and the imperfection of the 
measures may introduce bias into the study. After all, measuring such a psychological 
propensity as narcissism is always a challenging task for researchers. New cleaner 
measures need to be developed and the measures used in this study need to be further 
improved.    
    
Second, this study focuses on “destructive” CEO narcissism (i.e., the dark side of the 
narcissistic personality). However, some academics (e.g. Maccoby, 2007) argue that 
CEO narcissism may play a positive role in some circumstances (i.e., the positive side 
of the narcissistic personality). Therefore, “constructive” CEO narcissism needs to be 
further studied and discussed in the future.      
 
Finally, my current M&A deal sample only consists of c mpleted (successful) deals. A 
further study using a sample including both successful and unsuccessful M&A bids will 
help us to understand the role and impact of CEO narcissism in a broader context.  
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8.5 Future research 
 
My current study empirically tests the role and impact of such a personality tendency 
as CEO narcissism in the context of M&A decision-making, based on three proxies 
for CEO narcissism. However, as mentioned in the last section, the current study has 
its limitations in several aspects, which needs to be further addressed. In addition, 
there are still some interesting unanswered questions, suggesting opportunities for 
future research. More specifically, the current study can be further extended from the 
following four aspects: 
 
First, the keywords used to construct the media portrayal measure are basically the 
words that capture only one key characteristic of CEO narcissism-overconfidence, and 
they are unable to capture some other characteristics of a narcissistic personality. 
Therefore, I should develop a more comprehensive set of key words to construct my 
media portrayal measure, in order to capture different aspects of the narcissistic 
tendency.  
 
Second, the role of corporate governance mechanisms n addressing the problems 
associated with the high CEO narcissistic tendency needs to be further explored.  
Analyses in this study are solely based on the use of corporate governance index as the 
proxy for the quality of corporate governance. Furthe  decomposition of this 
comprehensive index into sub-components may help us to nderstand the role of some 
specific governance mechanisms (e.g. board structure, compensation, ownership 
structure, etc.) in curbing CEO narcissistic tendency and therefore provide more insights 
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into the construction of effective corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
Third, the purpose of this study is to examine the rol and impact of CEO narcissism 
in M&A decision-making. A potential direction to ext nd my current work is to 
investigate the CEO narcissistic tendency in a broader context, for example, in the 
decision-making of general corporate investment policies, such as the IPO (initial 
public offering), dividend payment and project investment, not specifically in the 
context of M&A decision-making.  
 
Finally, in my current study, I make inferences about CEO narcissistic tendency based 
upon publicly available data (i.e., option holding data, media coverage, or CEO’s public 
speeches). However, the data collected through other methodologies, such as personality 
questionnaires and surveys, may provide much richer sou ces for us to construct direct 
measures of CEO narcissism and to further explore the role of such a narcissistic 
tendency in corporate decision-making and its impact on firm performance.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Formula and word lists used to construct variable OPTIMISM (Source: Diction 5.0 User Manual) 
 
Formula: OPTIMISM= [Praise + Satisfaction + Inspiration] -[Blame + Hardship + Denial] 
 
Word list Description/ number of words/ sample words 
Praise Description:  Affirmations of some person, group, or abstract entity. Included are terms isolating important social qualities, physical  
            qualities, intellectual qualities, entrep eneurial qualities, and moral qualities. All terms in this dictionary are adjectives. 
Number of words: 195 
Sample words: best, better, capable, favorable, good, great, important, positive, profitable, strong, successful 
Satisfaction 
 
Description:  Term s associated with positive affective states, with moments of undiminished joy and pleasurable div rsion, or with  
            moments of triumph. Also included are words of nurturance.  
Number of words: 315 
Sample words: applaud, attracts, celebrate, comfortable, confident, delighted, enjoy, enthusiasm, excited, pleased, atisfied 
Inspiration 
 
Description:  Abstract virtues deserving of universal respect. Most of the terms in this dictionary are nouns isolating desirable moral  
            qualities as well as attractive personal qu lities. Social and political ideals are also included. 
Number of words: 122 
Sample words: commitment, dedication, enrichment, improvement, loyalty, productivity, progress, promise, quality 
Blame 
 
Description:  Terms designating social inappropriateness as well as downright evil compose this dictionary. In addition, adjectives describing  
            unfortunate circumstances or unplanned vicissitudes are included. The dictionary also contains outright denigrations. 
Number of words: 346 
Sample words: adverse, bad, bleak, careless, costly, grim, hard, me iocre, struggling, troubled, unstable, upsetting 
Hardship 
 
Description:  This dictionary contains natural disasters, hostile actions and censurable human behavior. It also includes unsavory political  
            outcomes as well as normal human fears and incapacities. 
Number of words: 470 
Sample words: alarmed, conflict, depressed, disappointing, discouraged, fail, fear, hardship, problem, regret, setback, unfortunately, weakness 
Denial 
 
Description:  A dictionary consisting of standard negative contractions, negative functions words, and term s designat ng null sets. 
Number of words: 39 
Sample words: aren’t, cannot, didn’t, shouldn’t, don’t, nor, not, nothing 
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Appendix 2: An example of the output of Diction 5.0 
 
                         Arbortext.txt 
 
Total Words Analyzed:         128 
Total Characters Analyzed:      882 
Average Word Size:           5.67 
Number of Different Words:     92 
Alpha-numeric Identifier:   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Active Custom Dictionaries: 
Character Counts:        (none) 
View Character Counts:    No 
View Word Counts:        No 
Small File Option:        Report extrapolations 
Large File Option:        Averaged (Analyze maximum 500,000 words) 
Numeric File Name:       C:\Program Files\Diction\Data\Research.num 
Use Comma Separator:    Yes 
Print Input Text:          No 
View Input Text:         Yes 
 
Normative Values 
  Class:  Business 
  Type:  Corporate Public Relations 
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Standard Dictionary Totals 
 
Variable           Frequency  % of Words   Normal Rnge    Standard   Out of 
                             Analyzed    Low     High    Score     Range 
 
Numerical Terms      0.00         0.00       3.14     16.12     -1.48    * 
Ambivalence        3.91         0.78       2.89     17.50     -0.86 
Self-reference        0.00          0.00       0.00      7.97     -0.62 
Tenacity           27.34        5.47      18.94      36.19    -0.03 
Leveling Terms     19.53         3.91       4.79     13.36     2.44     * 
Collectives         0.00          0.00       4.32      13.69     -1.92     * 
Praise              7.81          1.56       3.12      10.48     0.28 
Satisfaction         0.00          0.00       0.23       5.93     -1.08      * 
Inspiration         0.00           0.00       1.46      15.84     -1.20      * 
Blame             0.00           0.00        0.00      2.86      -0.82 
Hardship           7.81          1.56       0.83       7.79      1.01     * 
Aggression         3.91          0.78       1.54       8.16     -0.29 
Accomplishment    26.98         5.40      14.27       37.71     0.08 
Communication     27.34          5.47      0.72        9.92      4.79     * 
Cognition          19.53          3.91      5.09      15.93      1.66     * 
Passivity           3.91          0.78      2.40        8.45      -0.50 
Spatial Terms       5.86           1.17      3.09       15.12      -0.54 
 
Familiarity         136.72        27.34     107.28    144.30      0.59 
Temporal Terms     23.44         4.69       5.12      17.76      1.90     * 
Present Concern     11.13         2.23       8.10    17.63     -0.36 
Human Interest      7.81          1.56      14.27      44.85     -1.42     * 
Concreteness       15.63          3.13      10.02      27.58     -0.36 
Past Concern        7.79          1.56       0.25       5.40      1.94     * 
Centrality           7.83          1.56       2.72      10.45      0.32 
Rapport             0.00          0.00      0.89       4.50      -1.49    * 
Cooperation         0.00          0.00      0.28      11.55      -1.05    * 
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Diversity           7.81        1.56       0.32    4.70        2.42    * 
Exclusion          0.00        0.00       0.00      3.47      -0.94 
Liberation          0.00        0.00       0.00      4.01       -0.95 
Denial             7.81        1.56       0.61      7.95        0.96 
Motion             0.00        0.00       0.00     3.78       -0.94 
 
Words for Insistence Score 
Word                             Occurrences 
 INFORMATION                     3 
 MANUAL                           2 
 NEEDS                             2 
 PROCESS                           3 
 PUBLISHING                        2 
 TOOLS                             2 
Calculated Variables 
 
Variable          Frequency    Normal Range     Standard     Out of 
                             Low     High      Score      Range 
 Insistence         32.81       9.40     99.67      -0.48 
 Embellishment      0.44       0.27     0.94       -0.48 
 Variety            0.72        0.45     0.53        5.42        * 
 Complexity        5.67        4.62     5.40        1.69        * 
 
Master Variables 
 
Variable          Score        Normal Range       Out of 
                             Low     High       Range 
 Activity            52.96      48.16     52.43         * 
 Optimism         46.84      48.21     55.58         * 
 Certainty          47.56      48.44     52.71          * 
 Realism           46.17      44.40    50.67 
 Commonality       47.24      48.40    54.08         * 
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Appendix 3: Robustness check – different thresholds in the option exercise behaviour-based measure of CEO narcissism (3 tables) 
 
Table 1 Logistic regression: CEO narcissism and M&A decision making 
        
Y=
876543210 ββββββββα ++++++++ QCFVOSOSizeCGHN ε+−1yearreturn   
This table presents the regression results when different thresholds (50%, 67%, 80% in-the-money) are applied in the option exercise behaviour-based measur  of CEO narcissism 
are applied. The dependent variable Y is a binary variable which equals 1 if the firm announced at least one deal (successful bid and completed deal) in a specific firm year during the 
period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2005, otherwise 0. HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. HN is derived from 
Holder X. CG is the GIM’s G index, the proxy for corp rate governance quality. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal 
announcement year. SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal ye r before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of 
exercisable options, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. CF is the normalized ratio of firm cash flow, given by earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, divided 
by the beginning of the year capital. (Here, capital is measured as property, plant and equipment.)  Q represents Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of assets/book value of assets, 
where the book value of assets = total assets, and the market value of assets = total assets + market equi y - book equity. Market equity = common share outstanding x fiscal year 
closing price, and book equity = total assets-total liabilities-preferred stock + deferred taxes. I report the regression results based on using Holder67 and media portrayal as the 
measures of CEO narcissism respectively. returnyear-1 represents the 1-year lagged stock return.  This table also shows the coefficients in the form of odds ratios.   
 
Threshold applied in the option exercise behaviour-based measure of CEO narcissism (Holder X) 
50% 67% 80% 
 
Variables 
Coefficient Odds ratio z-Statistics Coefficient Odds ratio z-Statistics Coefficient Odds ratio z-Statistics 
          
HN 0.31 1.36    2.46** 0.32 
 
1.38 2.51** 0.32 1.38    2.53** 
CG 0.02 1.02    0.68 0.01 
 
1.01     0.64 0.01 1.01    0.66 
Size 0.23 1.26    2.69*** 0.23 
 
1.26    2.76*** 0.22 1.25    2.74*** 
SO -0.85 0.43    -0.72     -0.89 
 
0.41    -0.76 -0.90 0.41    -0.78 
VO -0.50 0.61   -0.58     -0.53 
 
0.59    -0.61 -0.52 0.59    -0.60 
CF 0.21 1.23   1.78* 0.22 
 
1.25 
 
   1.80* 0.23 1.26    1.84* 
Q 0.18 1.20    2.05** 0.17 
 
1.19    2.08** 0.17 1.19    2.06** 
returnyear-1    0.09 1.09    1.71* 0.10 
 
1.11    1.73* 0.09 1.09    1.70* 
          
LR statistic 62.89      64.12***    65.03   
Observations 22,103   22,103    22,103   
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2 Multiple regression: the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on firm M&A short run (announ cement) performance 
     
εγγγγγγγγγγα +++++++++++= SizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNCAR 109876543210  
εγγγγγγγγγγα +++++++++++= SizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNBHAR 109876543210  
 
This table presents the regression results when different thresholds (50%, 67%, 80% in-the-money) are applied in the option exercise behaviour-based measur  of 
CEO narcissism. The dependent variable is the 3-day (-1, 1) event window CAR or the 2-year (1, 24 month) BHAR for the acquiring firm. HN is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. HN is derived from Holder X. CG is GIM’s G index, a proxy for corporate governance quality.  
SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of 
exercisable options as a fraction of common the share  outstanding.  Attitude is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, 
and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the method of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a 
binary variable where 1 signifies that the first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and those of the target are the same. Rsize is the relative size of the target 
firm. Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, which is used to proxy for firm growth options. Size is the natur l logarithm of acquirer total assets.  
 
Threshold applied in the option exercise behaviour-based measure of CEO narcissism (Holder X) 
CAR BHAR Variable 
50% 67% 80% 50% 67% 80% 
       
HN     
CG 
SO 
VO 
Attitude 
Payment 
relatedness 
RSize 
Growth 
Size 
 
 -0.014** 
 -0.038** 
      0.079 
      0.113 
     -0.001 
  0.013*** 
      0.005 
      0.143 
      0.122 
      -0.189** 
 -0.015** 
 -0.037** 
0.078 
0.112 
      -0.002 
      0.013*** 
0.007 
0.145 
0.121 
      -0.190 
  -0.015** 
  -0.037** 
-0.077 
        0.111 
-0.002 
   0.014*** 
0.008 
0.145 
0.120 
 -0.190** 
 -0.020** 
 -0.022** 
0.068 
   0.172*** 
0.000 
 0.016* 
0.047 
0.064 
-0.029 
-0.090 
 -0.019** 
 -0.023** 
0.068 
   0.174*** 
0.000 
 0.015* 
0.049 
0.065 
-0.031 
-0.091 
 -0.019** 
 -0.022** 
       -0.067 
  -0.175*** 
        0.000 
 0.015* 
0.048 
0.065 
       -0.030 
-0.091 
Adjusted 2R         0.06        0.06       0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
F- test   9.63***   9.67***   9.70***   8.89***    8.96***    9.02*** 
Observations 
       1,888       1,888       1,888       1,888  1,888  1,888 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3 Multiple regression: the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm short run (announcement) performance 
 
εγγγγγγγγγγγα ++++++++++++= SizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNHNCAR TA 11109876543210  
εγγγγγγγγγγγα ++++++++++++= SizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNHNBHAR TA 11109876543210  
 
This table presents the regression results when different thresholds (50%, 67%, 80% in-the-money) are applied in the option exercise behaviour-based 
measure of CEO narcissism. The dependent variable is the 3-day (-1, 1) event window CAR or the 2-year (1, 24 month) BHAR for the acquiring firm. 
HNA measures the acquiring firm CEO narcissism, and HNT the equivalent for the target firm. HNA and HNT are dummy variables, derived from Holder X, 
equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. CG is the GIM’s G index, a proxy for c rporate governance quality.  SO is the fraction 
of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options 
as a fraction of common shares outstanding.  Attitude is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies 
“friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the method of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary 
variable, where 1 signifies that the first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and target are the same. Rsize is the relative size of the target firm. 
Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, which proxies forirm growth options. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets.  
 
Threshold applied in the option exercise behaviour-based measure of CEO narcissism (Holder X) 
CAR BHAR Variable 
50% 67% 80% 50% 67% 80% 
       
HNA 
HNT 
CG 
SO 
VO 
Attitude 
Payment 
relatedness 
RSize 
Growth 
Size 
 
 -0.008* 
-0.007 
-0.029 
      0.027 
      0.053 
     -0.001 
  0.018** 
      0.010 
      0.154 
      0.190 
     -0.129* 
  -0.007* 
 -0.008 
       -0.028 
 0.025 
 0.055 
-0.000 
   0.017** 
0.010 
0.155 
0.188 
      -0.130* 
 -0.007* 
-0.007 
-0.028 
0.026 
0.054 
      -0.000 
       0.017** 
0.009 
0.155 
0.187 
-0.130* 
 -0.026* 
-0.002 
 -0.029* 
0.082 
 0.143* 
0.001 
0.018 
0.033 
0.018 
0.001 
     -0.036 
 -0.028* 
-0.001 
 -0.029* 
0.086 
 0.146* 
0.000 
0.020 
0.031 
0.022 
      0.001 
     -0.037 
-0.027* 
       -0.001 
       -0.030* 
0.085 
 0.147* 
0.000 
0.021 
0.030 
0.021 
0.002 
       -0.037 
Adjusted 2R  0.07        0.07       0.07      0.06      0.06       0.06 
F- test 9.26    9.17***       9.20      9.10   8.99***   9.02*** 
Observations 342       342       342 
 
      342       342        342 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 4: Robustness check – high-tech dummy (5 tables) 
 
Table 1 Logit regression: CEO narcissism and M&A decision making 
       
Y=
876543210 ββββββββα ++++++++ QCFVOSOSizeCGHN εβ ++− dumytechHighreturn year __91  
The dependent variable Y is a binary variable which equals 1 if the firm announced at least one deal (successful bid and completed deal) in a specific firm year 
during the period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2005, otherwise 0. HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 
otherwise. (HN is derived from Holder67 in model 1 and the media portrayal narcissism proxy measures in model 2). CG is the GIM’s G index, the proxy for 
corporate governance quality. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets at the end of the last fiscal year. SO is the fraction of company stock owned by 
the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options, as a fraction of common shares 
outstanding. CF is the normalized ratio of firm cash flow, given by earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, divided by the beginning of the year 
capital. (Here, capital is measured as property, plant and equipment.)  Q represents Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of assets/book value of assets, where the 
book value of assets = total assets, and the market value of assets = total assets + market equity - book equity. Market equity = common share outstanding x fiscal 
year closing price, and book equity = total assets-total liabilities-preferred stock + deferred taxes. We report the regression results based on using Holder67 and 
media portrayal as the measures of CEO narcissism re pectively. returnyear-1 represents the 1-year lagged stock return.  High-tec  dummy equals to 1 if the 
acquiring firm is classified as high-tech firms by Thomson One Banker, otherwise 0. This table also show  the coefficients in the form of odds ratios.   
 
Model 1 
(Based on Holder 67) 
Model 2 
(Based on media portrayal) Variables 
Coefficient Odds ratio z-Statistics Coefficient Odds ratio z-Statistics 
       
HN 0.31 1.36   2.49** 0.25 1.28  1.78* 
CG 0.01 1.01  0.63 0.01 1.01 0.47 
Size 0.24 1.27     2.70*** 0.21 1.23   2.59** 
SO -0.92 0.40  -0.77 -0.94 0.39 -0.65 
VO -0.51 0.60  -0.56 -0.53 0.59 -0.49 
CF 0.21 1.23   1.80* 0.19 1.21   1.77* 
Q 0.17 1.19    2.03** 0.18 1.20    2.07** 
returnyear-1 0.09 1.09   1.72* 0.09 1.09   1.76* 
High-tech dummy 0.03 1.03  0.86 0.02 1.02  0.79 
       
LR statistic  65.33***     60.92***   
Observations 22,103     16,418   
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 2 Multiple regression: the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on firm M&A short run (announ cement) performance 
     
εγγγγγγγγγγγα ++++++++++++= dummytechHighSizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNCAR __11109876543210  
 
The dependent variable is the 3-day (-1, 1) event wi dow CAR for the acquiring firm. HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, 
and equal to 0 otherwise. (HN is derived from Holder67 in model 1, media portrayal in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourse in model 3.) CG 
is GIM’s G index, a proxy for corporate governance quality.  SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year 
before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of common the shares outstanding.  Attitude is a 
binary variable, where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary variable, 
where 1 signifies that the method of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the first two digits of the 
SIC code of the acquirer and those of the target are he same. Rsize is the relative size of the target fi m. Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, which is used 
to proxy for firm growth options. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets.  High-tech dummy equals to 1 if the target firm is classified as 
high-tech firms by Thomson One Banker, otherwise 0. 
 
Model 1 
(Based on Holder 67) 
Model 2 
(Based on media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(Based on content analysis of CEO speech) Variable 
Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics 
       
HN           -0.012   -2.21** -0.007      -1.90* -0.011   -2.46** 
CG       -0.033   -2.30** -0.036   -2.37** -0.019  -1.70* 
SO  0.075 1.22     0.090 1.11       0.060 0.98 
VO  0.109 1.02 0.102 1.19 0.117 1.20 
Attitude -0.001      -0.17 -0.002     -0.19 0.000        -0.15 
Payment  0.010    2.76*** 0.009   2.67*** 0.013    2.84*** 
relatedness  0.009 1.00 0.007 0.98 0.005 0.84 
RSize  0.142 0.18 0.145 0.18 0.127 0.16 
Growth  0.119 0.32 0.126 0.28 0.165        0.28 
Size -0.187   -2.43** -0.179  -2.29**      -0.153 -1.83* 
High-tech dummy  0.011 1.51 0.014       1.72* 0.012  1.69* 
       
Adjusted R2 0.05       0.06        0.06  
F- test   10.01***   10.47***   13.98***  
Observations      1,888      1,722       1076 
  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3 Multiple regression: the impact of acquiring firm CEO narcissism on firm long run post-acquisition performance 
 
εγγγγγγγγγγγα ++++++++++++= dummytechHighSizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNBHAR __11109876543210
 
The dependent variable is the 2-year (1, 24 month) BHAR for the acquiring firm. HN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and 
equal to 0 otherwise. (HN is derived from Holder67 in model 1, media portrayal in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourses in model 3.) CG is 
GIM’s G index, a proxy for corporate governance quality.  SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before 
the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of the common shares outstanding.  Attitude is a binary variable, 
where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary variable, where 1 signif es that 
the method of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that he first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer 
and those of the target are the same. Rsize is the relative size of the target firm. Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, which is used to proxy for a firm’s growth 
options. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets. High-tech dummy equals to 1 if the target firm is classified as high-tech firms by Thomson 
One Banker, otherwise 0. 
 
Model 1 
(Based on Holder67) 
Model 2 
(Based on media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(Based on content analysis of CEO speech) Variable 
Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics 
       
HN     -0.017   -2.40** -0.018  -1.97*      -0.022  -1.79* 
CG -0.021   -2.49** -0.020   -2.34**      -0.015   -2.16** 
SO  0.072  0.91  0.066  0.70 0.055  0.57 
VO  0.169     2.79***  0.171     2.84*** 0.148    2.51** 
Attitude  0.001        0.13  0.000  0.12 0.001  0.13 
Payment  0.016   1.78*  0.015    2.42** 0.013   1.97* 
relatedness  0.046        0.85  0.054  0.98 0.059  0.79 
RSize  0.063        0.15  0.060  0.18 0.042  0.14 
Growth -0.028  -0.17 -0.035  -0.40      -0.023 -0.39 
Size -0.090  -0.79 -0.089  -0.92      -0.067 -0.85 
High-tech dummy -0.018  -0.99 -0.022  -1.00      -0.019 -1.01 
       
 Adjusted 2R    0.06     0.05         0.05  
 F- test      9.34***         9.19***     12.25***  
 Observations 
 
  1,888     1,722        1076  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4 Multiple regression: the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm short run (announcement) performance 
 
εγγγγγγγγγγγγα +++++++++++++= dummytechHighSizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNHNCAR TA __1211109876543210  
 
The dependent variable is the 3-day (-1, 1) event wi dow CAR for the acquiring firm. HNA measures the acquiring firm CEO narcissism, and HNT the equivalent 
for the target firm. HNA and HNT are dummy variables equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. HNA is derived from Holder67 in model 
1, media portrayal in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourse in model 3. HNT is derived from Holder67 in model 1, and media portrayal in models 2 and 
3. CG is the GIM’s G index, a proxy for corporate governance quality.  SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal ye r 
before the deal announcement year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of common shares outstanding.  Attitude is a binary variable, 
where 1 signifies that the deal attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary variable, where 1 signif es that the 
method of deal payment is cash, otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that e first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and target 
are the same. Rsize is the relative size of the targe  firm. Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, which proxies for firm growth options. Size is the natural logarithm of 
acquirer total assets.  High-tech dummy equals to 1 if the target firm is classified as high-tech firms by Thomson One Banker, otherwise 0. 
 
Model 1 
(
AHN : Holder 67, 
  
THN : Holder 67) 
Model 2 
(
AHN : media portrayal, 
  
THN : media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(
AHN : content analysis of CEO speech, 
  
THN : media portrayal) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics 
       
HNA      -0.008       -2.09*      -0.014  -2.27**      -0.010    -2.24** 
HNT      -0.008 -1.51     -0.006  -2.29**      -0.004   -1.92* 
CG      -0.027 -1.38     -0.031 -1.77*      -0.017  -1.43 
SO 0.024        1.16 0.069 1.33 0.047        1.18 
VO 0.052        0.87 0.101 0.83 0.104  1.09 
Attitude      -0.001       -0.10      -0.000       -0.13      -0.000       -0.13 
Payment 0.016    2.39** 0.010    2.61*** 0.011    2.45** 
relatedness 0.012  1.41 0.008 1.42 0.007   1.74* 
RSize 0.154  0.15 0.133 0.19 0.105  0.20 
Growth 0.190  0.32 0.124 0.31 0.146  0.33 
Size      -0.129       -1.96*      -0.175  -2.43**      -0.150    -2.26** 
High-tech dummy      0.01  1.47 0.012  1.71*      0.009   1.44 
       Adjusted R2      0.070  0.070       0.060  
F- test       9.29***    12.88***    11.03***  
Observations        342        1316        661  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5 Multiple regression: the impact of target firm CEO narcissism on acquiring firm long run post-acquisition performance. 
 
εγγγγγγγγγγγγα +++++++++++++= dummytechHighSizePaymentAttitudeGrowthsrelatednesRSizeCGVOSOHNHNBHAR TA __1211109876543210  
 
The dependent variable is the 2-year (1, 24 month) BHAR for the acquiring firm. HNA measures acquiring firm CEO narcissism, and HNT the equivalent for the target 
firm. HNA and HNT are dummy variables equal to 1 for highly narcissistic CEOs, and equal to 0 otherwise. HNA is derived from Holder67 in model 1, media portrayal 
in model 2, and content analysis of CEO discourse in model 3. HNT is derived from Holder67 in model 1, and media portrayal in models 2 and 3. CG is the GIM’s G 
index, a proxy for corporate governance quality. SO is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement 
year. VO is the CEO’s holdings of exercisable options as a fraction of common shares outstanding.  Attitude is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the deal 
attitude is classified as “hostile”, and 0 signifies “friendly” or “neutral”.  Payment is a binary vari ble, where 1 signifies that the method of deal payment is cash, 
otherwise 0. relatedness is a binary variable, where 1 signifies that the first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer and target are the same. Rsize is th  relative size 
of the target firm. Growth is the target’s M/B ratio, which proxies for firm growth options. Size is the natural logarithm of acquirer total assets. High-tech dummy 
equals to 1 if the target firm is classified as high-tech firms by Thomson One Banker, otherwise 0.  
 
Model 1 
(
AHN : Holder 67, 
 
THN : Holder 67) 
Model 2 
(
AHN : media portrayal, 
 
THN : media portrayal) 
Model 3 
(
AHN : content analysis of CEO speech, 
     
THN : media portrayal) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics Coefficient t Statistics 
       
HNA    -0.025        -1.77* -0.029   -2.20**      -0.022   -1.80* 
HNT    -0.001        -0.90 -0.003 -0.96       -0.001  -0.88 
CG    -0.027         -1.79* -0.019   -2.50**      -0.024    -2.29** 
SO  0.079         0.68  0.054  0.79 0.069  0.75 
VO  0.153  1.90*  0.161     2.69*** 0.142    2.37** 
Attitude  0.001 0.14  0.000  0.17 0.001  0.16 
Payment  0.024 1.53  0.014    2.24** 0.011   1.84* 
relatedness  0.027 0.58  0.043        0.78 0.054  0.59 
RSize  0.020          0.13  0.059   0.19 0.036  0.16 
Growth -0.013         -0.16 -0.019  -0.20       -0.011 -0.19 
Size -0.036         -0.65 -0.070  -0.80       -0.063 -0.69 
High-tech dummy -0.015        -1.42 -0.019       -1.69*       -0.017 -1.56 
       
Adjusted R2     0.06       0.05        0.06  
F- test    9.14***     14.28***   11.98***  
Observations 
 
    342       1,316        661 
 
 
 * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
